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While the European Union is facing a quickly changing  international reality this 
strongly underlines the need for Europe to  further enhance its adaptation capacity 
to external shocks by keeping  momentum in the Growth and Jobs Strategy and to 
boost competitiveness. This  latter aspect is at the centre of analysis of the yearly 
competitiveness  report of the Commission. Its main focus is on recent changes of the 
EU’s  productivity growth, which is the key driver of competitiveness in the long  run.
 
Besides this, the European Competitiveness Report 2008  analyses different factors that 
may have an impact on competitiveness, such  as the openness in trade and FDI, EU’s 
recent proposal for a sustainable  industrial policy and the Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR). This year’s  report also studies in depth the competitiveness of the most important   
segment of our economy, the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and analyses 
in depth determinants of sectoral  performance of the EU economy.
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1.  Introduction
The EU is facing a changing international reality. Cur-
rently financial markets are in a severe crisis that has 
started to spill over to the real economy. Policy makers 
around the world are working to restore confidence 
in the financial system. In 2008, volatile commodity, 
food and energy prices and the weakening of the dol-
lar against the euro have influenced economic deve-
lopments.  These  developments  underline  the  need 
for Europe to further enhance its adaptation capacity 
to external shocks by developing a knowledge-based 
economy and boosting competitiveness through con-
tinued commitment to the Growth and Jobs Strategy. 
European competitiveness is at the centre of analysis 
of the yearly competitiveness report of the Commis-
sion. Its main focus is on recent changes of the EU’s 
productivity growth, which is the key driver of com-
petitiveness in the long run. Besides this, the European 
Competitiveness Report 20081 analyses different fac-
tors  that  may  have  an  impact  on  competitiveness, 
such as the openness in trade and FDI and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) as well as the EU’s recent 
proposal for a sustainable industrial policy. This year’s 
report also studies in depth the competitiveness of the 
most important segment of our economy, the small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
The 2008 Competitiveness Report shows a con-
tinued improvement of the European economy in 
terms of productivity and standards of living vis-
à-vis  the  United  States,  although  in  2007  Gross 
Domestic  Product  (GDP)  per  capita  levels  were 
still lower than the US by roughly a third. Both 
at macro and sector level, total factor productivity 
(TFP) is an important source of difference between 
the US and the EU. A number of factors, such as 
innovation, better institutional and business envi-
ronment,  improved  managerial  practices,  and 
access to ICT explain the higher contribution of 
total factor productivity in the US compared to the 
1   European  Competitiveness  Report  2008  COM  (2008)  774  final  ; 
SEC(2008)2853
EU countries. Intra-EU productivity differences are 
diminishing, new Member States are catching up 
and some of the richest EU Member States actually 
outperform the US.
2.  Overall competitiveness 
performance
Growth  of  the  European  economy  continued  in 
2007
Economic growth in the EU continued to be strong 
in 2007, though a slowing down became visible 
especially in the fourth quarter (the EU’s real GDP 
grew by 2.6%). This strong economic growth per-
formance was supported by a high employment 
growth  rate  of  about  1.7%.  Labour  producti-
vity growth, which is typically more cyclical than 
employment growth, slightly weakened to 1.3% 
in 2007 (from 1.5% in 2006).
In  terms  of  per  capita  income  levels  (i.e.  GDP 
per capita) the EU is still lagging behind the US 
(EU-27=100,  US=154.3).  The  reasons  for  this 
continued  gap  vary  across  EU  Member  States, 
although it is partly due to differences in hours 
worked per person. For some EU Member States 
(Belgium, France and Netherlands) this gap is fully 
explained by a lower number of hours worked, as 
their hourly labour productivity actually outweighs 
US levels. For the new Member States, lower GDP 
per capita levels are mainly due to lower labour 
productivity. 
Intra-EU productivity differences are diminishing
In 2007 (as well as in 2006) productivity growth 
in the EU-27 outperformed that of the US which 
is  a  positive  development.  However,  the  EU-27 
productivity level is much lower than in the US 
as an employed person in the US contributes on 8
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average  42%  more  to  GDP  than  his  or  her  EU 
counterpart;  the  difference  of  productivity  per 
hour worked is lower (28% in 2006; 2007 data 
not yet available for the US). Intra-EU differences 
are still substantial. Starting from very low levels 
of productivity in the immediate post-Communist 
years,  the  new  Member  States  are  catching  up 
since they typically show faster growth in labour 
productivity. Facilitated by EU membership, the 
new Member States benefit from the adoption of 
advanced  technologies  and  improved  organisa-
tion and management.
Table 1: Growth of real labour productivity per person employed & 2007 levels of GDP per person 
employed (ppe), GDP per hour worked (phw), and GDP per capita (pc)
Average annual labour productivity 
growth per person employed GDP ppe 
2007 
(EU-27=100)
GDP phw 
2007 
(EU-25=100) 
(*)
GDP pc 
2007 
(EU-27=100) 1996-
2001
2001-2006 2008
Austria 1,6 1,4 1,4 120,4 107,9 127,7
Belgium 1,3 1,4 1,1 131,2 133,8 118,9
Bulgaria 2,4 3,3 3,3 35,6 34,6 37,9
Cyprus 2,6 0,2 1,1 84,7 73,9 91,6
Czech Republic 2,0 4,1 4,6 73,1 59,7 81,0
Denmark 1,4 1,7 0,0 107,1 112,3 124,0
Estonia 8,5 6,9 6,6 67,5 54,2 71,4
Finland 2,2 2,0 2,1 113,4 107,1 118,3
France 1,2 1,2 0,8 123,6 129,4 110,6
Germany 2,0 1,6 1,0 106,6 119,3 114,0
Greece 3,1 2,5 2,7 105,4 77,9 98,2
Hungary 3,2 4,0 1,5 74,8 60,3 64,1
Ireland 3,2 2,2 1,6 135,4 115,9 145,9
Italy 0,9 0,0 0,5 108,0 94,9 101,3
Latvia 6,0 6,7 6,6 53,6 45,3 57,9
Lithuania 7,2 5,9 6,7 60,2 51,5 59,8
Luxembourg 1,5 1,6 0,2 182,3 180,8 279,2
Malta 2,6 1,1 1,1 90,1 85,0 77,1
Netherlands 1,4 1,6 1,1 113,1 130,4 131,2
Poland 5,5 3,6 1,9 61,4 49,7 54,4
Portugal 1,8 0,6 1,7 68,4 62,2 73,6
Romania 0,9 6,9 4,7 40,5 N/A 40,2
Slovakia 3,8 5,0 8,1 76,6 69,1 68,3
Slovenia 4,0 3,6 3,3 85,7 79,3 90,1
Spain 0,2 0,5 0,8 102,5 99,6 104,1
Sweden 1,8 3,0 0,5 113,0 112,2 123,6
United Kingdom 1,9 1,6 2,3 110,8 107,4 117,8
EU-25 1,7 1,4 1,3 103,9 100,0 103,8
EU-27 1,7 1,4 1,3 100,0 N/A 100
US 1,8 2,1 1,0 142,0 128,4 154,3
Note:  The relative levels of GDP per person employed, per hour worked and per capita have been calculated on the basis of 
purchasing power standards.
  (*) Data for Romania and EU-27 are not available (N/A), and number for the US refers to 2006.
Source: AMECO (Annual macro-economic database of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs), June 2008.9
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Box: Growth and productivity - explanations of concepts
Economic  growth  can  be  decomposed  into  employment  growth  and  growth  in  labour  productivity. 
Employment growth may result from an increase in the population in a country (“demographic compo-
nent”) or from better labour market performance (including participation rates, unemployment rates and 
hours worked; this is the “labour market component”).
Higher per capita income levels do not necessarily correspond to increased welfare levels. To the extent 
that these high income levels are achieved through intensive use of labour (relative to other countries), 
this implies less leisure per worker which should be counted as a welfare loss when leisure time is positively 
valued. Therefore, labour productivity per hour worked is a more direct indicator of efficiency than labour 
productivity per person employed, as hours worked per employee differ across countries.
A complementary productivity indicator is total factor productivity. TFP refers to the factors linking pro-
duction and the combination of productive inputs. In other words, changes in production can be due to 
changes in factor inputs (say, capital or labour) but also due to other changes. This latter component, 
the unexplained residual, reflects a change in TFP. It is the part of the productivity growth generated by 
intangible factors such as technical progress or organisational innovation instead of increased use of inputs, 
such as capital. Among the policies most relevant to TFP growth are those designed to foster technological 
progress, organisational changes, labour mobility, increased investment in R&D, the use of ICT, competi-
tion and product market reforms. These policies are all at the heart of the microeconomic pillar of the 
Lisbon strategy, suggesting that it can contribute significantly to boosting TFP.
Structural  labour  productivity  growth  in  the  EU  is 
lower than in the US
The annual average EU-15 growth rate of real GDP 
was around 0.8% lower than the US over the 1995-
2006 period. A macroeconomic growth accounting 
exercise for this group reveals the strong and weak 
points in that period (see Annex):
•   EU strengths: The EU-15 has made relative improve-
ments compared to the US in the field of labour 
market participation. Moreover, the initial education 
of labour has also improved more in the EU-152.
•   EU weaknesses: The lower growth rate in the EU-15 
was mainly due to less favourable demographic 
developments and lower growth of labour pro-
ductivity, the latter being caused mainly by under-
performing total factor productivity developments 
and, to a lesser extent, less capital deepening.
The slower growth of labour productivity and in par-
ticular of total factor productivity may relate to EU’s 
lower level of innovation performance, which is a key 
long term driver of productivity. Although measures 
of innovation performance show the EU is catching 
up with the US, the rate of this convergence appears 
to have slowed down.
2     The results should be interpreted carefully, as the available data are not 
fully harmonised and the data on employment breakdown by educa-
tional attainment for the US are only available from 2001.
High variation across sectors in their contribution to 
EU labour productivity growth
A large part of the annual labour productivity growth 
rate in the whole economy over the period 1995-2005 
(1.6%)3 is accounted for by a relatively low number of 
sectors. Setting aside non-market sectors, the high-
est six (out of 49) contributors, namely agriculture, 
retail trade, wholesale trade, post and telecommuni-
cation, inland transport, and financial intermediation, 
account for half of labour productivity growth over the 
period. This is the result of above average productiv-
ity growth rates combined with relatively high shares 
in the economy. Interestingly, the EU’s performance 
in these sectors, relative to US, is mixed as in half of 
them  (post  and  communications,  inland  transport 
and financial intermediation) the EU displays higher 
labour productivity growth. At the same time, the US 
largely outperforms the EU in retail trade.
3.  Drivers of competitiveness
3.1.  Trade openness and competitiveness
Openness in terms of trade or foreign direct investment 
(FDI) benefits the economy – there is massive empiri-
cal evidence that open economies are richer and more 
productive than closed ones: macroeconomic studies 
indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the share 
3     The productivity (per hour worked) growth rate for the whole economy 
is calculated as the weighted average of sectoral growth rates, where 
weights are the sectors’ shares in the total number of hours worked. This 
may differ from the growth rate presented by other sources. The source 
of data is the research database EUKLEMS (www.euklems.net).10
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of trade in GDP raises the level of income in the range of 
0.9 to 3 percent. From a sectoral perspective, a positive 
and significant relation is found between trade open-
ness levels (both export openness and import penetra-
tion) and labour productivity growth.
Exporters are more productive than non-exporters
Firms engaging in trade are substantially more produc-
tive than those that do not. Evidence using firm level 
data  shows  that  the  “export  premium”  (i.e.  better 
performance by exporters) based on labour produc-
tivity in EU ranges from 3% to 10%. Two hypotheses 
are being used as explanation for the export produc-
tivity premium: self-selection hypothesis according to 
which the most productive firms self-select into export 
markets; and the more intuitive learning-by-exporting 
hypothesis according to which firms increase produc-
tivity through exporting. These two hypotheses are 
not mutually exclusive and most productive firms may 
self-select into exporting, but once firms have entered 
export markets productivity growth may receive a fur-
ther boost. Empirical evidence supporting firm-level 
productivity gains via learning-by-exporting is, how-
ever,  more  mixed  than  the  evidence  showing  that 
only the more productive firms self-select into export-
ing. Even if exporting has a mixed effect on firm-level 
productivity, it has a clear undisputed positive impact 
in aggregate productivity. Similar results can be found 
for importers that are also more productive than non-
importers,  and  for  firms  engaged  in  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI) that are more productive than both 
exporters and importers. Given the productivity gains 
associated  with  exports,  imports  and  FDI  activities, 
policies aimed at opening markets abroad, as well as 
open domestic markets are well placed.
The crucial role of the internal market
For  EU  countries  the  internal  market  has  been  of 
paramount importance when reaping the productiv-
ity gains from openness. Focusing on intra-EU trade, 
recent research confirms the important role of the 
internal  market  for  productivity  growth:  it  is  esti-
mated that average productivity would be reduced 
by 13% if bilateral trade within the EU was elimi-
nated. Furthermore, it is also estimated that produc-
tivity can increase by 2% if trade costs within the 
EU are further reduced by 5%. These findings stress 
the  importance  of  the  Single  Market,  a  common 
currency and eliminating border controls for doing 
business within the EU and underline the economic 
potential of further improvements of the functioning 
of the internal market.
A well developed internal market also plays an impor-
tant role as it enables Europe to take the lead in set-
ting benchmarks and bringing about convergence of 
rules worldwide. Finally, since decreasing trade costs 
in the past have been driven by lower transportation 
costs and tariffs, the emphasis on “softer” trade costs 
often linked to non-tariff barriers could benefit SMEs 
that particularly suffer from these kinds of barriers.
The importance of non-tariff-barriers
Trade costs (divided into transport costs, border costs 
including tariffs, currency and information costs, and 
retail and wholesale distribution costs) for developed 
countries might add up to a 170% ad-valorem tax 
equivalent.  However,  EU  firms  perceive  that  non-
tariff barriers and lack of information (e.g. lack of 
knowledge on export markets) are more important 
than the traditional policy-based trade constraints of 
import tariffs and duties4. In addition EU firms also 
perceive internal market policies as very helpful for 
doing business abroad because of a common cur-
rency, common customs procedures at the EU exter-
nal borders and Single Market legislation including 
harmonised technical standards5.
The  EU’s  external  competitiveness  policies  should 
therefore  help  to  reduce  behind-the-border  costs. 
Information costs and non-tariff barriers in third coun-
tries are major trade impediments. Policies directed to 
deepen integration with third countries, ideally by 
implementing policies aiming at removing behind-
the-border barriers for goods and services trade 
and foreign direct investment and by enhancing 
international regulatory cooperation are in order 
here. These policies can deal with reducing regula-
tions heterogeneity, non-tariff barriers and standardis-
ing customs procedures. The Transatlantic Economic 
Council and regional and bilateral “deep free trade 
agreements” with some Asian countries pursue this 
approach. Particularly with some Asian countries with 
weak  IPR  protection  systems,  the  EU  should  work 
towards an effective protection of innovations.
3.2.  Economic performance and 
competitiveness: the role of SMEs’ growth
Entrepreneurship  and  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) are increasingly recognised as the 
main drivers of the EU’s economic performance since 
they  are  engines  of  structural  change,  innovation 
and employment growth. Encouraging the growth 
potential of SMEs is one of the primary objectives of 
the Small Business Act (SBA) which is a key element 
in the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy6.
4     Although these results hold generally for all broad sectors of activity 
considered in the analysis, for particular sectors and countries import 
tariffs are still major trade barriers for European firms exporting abroad. 
5     Based on estimations using “Observatory of European SMEs” survey, 
Flash Eurobarometer Series no. 196.
6     Commission Communication “Think Small First - A Small Business Act 
for Europe” – COM(2008)394.11
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The effect of business structure and dynamics on pro-
ductivity and differences between the EU and the US
Using sector and country data it can be shown that 
while a strong SME presence in itself is not a guaran-
tor of a strong labour productivity or value added 
growth, the entrepreneurial climate triggered by a 
strong SME presence can contribute to generate the 
business  dynamics  and  the  development  of  high-
growth firms in a sector/country which are positively 
associated  with  labour  productivity,  employment 
and value added growth.
At a more aggregate level there is evidence that both 
entry and exit contribute to overall productivity 
growth.  Comparison  of  these  contributions  across 
the Atlantic reveals that the contribution of entry to 
aggregate productivity growth is on average slightly 
higher in Europe but the contribution of exit is much 
lower than in the US.
A  comparison  between  the  EU  and  the  US  also 
reveals  important  differences  in  business  structure 
and  business  dynamics.  The  main  differences  are 
that (i) in the US successful new firms expand more 
rapidly compared with the EU; (ii) entrants in the US 
enter at a smaller size and display a higher disper-
sion of productivity levels than in Europe; and (iii) 
in the US the more productive firms have a stronger 
tendency to increase their market shares than in the 
EU after some years. As a result American firms are 
on average larger than European firms and firm size 
distribution in the US displays a substantially smaller 
firm and employment share of micro enterprises (1-9 
employees). Entry and exit rates as well as survival 
rates are largely comparable across the EU countries 
and the US though some sources suggest that entry 
rates are more similar than exit rates, which tend to 
be lower in the EU than in the US. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that the market environment 
is more competitive in the US and favours greater 
market experimentation. In addition, the evidence 
indicates that relative to the US, barriers to growth 
pose the biggest problem for a business in the EU.
Rapidly growing firms exist in every economic sector 
and in every country in the EU
Employment in new firms is crucial for total employ-
ment growth and is of at least the same importance 
as  the  net  job  contribution  of  continuing  (high 
growth) firms. Contrary to popular belief, recent evi-
dence shows that rapidly growing firms are found 
in  every  sector  of  economic  activity  and  in  every 
country. This implies that high-growth firms are 
not only, or even primarily, high-tech firms. They 
manifest the firms’ entrepreneurial alertness and 
ability  to  exploit  opportunities  on  the  market. 
Nevertheless, evidence also points to the reala-
tive weakness of the EU in high-tech sectors. In 
the  US  many  more  new  R&D-intensive  firms, 
(often labelled “New technology-based firms” or 
NTBFs) were able to develop, grow rapidly and 
become key economic players. This phenomenon 
allows the US economy to orient itself towards 
new promising sectors with more flexibility than 
the EU.
There is evidence that industrial countries close to 
the  technological  frontier  provide  stronger  incen-
tives  for  entrepreneurial  innovation,  while  firms 
in  other  countries  will  typically  pursue  a  catch-up 
strategy  based  on  investments  for  growth.  Within 
the EU-15, high-growth firms are characterised by 
above-average innovativeness, whereas in the new 
Member States their innovation inputs and outputs 
are closer to average.
4.  Impact of important EU 
policies on competitiveness
4.1.  Sustainable Industrial Policy
To keep Europe competitive in the increasingly chal-
lenging  international  environment  and  to  further 
environmental  goals  by  constraining  the  carbon 
footprint, the EU is promoting change toward a low-
carbon and resource-efficient economy. In order to 
achieve  this  objective,  the  European  Commission 
proposed  a  range  of  Community-wide  measures 
among which: the 3rd Internal Energy Market pack-
age and the Climate action and renewable energy 
package7 in January 2008 which are currently dis-
cussed in Council and Parliament. Its ambition is to 
reach a significant reduction of the EU’s greenhouse 
gas emissions (depending on the international situa-
tion, 20% or 30% as compared to 1990 levels) and 
an increase of the share of renewable energy in the 
EU’s overall energy consumption to 20% by 2020, 
without compromising the EU’s competitiveness.
The shift towards a low-carbon economy represents 
a real potential in growing markets for “environmen-
tally friendly” products. It also creates opportunities 
for the competitiveness of this sector on international 
markets. European industry has already made signifi-
cant advances in improving its energy and resource 
efficiency and is at the leading edge in key indus-
tries8. However, barriers still hold back the market 
penetration of such products and technologies. One 
such barrier results from consumers often not being 
aware of the existence of these products or being 
7     COM(2008)30  final,  COM(2008)13  final,  COM(2008)16  final, 
COM(2008)17 final, COM(2008)18 final and COM(2008)19 final.
8     Wind energy, for which EU companies have 60% of the world market 
share, is a case in point. Solar energy is another example. 12
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discouraged  by  their  higher  initial  prices  despite 
longer-term subsequent savings.
Evidence shows that increased market penetration 
of energy and resource efficient products and tech-
nologies entails very significant potential benefits for 
both the economy and the environment. To unleash 
such potential the Commission has recently adopted 
an Action Plan on Sustainable Consumption and Pro-
duction and Sustainable Industrial Policy that sets out 
a harmonised, integrated and dynamic framework 
aimed at improving the energy and environmental 
performance of products9. The framework proposed 
aims  at  improving  the  overall  environmental  per-
formance  of  products  throughout  their  life-cycle, 
promoting and stimulating the demand for better 
products and technologies and helping consumers 
to make better choices through a more coherent and 
simplified labelling. As such they should contribute 
to the strengthening of the EU competitiveness.
4.2.  Corporate Social Responsibility
When re-launching the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, the 
Commission stated that Corporate Social Responsi-
bility (CSR)10 “can play a key role in contributing to 
sustainable development while enhancing Europe’s 
innovative  potential  and  competitiveness”11.  The 
importance  of  CSR  cannot  be  overestimated,  not 
least since one lesson from the current financial crisis 
is that socially responsible entrepreneurs and CEOs 
are of utmost importance for the wellbeing of our 
societies.
CSR has a positive impact on firms’ competitiveness
An overview of the effects of CSR on six different 
determinants of competiveness at firm level - cost 
structure,  human  resources,  customer  perspective, 
innovation,  risk  and  reputation  management,  and 
financial performance - shows that it can have a posi-
tive impact on competitiveness. The strongest evi-
dence of a positive impact of CSR on competitiveness 
appears to be in the cases of human resources, risk 
and  reputation  management  and  innovation.  The 
reputation of a company in terms of CSR becomes 
increasingly important for the chances to be success-
ful in recruiting staff on highly competitive labour 
markets.
The evidence suggests an important positive relation-
ship between CSR and competitiveness via human 
resource management, although for some companies 
9   COM(2008)397.
10     CSR is a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis.
11     Communication to the Spring European Council “Working together for 
growth and jobs. A new start for the Lisbon Strategy”, COM(2005)24.
the additional costs of CSR might initially outweight 
the benefits. CSR is an essential component of risk 
and reputation management for many companies, 
and becomes increasingly important as enterprises 
are exposed to greater public scrutiny. Dealing with 
CSR issues such as transparency, human rights, and 
supply-chain requirements from a risk management 
perspective  have  led  some  companies  to  discover 
additional positive impacts of CSR.
Certain  aspects  of  CSR,  such  as  the  creation  of 
employee-friendly work-places, can enhance a firm’s 
capacity  for  innovation.  The  positive  relationship 
between CSR and innovation is strengthened by the 
fact  that  innovation  is  increasingly  a  collaborative 
exercise, and by the trend towards the generation 
of new business value from innovations that address 
societal problems.
The  relationship  between  CSR  and  competitiveness 
appears to be getting stronger
Many of the factors affecting the business case of 
CSR  are  themselves  dynamic  and  are  intensifying, 
such  as  employee  expectations,  consumer  aware-
ness, trends in private and public procurement, the 
nature of innovation processes, and the importance 
that financial markets attribute to social and environ-
mental issues. Business interest in CSR is increasingly 
based on opportunities for new value creation and 
not just on value protection through risk and reputa-
tion management.
The strength of the business case of CSR in any given 
enterprise is still dependent on its competitive posi-
tioning.  For  some  companies,  exceeding  social  and 
environmental  legal  requirements  might  generate 
costs that undermine competitiveness. However, for 
an  increasing  number  of  enterprises  in  a  growing 
number of industries, CSR is becoming a competitive 
necessity. Moreover, to be a competitive differentia-
tor, CSR needs to be part of a core business strategy. 
Enterprises in which CSR remains a peripheral concern, 
mainly confined to public relations functions, are likely 
to miss opportunities for competitiveness gains.
5.  Policy implications
This  year’s  Competitiveness  Report  has  important 
policy implications: well designed and implemented 
policies in some specific areas such as trade, inno-
vation and entrepreneurship or energy can contrib-
ute to strengthening the competitiveness of the EU 
economy.
The analysis of this year’s Report has shown that the 
priorities and policy recommendations of the 2008-
2010  cycle  of  the  EU’s  Growth  and  Jobs  Strategy 13
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remain highly relevant. The EU has to further boost 
innovation, the uptake of ICT and the competition in 
retail and product markets. The Small Business Act, if 
implemented at all levels, will improve the business 
environment and promote entrepreneurship. It will 
foster entrepreneurial experimentation and the over-
all business climate in the EU.
Concerning the external dimension of competitive-
ness, trade policies should target the reduction of 
behind-the-border costs, namely international regu-
latory co-operation and policies aimed at reducing 
non-tariff barriers and customs procedures. This can 
contribute to significant productivity gains for the EU 
economy.
Early action in the field of sustainable production can 
lead to first mover advantages and can bring very 
significant potential benefits for both the economy 
and the environment. The recently adopted Action 
Plan  on  Sustainable  Consumption  and  Production 
and Sustainable Industrial Policy is an important step 
towards a competitive low-carbon economy.
Finally,  this  year’s  Competitiveness  Report  has 
pointed to a positive link between competitiveness 
and  Corporate  Social  Responsibility.  The  Commis-
sion will continue to provide political impetus and 
the practical support to all stakeholders engaged in 
CSR.14
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Annex: Growth decomposition in the EU-15 vis-a-vis the US (1995-2006)
-1.2%- 1.0% -0.8%- 0.6% -0.4%- 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8%
Real GDP
Demographic component
Labour market component
Labour productivity
Native population
Net migration
Share of working age population
Youth participation
25-54 male participation
25-54 female participation
55-64 participation
Unemployment rate
Average hours worked
Initial education of labour
Capital deepening
Total factor productivity
Source: Mourre, G. (2008), “What Drives Income Differentials, Underutilisation of Labour and Economic Growth in Europe? A 
Detailed GDP Accounting Exercise”, Manuscript, Free University of Brussels.15
Introduction
This  is  the  eleventh  edition  of  the  Commission’s 
European  Competitiveness  Report  since  the  1994 
Industry Council Resolution that established its basis. 
Competitiveness here is understood to mean a sus-
tained rise in the standards of living of a nation or 
region and as low a level of involuntary unemploy-
ment as possible.
As  in  previous  years,  the  Report  approaches  the 
issues  from  the  standpoint  of  view  of  economic 
theory and empirical research and its ambition is to 
contribute to policy-making by bringing to attention 
relevant trends and developments and by discussing 
analytically the likely outcomes of the various pol-
icy options. Its main subjects continue to be topics 
related to productivity, as the most reliable indica-
tor for competitiveness over the longer term, sec-
toral performance developments, and other micro-
economic issues in the context of the Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs. Based on an overview of recent 
macroeconomic developments presented in Chap-
ter 1 and a more sectoral investigation of sources 
and drivers of economic performance in Chapter 6, 
the effect of openness in trade and FDI and the role 
of SMEs in fostering economic performance will be 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 looks at 
the competitiveness aspects of the EU’s recent pro-
posal on sustainable industrial policy and Chapter 5 
investigates the business case for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) by looking at the evidence on 
the competitiveness effects of CSR.12
While economic growth in the EU was still strong in 
2007 (2.6%), the growth rate decreased compared 
to 2006. This strong economic growth performance 
was  supported  by  a  relatively  high  employment 
growth rate, of about 1.7% in 2007. Labour produc-
tivity growth, typically more cyclical than employ-
12   Clearly, the factors influencing competitiveness go far beyond those 
covered here and each annual European Competitiveness Report has paid 
particular  attention  to  other  selected  drivers  such  as  R&D,  innovation  or 
human capital.
ment growth, weakened to 1.3% in 2007. Chapter 
1 provides a snapshot of these recent developments, 
contrasts them with the situation in the US and dis-
entangles the various components behind the gap 
relative  to  the  US.  In  terms  of  per  capita  income 
levels, the EU is still lagging behind the US. For the 
five richest EU members this gap is fully explained 
by lower labour utilisation while their hourly labour 
productivity  actually  outweighs  US  levels.  For  the 
new Member States lower GDP per capita levels are 
mainly due to lower labour productivity.
Competitiveness is a multifaceted target for which 
no single and fully comprehensive measure or driver 
exists. To provide a comprehensive picture, Chap-
ter 6 assesses the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of European industries with respect to the various 
dimensions of performance — such as labour and 
multifactor productivity, growth of value added, and 
employment — as well as the relative importance 
of several potential competitiveness drivers such as 
macroeconomic  and  demand-led  conditions,  R&D 
expenditure, market structure or openness to trade. 
These findings underline the importance of setting 
the right general framework conditions without los-
ing sight of the way each industry specifically reacts 
to them.
In the context of a changing global environment the 
external dimension of the Lisbon Strategy empha-
sises the need to complement the internal agenda 
with an external agenda to create opportunities at 
home  and  abroad.  Having  the  right  internal  poli-
cies at home and ensuring openness to trade and 
investment as well as greater openness and fair rules 
abroad are critical and linked requirements for Euro-
pean competitiveness.
It is a fact that openness in terms of trade or foreign 
direct investment benefits the economy. But it is less 
clear  which  factors  hamper  openness,  which  poli-
cies promote openness and through which channels 
openness  leads  to  higher  productivity.  Chapter  2 16
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addresses these questions, building on the “hetero-
geneous firms” literature, which focuses on charac-
teristics of individual firms and provides a fresh per-
spective away from the traditional way of thinking 
about trade. The chapter investigates the direction of 
causality in the link between productivity and exports 
at firm level, as well as productivity and imports, and 
discusses the possible channels behind this causality. 
The chapter also analyses empirical linkages between 
trade costs and export activities.
Entrepreneurship  and  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises  (SMEs)  are  increasingly  recognised  as 
important drivers of the economic performance of 
sectors and countries through their role as an engine 
of  structural  change,  innovation  and  employment 
growth. Chapter 3 reviews the evidence on the link 
between SMEs and competitiveness and the perform-
ance of EU SMEs compared to larger firms and to 
their US counterparts. This chapter also surveys evi-
dence on the relative importance of various obstacles 
to the creation and growth of firms and discusses the 
effectiveness of areas for policy intervention depend-
ing on the varying stages in the development of an 
enterprise.  An  overview  is  also  provided  of  bank-
ruptcy  regulation  and  the  conditions  for  a  “fresh 
start” across the EU Member States.
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the competitive-
ness dimension of the EU’s sustainable industrial pol-
icy. It discusses the barriers that prevent the uptake 
of energy-efficient products and technologies in the 
internal market, considers the policy response at the 
European level to tackle them, and presents potential 
benefits of removing these barriers.
By promoting a combination of market dynamism, 
social cohesion and environmental responsibility, the 
Growth and Jobs agenda focuses on social and envi-
ronmental outcomes as well as economic ones. Cor-
porate Social Responsibility (CSR) is part of the Growth 
and Jobs agenda, and can contribute to a number of 
social, environmental and economic policy objectives. 
Chapter 5 reports on existing evidence concerning 
the impact of Corporate Social responsibility on com-
petitiveness. While the origins of the current attention 
to CSR lie mainly in value protection (risk and repu-
tation management), leading businesses have found 
that it can also lead to opportunities for innovation 
and new value creation.17
A. General developments
1.  Key facts about 
competitiveness in the EU13
1.1.  Introduction
After  a  prolonged  period  of  recovery,  economic 
growth in the European Union (EU) slowed down in 
2007. This introductory chapter reviews the main 
economic developments in the EU. The aim is to 
better understand the driving forces of the EU’s eco-
nomic performance, and to illustrate the economic 
environment in which EU businesses operate.
Recent  macroeconomic  performance  is  first  dis-
cussed in brief. To this end it is helpful to decom-
pose  economic  growth  into  labour  productivity 
growth and employment growth. Developments 
in  the  EU  are  compared  to  those  in  the  United 
States (US). A second objective of this chapter is to 
address the underlying structural patterns. Results 
from a growth accounting exercise at macro level 
are discussed, and a comparison of growth drivers 
between the EU and the US is presented. In addi-
tion, the contribution of inputs to value added is 
studied at sectoral level. This provides insights into 
differences in growth drivers across EU industries, 
and between EU and US industries.
When reflecting on EU’s economic situation, it is 
perhaps more than ever necessary to consider the 
main  economic  and  geo-political  developments 
in other parts of the world. Indeed, energy price 
developments,  emerging  markets  such  as  India, 
China and Brazil, the turmoil in stock markets and 
the international repercussions of the troubled US 
sub-prime mortgage markets are all affecting the 
European  economies.  While  these  international 
shocks are influencing the character of economic 
developments in the EU, the birth and expansion 
13   This chapter was finalized in August 2008.
of new markets also creates a myriad of opportuni-
ties. Further progress on the EU’s growth and jobs 
strategy will help to improve competitiveness so 
that EU countries can face the new challenges and 
grasp these new opportunities.
This  introductory  chapter  is  intended  to  set  the 
scene, and to entice the reader to take a closer 
look at the following chapters for a more extensive 
discussion and analysis of the EU’s productivity per-
formance. In section 2 the major macroeconomic 
developments in the EU are described. Section 3 
presents more structural economic patterns at sec-
toral level. Section 4 highlights some of the impor-
tant global trends and events in other parts of the 
world that impinge on European economies. And 
section 5 concludes.
1.2.  Recent macroeconomic 
developments
1.2.1.  Economic growth and standards of living
An important summary indicator of economic per-
formance is the rate of economic growth, conven-
tionally measured by the rate of growth of a coun-
try’s Gross Domestic Product adjusted for inflation. 
Real GDP growth can be decomposed into employ-
ment growth and growth in labour productivity. 
According to Graph 1.1, GDP growth in the EU 
peaked  during  the  first  quarter  of  2007,  reach-
ing its highest level since the economic boom in 
2000. Economic growth in the EU flattened some-
what  in  the  second  and  third  quarters  of  2007, 
and fell further back to 2.4% in the fourth quarter 
of 2007, after a period of strong recovery follow-
ing the slow-down in 2002. This strong economic 
growth performance was supported by a relatively 
high employment growth rate, of about 1.7% in 
2007. Labour productivity growth is typically more 
cyclical than employment growth, and weakened 
to 1% during the fourth quarter of 2007.18
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Graph 1.1: GDP, employment and productivity growth in the EU-27
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Source: Eurostat, July 2008.
A common indicator for measuring standards of liv-
ing is GDP per capita (i.e. per capita income). Table 
1.1 presents average annual growth rates for the 
five-year intervals 1996-2001 and 2001-2006 and 
for 2007 for the 27 countries of the EU, as well as for 
the US. There is a wide dispersion of GDP per capita 
growth rates within the EU. In 2007, growth varied 
between 0.8% in Italy to 10.9% in Latvia. The US 
achieved a growth rate of only 1.2% in 2007. Also 
in terms of average income levels, the EU coun-
tries show a large variation, ranging from only 38% 
of the EU-27 average in Bulgaria to 2.8 times the 
EU-27 average in Luxemburg14. Per capita income 
in the United States is 54% above the EU-27 aver-
age. It should be noted that part of the per capita 
income differences between EU countries and the 
US is due to differences in hours worked per person. 
Employees in the US tend to work more hours. The 
question why this is so goes beyond the scope of 
this chapter, but two oft-mentioned explanations 
are institutional differences such as higher marginal 
tax rates on labour in the EU countries (cf. Pres-
cott, 2004) and a stronger preference for leisure in 
the EU. In fact, public opinion surveys indicate that 
most Europeans would prefer to work even shorter 
hours than they do at present (see e.g. Dekker and 
Ederveen, 2005).
As  discussed,  the  EU  economies  still  vary  widely 
in  per  capita  income  levels.  Starting  from  very 
14   The high level of GDP per inhabitant in Luxemburg is partly due to the 
large share of cross-border workers in total employment. While contributing 
to GDP, they are not taken into consideration as part of the resident popula-
tion which is used to calculate GDP per inhabitant.
low levels of productivity in the immediate post-
Communist years, the new Member States are typi-
cally catching-up through relatively high rates of 
economic growth. However, this catching-up pro-
cess should not be seen as a free lunch. Indeed, 
the European Commission has presented evidence 
that convergence in the euro-area is conditional, 
i.e.  that  economic  growth  is  inversely  related  to 
initial  per  capita  incomes  and  directly  propor-
tional to its steady-state per capita income level. 
The latter is determined by the rate of time pref-
erence and hence savings behaviour, work-leisure 
choices, and fertility, which may all be affected by 
economic policies15. Steady-state income levels are 
also determined by a country’s human and physi-
cal capital stock, and by its “knowledge capital”16. 
So countries with similar initial per capita income 
levels may experience dissimilar growth patterns if 
they adopt different education and R&D policies. 
For example, whereas Greece, Spain, Cyprus and 
Slovenia  have  been  converging  to  euro-area  per 
capita income levels since 1999, economic growth 
in Malta has stagnated and Portugal has actually 
fallen behind in income levels. So within the group 
of EU countries, several convergence “clubs” can 
be distinguished. This is important as it underlines 
that there is no one-size-fits-all model for a coun-
try’s growth strategy, and initial conditions have to 
be taken into account.
15   Cf. European Commission (2008a).
16   Such knowledge capital helps to build absorptive capacity, and coun-
tries have to invest in human capital and research in order to exploit interna-
tional technology spillovers (cf. Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir, 2006).19
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1.2.2.  Employment
Graph 1.2 illustrates employment trends in the US 
and the EU, distinguishing between the EU-15 and 
the new Member States (NMS). While US employ-
ment levels are higher than in both groups of EU 
countries, the trend in the EU is upward17. A com-
parison within EU countries shows that employment 
rates are lower in the new Member States, though 
there has been some catching up. The employment 
rate within the EU-27 in 2007 was about 4.6 per-
centage points below its 70% target for 2010.
The employment situation in each EU Member State 
is  presented  in  Table  1.2,  with  data  for  the  total 
employment rate, the female employment rate, as 
17   Notice that the comparison between the US and the EU is hampered by 
the fact that definitions of employment rates are slightly different.
Table 1.1: GDP per capita growth & per capita GDP level
Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita (*) 2007 GDP per 
capita 
(in pps; EU-27=100) 
(*)
1996-2001 2001-2006 2007
Austria 2,4 1,3 3,0 127,7
Belgium 2,4 1,5 2,0 118,9
Bulgaria 3,1 6,3 6,2 37,9
Cyprus 3,0 1,3 2,4 91,6
Czech Republic 1,4 4,4 5,9 81,0
Denmark 2,1 1,6 1,4 124,0
Estonia 7,5 9,3 7,3 71,4
Finland 4,3 2,7 4,0 118,3
France 2,4 1,1 1,6 110,6
Germany 1,9 0,9 2,6 114,0
Greece 3,4 3,9 3,8 98,2
Hungary 4,8 4,5 1,5 64,1
Ireland 7,7 3,4 3,1 145,9
Italy 2,0 0,2 0,8 101,3
Latvia 7,2 9,6 10,9 57,9
Lithuania 5,7 8,6 9,4 59,8
Luxembourg 5,1 3,0 2,8 279,2
Malta 2,7 1,2 3,1 77,1
Netherlands 3,1 1,1 3,3 131,2
Poland 4,4 4,2 6,6 54,4
Portugal 3,3 0,2 1,6 73,6
Romania -0,7 6,4 6,4 40,2
Slovakia 2,7 5,9 10,3 68,3
Slovenia 4,2 4,0 5,5 90,1
Spain 3,7 1,7 2,0 104,1
Sweden 3,1 2,7 2,0 123,6
United Kingdom 2,8 2,1 2,7 117,8
EU-27 2,7 1,6 2,5 100,0
US 2,4 1,8 1,2 154,3
Note:  (*) GDP per capita is measured in prices of 2000. The figures represent the average annual growth rates between the 
GDP levels of the first and the last years.
  (**) pps = purchasing power standards.
Source: AMECO database (Annual Macro Economic Data) – European Commission, DG ECFIN.
well as the employment rate for young and older 
workers.  Some  Member  States  (Austria,  Cyprus, 
Denmark,  Finland,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden  and 
the United Kingdom) have employment rates above 
70%, which is the target level for the EU average in 
2010 as agreed in the growth and jobs strategy. The 
overall employment situation is particularly worrying 
in Malta (55.7% employment rate in 2007), Poland 
(57.0%) and Hungary (57.3%). Female employment 
rates are lower than total employment rates in all 
countries. Differences are small in for instance Den-
mark,  Estonia  and  Finland,  while  Greece  (47.9%), 
Italy  (46.6%)  and  Malta  (36.9%)  have  a  large 
unused female labour force potential. 15 Member 
States have already surpassed the 60% norm for the 
female employment rate at EU level. The table further 
presents employment rates for groups at both ends 
of the working age range. Youth employment rates 20
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Graph 1.2: Employment rates in the EU and US
EU-27
EU-15
NMS
US
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
%
Note:   Employment rates are definited as the number of persons in employment aged 15-64 (16-64 for US) as a percentage of 
the population of the same age.
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey for EU, OECD for US.
are particularly low in for example Belgium, Hungary 
and Luxembourg. Employment rates of older work-
ers are much lower than total employment rates, and 
in several Member States only about a third of older 
workers are employed. Efforts to increase employ-
ment rates among older workers are of paramount 
importance, also given our ageing societies and the 
corresponding need to make optimal use of the avail-
able human resources to support our welfare states.
Concerning  labour  market  reforms,  the  “flexicu-
rity model”, combining flexible labour markets and 
extensive  social  security  provisions,  has  received 
ample attention in recent policy debates. The Euro-
pean Commission has further developed the flexi-
curity  concept,  distinguishing  four  dimensions  of 
flexicurity, namely (i) flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements,  (ii)  comprehensive  lifelong  learning 
strategies, (iii) effective active labour market policies, 
and (iv) modern social security systems18. Member 
States  are  invited  to  develop  their  own  flexicurity 
pathways, depending on their various starting posi-
tions.
Labour market reforms are needed not only to prepare 
for long-term trends such as ageing and the viability 
of pension systems, but also, even more urgently, to 
18   See European Commission (2007a).
accommodate current needs. The economic boom 
(though economic growth moderated towards the 
end of 2007) with rapid employment growth has 
already led to recruitment difficulties in some sectors 
and in some countries, and the tightness on labour 
markets is creating an upward pressure on wages19. 
This will further increase inflationary pressures and 
may negatively affect competitiveness.
1.2.3.  Labour productivity
As  mentioned  above,  economic  growth  can  be 
decomposed into employment growth and growth 
in labour productivity, and in this sub-section the lat-
ter is considered. Higher per capita income levels do 
not necessarily correspond to increased welfare lev-
els. To the extent that these high income levels are 
achieved through intensive use of labour (relative to 
other countries), this implies less leisure per worker, 
which should be counted as a welfare loss when lei-
sure time is positively valued (and/or it implies that 
more people are working). Productivity levels (labour 
productivity or total factor productivity) are a bet-
ter indicator of welfare, and are more directly linked 
to competitiveness. In turn, labour productivity per 
19   An analysis on skill problems in European industrial sectors is provided 
in the 2007 edition of the European Competitiveness Report (European Com-
mission (2007b), chapter 3).21
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Table 1.2: Total employment, female employment and employment of youth and older workers per 
MS in 2007 (*)
Total 
employment 
rate
Female 
employment 
rate
Young 
people’s 
employment rate
Older people’s 
employment 
rate
Austria 71.4 64.4 55.5 38.6
Belgium 62.0 55.3 27.5 34.4
Bulgaria 61.7 57.6 24.5 42.6
Cyprus 71.0 62.4 37.4 55.9
Czech Republic 66.1 57.3 28.5 46.0
Denmark 77.1 73.2 65.3 58.6
Estonia 69.4 65.9 34.5 60.0
Finland 70.3 68.5 44.6 55.0
France 64.6 60.0 31.5 38.3
Germany 69.4 64.0 45.3 51.5
Greece 61.4 47.9 24.0 42.4
Hungary 57.3 50.9 21.0 33.1
Ireland 69.1 60.6 49.9 53.8
Italy 58.7 46.6 24.7 33.8
Latvia 68.3 64.4 38.4 57.7
Lithuania 64.9 62.2 25.2 53.4
Luxembourg 63.6 55.0 22.0 32.9
Malta 55.7 36.9 46.0 28.3
Netherlands 76.0 69.6 68.4 50.9
Poland 57.0 50.6 25.8 29.7
Portugal 67.8 61.9 34.9 50.9
Romania 58.8 52.8 24.4 41.4
Slovakia 60.7 53.0 27.6 35.6
Slovenia 67.8 62.6 37.6 33.5
Spain 65.6 54.7 39.1 44.6
Sweden 74.2 71.8 42.2 70.0
United Kingdom 71.3 65.5 52.1 57.4
EU-27 65.4 58.3 37.2 44.7
2010 target 70 more than 60 50
US (**) 71.8 65.9 53.1 61.8
Note:  (*) Persons in employment aged 15-64 (total and female employment), 15-24 (youth workers) or 55-64 (older workers) 
as a percentage of the population of the same age.
  (**) For the US the age groups are respectively 16-64 (total and female employment), 16-24 (youth workers) and 55-64 
(older workers).
Source: Eurostat, OECD, July 2008.
hour worked is a more direct indicator of welfare 
than  labour  productivity  per  person  employed,  as 
hours worked per employee differ across countries.
Graph 1.3 illustrates productivity growth develop-
ments in the EU-27 and the US since 2000. Over the 
whole period, average annual productivity growth in 
the EU has been 1.3%. In the first quarter of 2007, 
EU-wide  labour  productivity  growth  amounted  to 
1.8%, but fell below the 1.3%-average in later quar-
ters. Structural productivity growth is unobservable, 
but statistical smoothing techniques can be used to 
estimate it. The smoothed series in the graph sug-
gest that after bottoming out in 2003, trend pro-
ductivity growth in the EU has recovered somewhat 
in recent years. The extent to which this represents 
a structural increase in labour productivity growth, 
possibly as a result of the Growth and Jobs strategy, 
cannot be assessed on the basis of this evidence and 
would require further investigation. A reverse pattern 
seems to emerge in the US, where the trend line has 
been going down in recent years.22
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Graph 1.3: Productivity growth in the EU-27 and the US
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Source: Eurostat for EU GDP and Employment (persons in employment aged 15 and over); OECD for US GDP and Employment 
(persons in employment aged 16 and over).
Country-level  data  on  average  annual  labour  pro-
ductivity growth (more precisely, growth in GDP per 
person employed) as well as labour productivity lev-
els (using two definitions: GDP per person employed 
and GDP per hour worked) in 2007 are presented 
in Table 1.3. The table shows that Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and especially Slovakia experienced rapid 
labour  productivity  growth  in  2007,  compared  to 
the EU average of 1.3% and the US rate of 1%. These 
new Member States are clearly catching up with the 
EU averages, also because they have consistently seen 
fast productivity growth over the past decade. This 
is clear from the annual averages over the five-year 
periods 1996-2001 and 2001-2006, which illustrate 
more structural patterns by filtering out (part of) the 
business cycle fluctuations. In 2007, labour produc-
tivity remained virtually unchanged in Denmark, Italy 
and Luxembourg, and especially for Italy and Spain 
this seems to be more of a structural problem. The 
two  last  columns  show  labour  productivity  levels. 
Luxembourg has by far the highest labour produc-
tivity level, both in terms of GDP per worker and in 
GDP per hour worked (the latter not being available 
for  Romania).  Intra-EU  differences  are  substantial, 
and as a rule of thumb one could say that labour 
productivity growth is typically higher in countries 
with lower productivity levels, as these countries can 
benefit more from adopting more advanced tech-
nologies from abroad (catch-up growth or the con-
vergence hypothesis, see also section 1.2.1).
Comparison of the last two columns of Table 1.3 reveals 
that most countries with an above average labour pro-
ductivity level in terms of persons employed also have 
above  average  labour  productivity  levels  in  terms  of 
hours worked, but there are exceptions such as Greece, 
Italy and Spain. A country that has a higher labour pro-
ductivity level in terms of persons employed (relative to 
the EU-average) than in terms of hours worked (again 
relative to the EU-average) indicates a situation where 
people  work  on  average  more  hours  (on  either  the 
intensive or the extensive margin, or both)20. It is impor-
tant to make this distinction, as productivity-enhancing 
strategies may depend on the particular situation. Spe-
cifically, countries where the index of GDP per worker 
is higher than the index of GDP per hour worked may 
benefit more from designing and implementing policies 
to work “smarter” (this could be the case for e.g. Austria 
and Finland), while Member States where the situation 
is the reverse could benefit from increasing labour input 
(this holds for Germany and the Netherlands). GDP per 
hour worked is a more direct indicator of competitive-
ness, as it corrects for cross-country differences in labour 
inputs. Based on this, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands have the highest levels of com-
petitiveness, while competitiveness is relatively low in 
for instance Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia.
20   The extensive margin refers to the decision whether to work or not, 
while the intensive margin refers to the decision on the number of hours 
worked per person.23
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Labour productivity is also closely related to inno-
vation,  in  that  the  introduction  of  new  products, 
services, processes as well as organisational and mar-
keting innovations can increase labour productivity 
and create further potential for productivity gains. 
The analysis in the 2007 European Innovation Score-
board21, based on a range of indicators of innova-
tion, shows that innovation performance is gener-
ally increasing faster in those Member States with 
below average performance, pointing to a catching 
up process within the EU. It can also be observed 
21   Available at www.eis.eu (European Commission, 2008b).
that  several  of  the  Member  States  with  the  fast-
est growth in innovation performance (e.g. Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Lithuania) have also experienced 
rapid growth in labour productivity. A comparison 
between the EU and US shows a significant gap in 
innovation  performance.  This  gap  has  been  rap-
idly reduced between 2003 and 2006, and shows 
a further but modest reduction in 2007 (cf. Euro-
pean Innovation Scoreboard 2007). The slow down 
in catching up may affect the EU’s ability to further 
close the gap in labour productivity.
Table 1.3: Growth of real labour productivity per person employed & 2007 levels of GDP per 
person employed (ppe) and GDP per hour worked (phw)
Average annual labour productivity 
growth per person employed
GDP ppe 
2007 
(EU-27=100) 
(*)
GDP phw 
2007 
(EU-25=100) 
(**) 1996-2001 2001-2006 2007
Austria 1,6 1,4 1,4 120,4 107,9
Belgium 1,3 1,4 1,1 131,2 133,8
Bulgaria 2,4 3,3 3,3 35,6 34,6
Cyprus 2,6 0,2 1,1 84,7 73,9
Czech Republic 2,0 4,1 4,6 73,1 59,7
Denmark 1,4 1,7 0,0 107,1 112,3
Estonia 8,5 6,9 6,6 67,5 54,2
Finland 2,2 2,0 2,1 113,4 107,1
France 1,2 1,2 0,8 123,6 129,4
Germany 2,0 1,6 1,0 106,6 119,3
Greece 3,1 2,5 2,7 105,4 77,9
Hungary 3,2 4,0 1,5 74,8 60,3
Ireland 3,2 2,2 1,6 135,4 115,9
Italy 0,9 0,0 0,5 108,0 94,9
Latvia 6,0 6,7 6,6 53,6 45,3
Lithuania 7,2 5,9 6,7 60,2 51,5
Luxembourg 1,5 1,6 0,2 182,3 180,8
Malta 2,6 1,1 1,1 90,1 85,0
Netherlands 1,4 1,6 1,41 113,1 130,4
Poland 5,5 3,6 1,9 61,4 49,7
Portugal 1,8 0,6 1,7 68,4 62,2
Romania 0,9 6,9 4,7 40,5 N/A
Slovakia 3,8 5,0 8,1 76,6 69,1
Slovenia 4,0 3,6 3,3 85,7 79,3
Spain 0,2 0,5 0,8 102,5 99,6
Sweden 1,8 3,0 0,5 113,0 112,2
United Kingdom 1,9 1,6 2,3 110,8 107,4
EU-25 1,7 1,4 1,3 103,9 100,0
EU-27 1,7 1,4 1,3 100,0 N/A
US 1,8 2,1 1,0 142,0 128,4
Note:  (*) The relative levels of GDP per person employed and per hour worked have been calculated on the base of purchasing 
power standards.
  (**) Data for Romania, the US and EU-27 are not available (= N/A) ; number for the US refers to 2006.
Source: AMECO, June 2008.24
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1.2.4.  Sources of the productivity gap between the 
EU and the US22
After the discussion of general economic develop-
ments in the EU, the question arises as to how these 
developments  differ  from  those  of  its  main  com-
petitor, the United States. In particular, what are the 
sources of the productivity differentials between the 
EU and the US? This question has been studied by 
applying the so-called growth accounting methodol-
ogy. In such a growth accounting framework, GDP 
growth is broken down into its underlying compo-
nents, so that one can assess the contributions of 
labour  inputs,  capital  inputs,  and  technological 
developments. The latter is typically obtained as a 
residual, referred to as the Solow residual. This sub-
section presents a growth accounting exercise at the 
aggregate level, while in section 1.3 a comparable 
analysis at sectoral level is discussed.
Consider a production function of the Cobb-Douglas 
type,
(1) 
where Y stands for GDP, E is employment in persons, 
H is average hours worked, QL is the indicator of the 
quality of the labour input, K is capital input, A is 
Total Factor Productivity, and   is the produc-
tion elasticity of labour (capital). TFP is calculated 
as a residual, i.e. that part of output growth that 
cannot  be  explained  from  changes  in  capital  and 
labour input. In growth rates, this equation can be 
expressed as
(2) 
where g is the growth rate. The expression gK – gE 
– gH refers to capital deepening, expressing labour 
input in terms of total hours worked. The term   
is the contribution of the change in the initial educa-
tion of the labour force to economic growth. Equa-
tion (2) also states that the growth rate of GDP is 
equal to the growth rate of hourly labour productivity 
 plus the growth rate 
of labour input expressed in hours worked  .
Finally, employment E is further decomposed into 
the participation rate, the rate of unemployment, the 
share of working age population, the natural popula-
tion increase, and the net migration rate,
(3) 
22   This section is largely based on Mourre (2008).
where  gPOP-M  is  the  natural  population  increase 
(increase of the population POP without net migra-
tion M), gm is the growth rate of net migration (m=M/
POP), gSWP is the growth rate of the share of working 
age population (15-64) in total population, gPART is 
the growth rate of the participation ratio as a share 
of working age population, and gur is the growth rate 
of the unemployment rate. Substitution of Equation 
(3) into Equation (2) yields the full decomposition of 
the growth rate of GDP as used in the macro growth 
accounting exercise.
GDP  growth  is  decomposed  into  a  demographic 
component,  a  labour  market  component,  and  a 
labour  productivity  component.  These  three  com-
posite  components  are  further  disaggregated  into 
twelve  individual  components.  The  demographic 
component  comprises  the  native  population,  net 
migration, and the share of working age population. 
The labour market component includes youth partic-
ipation, 25-54 male and female participation, 55-64 
participation, the unemployment rate, and average 
hours worked. Third, and finally, labour productivity 
comprises initial education of labour, capital deepen-
ing, and total factor productivity.
The production elasticity of labour,  , is set equal 
to 0.65. This implies that the labour share in total 
income  is  65%,  which  corresponds  to  the  EU-15 
value as reported by the Groningen Total Economy 
Growth Accounting Database for 2004 (cf. Timmer, 
Ypma and Van Ark, 2005).
Graph 1.4 illustrates the decomposition of the gap in 
GDP per capita for the EU vis-à-vis the US in terms 
of labour productivity and labour utilisation. The rela-
tively low labour utilisation explains around two third 
of the per capita GDP gap in the EU-15 relative to 
the US (17 percentage points out of 26), while hourly 
labour productivity accounts for only 10 percentage 
points. The underutilisation of labour is even slightly 
stronger in the euro area (19 percentage points out of 
28). While labour underutilisation is less pronounced 
in the five richest countries, it entirely explains the gap 
in per capita GDP relative to the US, with hourly pro-
ductivity being even slightly higher than in the US23. 
In contrast, labour underutilisation is fairly modest in 
the new Member States (EU-10) and only accounts 
for one tenth of the per capita GDP gap in the EU-10 
(6 percentage points out of 60).
The results of a growth accounting exercise for the 
EU-15 are summarized in Graph 1.5. Over the ten 
year period 1995-2006, the annual average growth 
of  real  GDP  was  2.3%  for  the  EU-15  as  a  whole. 
23   This finding that hourly labour productivity in some EU Member States 
exceeds US levels is not new, and was presented in earlier editions of this 
European Competitiveness Report (e.g. European Commission, 2003).25
1 — Key facts about competitiveness in the EU
Graph 1.4: Decomposition of per capita GDP 
gap vis-à-vis the US into productivity gap and 
labour utilisation gap, 1995-2006
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Source: Mourre, G. (2008).
When  real  GDP  growth  is  broken  down  into  the 
demographic component, the labour market com-
ponent,  and  labour  productivity,  it  can  be  seen 
that labour productivity (in low-skill units) explains 
around two thirds of GDP growth, while the demo-
graphic component (0.3 percentage points) and the 
labour market component (0.4 percentage points) 
together explain the remaining third of annual aver-
age GDP growth.
A further breakdown into the underlying twelve com-
ponents shows that the demographic component is 
mainly driven by net migration, while the negative 
contribution of the working-age population share is 
more or less counterbalanced by the slight increase 
in the native population.
Secondly, regarding the labour market component, 
the rise in the employment rate (extensive margins) 
contributed 0.8 percentage points, as a result of an 
increase in both female and older-worker participa-
tion and, to a lesser extent, the decline in unem-
ployment.  By  contrast,  youth  and  male  participa-
tion decreased and had a slightly negative effect on 
growth24. The decrease in the average hours worked 
per  employee  (intensive  margins)  had  a  negative 
effect of –0.4 percentage points.
Finally, the labour productivity component is mainly 
driven by TFP growth, which accounted for 0.8 per-
centage points, while 0.5 percentage points and 0.3 
percentage points were attributable to capital deep-
ening and initial education of labour, respectively.
Graph 1.5 also shows a comparison with the US. Com-
pared with the US, the annual average EU-15 growth 
rate was around 0.8 percentage points lower in 1995-
24   It should be noted that young people may not enter the labour market 
because they are enrolled in the education system, and decreased youth par-
ticipation may signal an increase in educational attainment. This will contrib-
ute to productivity when these people go to the labour market.
2006. The main drivers were, first, the much less favour-
able demographic trend and, second, the lower growth 
in labour productivity. With regard to the demographic 
component,  the  native  population  and,  to  a  lesser 
extent,  the  share  of  working-age  population,  grew 
much less than in the US. On the productivity side, TFP 
was the main factor behind the EU-15 gap, with capi-
tal deepening being an aggravating factor. However, 
the labour market situation improved vis-à-vis the US, 
especially due to the participation rate and despite the 
negative impact of hours worked. Moreover, the initial 
education of labour has improved more in the EU-15, 
although the results should be interpreted very care-
fully, as the available data are not fully harmonised and 
US data on employment breakdown by educational 
attainment are only available from 2001.
1.3.  Sectoral growth drivers
This section studies in greater detail the role of inputs 
in the production process at sectoral level25. The pur-
pose is to consider each input, and to demonstrate 
its importance to the production process in order 
to understand more fully the interactions between 
inputs as drivers of growth in the aggregate econ-
omy. The principal data source is the EU KLEMS data-
base26, which provides extensive coverage across the 
EU, as well as the US. We focus largely on an EU-1027 
aggregate and the US comparisons in order to evalu-
ate how the two regions’ use of inputs varied over 
the 1995-2004 period. This data source is used in a 
growth accounting framework, where the industry’s 
output is a function of capital, labour, intermediate 
inputs and technology. Inclusion of the new Mem-
ber States is not possible because of data limitations, 
but the report by O’Mahony, Rincon-Aznar and Rob-
inson (2008) presents some results for Hungary and 
the Czech Republic.
The capital input in the EU KLEMS database com-
prises two separately measured components: capital 
services from ICT assets and capital services from non-
ICT assets. The measurement of labour input needs 
to take into account its heterogeneity, as workers 
differ in terms of characteristics such as educational 
attainment, age and gender. There are three educa-
tional attainment groups used in EU KLEMS, broadly 
corresponding to high, medium and low attainment. 
Technology is interpreted as a total factor productiv-
25   This  section  is  based  on  O’Mahony,  Rincon-Aznar  and  Robinson 
(2008).
26   The EU KLEMS database is the result of a three-year research project 
funded by the European Commission and involving 16 European research 
institutes, which has recently become available for free public use at http://
www.EUKLEMS.net. See Timmer et al. (2007) for further details on the con-
struction of the database.
27   Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, Spain, UK. Notice that this group is different from the EU-10 men-
tioned elsewhere in this chapter, i.e. the group of new Member States (except 
Bulgaria and Romania).26
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ity (TFP) index, measured as the residual and captur-
ing all unobserved factors such as disembodied tech-
nological progress, economies of scale, economies of 
scope, organisational changes and also errors in the 
measurement of outputs and inputs.
The key question in this section is: what role do these 
inputs to production play in output and productiv-
ity growth? First of all, the decomposition of value 
added growth using the standard growth accounting 
decomposition procedures is considered. Results are 
presented for the US and the EU-10, for the whole 
10-year period.
Graphs 1.6 and 1.7 show the contribution of inputs 
to the growth in value added at the most detailed 
sector level permitted by the data set, for the US 
and  the  EU-10.  Comparing  the  two  regions,  the 
first thing to note is that growth varies considerably 
across industries and between the US and the EU-10. 
It is also interesting to note that TFP contributions 
to growth tend to be larger in the US than in the 
EU, which, given its residual nature, suggests that 
factors other than capital and labour that contrib-
ute to value added growth are not being taken into 
account, and these other factors are stronger in the 
US than in the EU-10.
Graph 1.5: Growth decomposition in the EU-15 (1995-2006) (annual average rate and contribution 
per component in %-point)
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Source: Mourre, G. (2008).
Regarding the contribution of labour input to value 
added growth, it should be noted that labour input 
is separated into the contributions in terms of hours 
(i.e. the volume of labour input), and the compo-
sition  of  labour  (the  quality  component  of  labour 
input).  The  contribution  of  hours  to  value  added 
growth, which measures labour quantity, is in some 
cases negative, particularly in the manufacturing sec-
tor. There are more industries in the EU-10 with a 
negative contribution of hours to growth. The indus-
tries  with  the  largest  positive  contribution  include 
hotels and restaurants, real estate and renting and 
business activities and some public services. In the 
US, construction, real estate, renting and other busi-
ness activities and some public services also make 
positive contributions to growth. In the US, there 
are fewer industries where the hours effect is nega-
tive than in the EU, but the negative contributions 
appear to be larger.
The contribution of capital to value added growth is 
split into ICT and non-ICT contributions. Comparing 
the two regions, Graphs 1.6 and 1.7 show that the 
contribution of ICT capital is in general smaller in the 
EU than in the US. The contribution of both types of 
capital in manufacturing is generally smaller than in 
services in both regions. The contribution of ICT in 27
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Graph 1.6: Contributions to value added growth in the US by sector, 1995-2004
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TOT Total industries AtB Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; C Mining and quarrying; 15t16 Food, beverages and tobacco; 17t19 
Textiles leather and footwear; 20 Wood and products of wood and cork; 21t22 Pulp, Paper printing and publishing; 23t25 Chemicals, 
rubber, plastics and fuels; 26 Other non-metallic mineral products; 27t28 Basic metals and fabricated metal products; 29 Machinery 
NEC; 30t33 Electrical and optical equipment; 34t35 Transport equipment; 36t37 Manufacturing nec/Recycling; E Electricity, gas and 
water supply; F Construction; G Wholesale and retail trade; H Hotels and restaurants 60t63 Transport and storage 64 Post and telecom-
munications J Financial intermediation 70 Real estate activities 71t74 Renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities; 
L Public administration and defence, compulsory social security; M Education N Health and social work O Other community social and 
personal services P Private households with employed persons Q Extra-territorial organisations and bodies.
electrical and optical equipment is similar in the EU 
and US. Service sectors where the ICT contribution 
is larger in the US than in the EU include post and 
telecommunications,  hotels  and  restaurants,  and 
wholesale  and  retail.  The  contribution  of  non-ICT 
capital is in general higher in the US although the 
differences are not very large and generally greater 
in service sectors (mainly in real estate and renting 
and also in financial intermediation). In the financial 
intermediation sector, it can also be seen that the US 
has a higher contribution of non-ICT capital, while in 
Europe the contribution of ICT capital is higher.
The TFP contribution is defined as the residual once 
the  impact  of  labour  and  capital  on  value  added 
growth has been taken into account. Taking a sec-
toral perspective, it can be seen that in the EU-10 
the contribution from TFP is highest in agriculture, 
wood, electrical and optical equipment, electricity, 
gas and water, and post and telecommunications. 
Sectors where the contribution is negative include 
mining,  textiles,  construction,  hotels,  renting  and 
other business activities and real estate. Thus, TFP 
does not clearly appear to be concentrated in high 
technology industries or in either the service or man-
ufacturing sector.
The estimates for the US in Graph 1.6 show that the 
highest TFP contributions are seen in the electrical 
and optical equipment industry. Other sectors where 
TFP  growth  is  very  important  include  agriculture, 
wholesale  and  retail  and  financial  intermediation 
in services, and textiles and transport equipment in 
manufacturing.  Sectors  where  the  contribution  of 
TFP growth is found to be negative include food, con-
struction, renting and other business activities and 
real estate. Reasons for TFP being negative include 
measurement  error,  but  it  has  also  been  argued 
that short-run disruption to production as a result 
of organisational change might lead to negative TFP 
growth until the new organisational structure is ‘bed-
ded in’. In this way, organisational change may also 28
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Graph 1.7: Contributions to value added growth in the EU-10 by sector, 1995-2004
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the contributions of these elements adds up to the growth rate of each sector.
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TOT Total industries AtB Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; C Mining and quarrying; 15t16 Food, beverages and tobacco; 17t19 
Textiles leather and footwear; 20 Wood and products of wood and cork; 21t22 Pulp, Paper printing and publishing; 23t25 Chemicals, 
rubber, plastics and fuels; 26 Other non metallic mineral products; 27t28 Basic metals and fabricated metal products; 29 Machinery 
NEC; 30t33 Electrical and optical equipment; 34t35 Transport equipment; 36t37 Manufacturing nec/Recycling; E Electricity, gas and 
water supply; F Construction; G Wholesale and retail trade; H Hotels and restaurants 60t63 Transport and storage 64 Post and telecom-
munications J Financial intermediation 70 Real estate activities 71t74 Renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities; 
L Public administration and defence, compulsory social security; M Education N Health and social work O Other community social and 
personal services P Private households with employed persons Q Extra-territorial organisations and bodies.
be viewed as an intangible input to production, and 
is also cited as a reason why the EU has failed to real-
ise benefits from ICT investment compared with the 
US. What is clearly noticeable is the fact that in most 
of the sectors the contribution of TFP is higher in the 
US than in EU (with the exception of wood, electric-
ity, gas and water, construction and post and tel-
ecommunications). Overall, the growth accounting 
exercise reveals that TFP seems to be the main source 
of the difference in value added growth between the 
US and the EU for most industries, especially manu-
facturing, followed by ICT capital accumulation in 
some service industries. This is broadly in line with 
the message from the growth accounting exercise 
at macro level, as presented in section 1.2.4, where 
it is also found that the relatively slow growth in TFP 
in the EU-15 is the prime cause of the GDP growth 
differential vis-à-vis the US28.
28   Similar caveats as mentioned in the macro growth accounting exercise 
apply, for instance regarding measurement errors in inputs and outputs.
1.4.  Changing international reality
The focus in the European Competitiveness Report 
is mainly on more structural developments, and the 
growth accounting exercises have revealed that the 
main explanatory factor behind the slow economic 
growth performance in the EU (relative to the US) is 
slow growth in TFP. However, the recent economic 
developments in the EU as well as in other parts of 
the world cannot be evaluated without taking into 
account several global developments that have dom-
inated the economic news recently, and will continue 
to do so until their full impacts have materialised and 
solutions to restore confidence have taken effect.
The turmoil, at times even panic, on financial mar-
kets has dominated the news29. Two principal mac-
roeconomic developments have contributed to the 
financial  crisis  (cf.  Buiter,  2007).  Firstly,  there  has 
29   An overview of the different events related to the credit market turmoil 
is presented in BIS (2008).29
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been an increase in the international supply of sav-
ings, especially among commodity exporters, which 
are also high savers, causing a decline in world real 
interest rates. Secondly, the US Federal Reserve in 
particular has contributed to an increase in liquidity, 
which prompting the newly industrialising nations 
and oil exporters to contain the potential apprecia-
tion of their currencies against the US dollar through 
sterilisation, resulting in an explosive growth in their 
foreign exchange reserves. As a result, private and 
financial sector leverage increased to unprecedented 
levels. The increased financial sector leverage took 
place outside commercial banks, in private invest-
ment  funds,  hedge  funds,  investment  banks  and 
through a whole series of instruments created as a 
result of financial liberalisation and often using inno-
vative securitisation. The risks associated with these 
processes were insufficiently appreciated by regula-
tors, banks and the new financial entities themselves 
which, though off-balance-sheet, continued to repre-
sent a significant reputational, financial, commercial 
and economic exposure for the parent institutions, 
as events confirmed after August 2007.
In  response,  the  US  Federal  Reserve  has  strongly 
reduced interest rates since September 2007 after 
the beginning of the crisis. The Fed (as well as the 
ECB and the Bank of England) has also engaged in 
repurchase  operations  (repos).  The  Fed’s  strategy 
aims to boost consumption and investment spend-
ing in the US, but entails the risk of further weak-
ening the dollar and triggering “moral hazard” in 
that it could induce investors and firms to take on 
excessive risks because they are confident the central 
bank will bail them out. In contrast, the European 
Central Bank has gradually increased interest rates, 
also because of increasing inflationary pressures in 
the euro area.
The impact of the financial turmoil on the economy 
could potentially be significant. While the impact is 
likely to be particularly marked within the financial 
sector, it could also be significant elsewhere and could 
undermine  economic  growth  prospects  for  some 
time.  The  key  channels  through  which  this  could 
happen are the cost of borrowing, residential con-
struction, wealth effects and the possible retrench-
ment of the financial sector. Credit conditions have 
worsened for firms and for mortgages around the 
world. Tighter credit conditions have an effect simi-
lar to an increase in interest rates by the central bank. 
The increase in the price terms for loans to firms and 
the  tightening  of  credit  standards  for  residential 
mortgage lending have already caused demand for 
loans to decline. The deflation of the housing bub-
ble in the US and across some Member States in the 
EU will undoubtedly have a contractionary impact 
on growth, although its size cannot be determined. 
However,  because  the  share  of  residential  invest-
ment in GDP is small (in the US around 4.5%) even 
a complete collapse would have only a small impact 
on economic performance. Nevertheless, as housing 
represents a significant part of household wealth, the 
collapse of the house bubble would negatively affect 
private consumption, although the size of the effect, 
again, is difficult to determine ex ante. Finally, it is 
possible that the financial sector itself will retrench, 
which could create some employment losses. These 
may  be  inevitable  after  the  over-expansion  of  the 
financial sector in recent years.
Though the impact of the credit crisis is hard to isolate 
from other major shocks (e.g. high oil prices, increas-
ing inflation), it is believed that these developments 
have  now  reached  the  real  side  of  the  economy 
as well. Indeed, also according to the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook (IMF, 2008a), the turbulence in 
financial markets has dampened the prospects for 
global growth. The US economy achieved a growth 
rate of 2.2% in 2007, but is expected to slow down 
in 2008 to 1.3% (IMF, 2008b). And according to the 
Spring 2008 forecast of the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2008c), economic growth 
for the EU-27 is expected to slow down to 2.0% for 
200830.
The  prices  of  oil  and  other  energy  sources,  com-
modity  prices  and  food  prices  increased  consider-
ably in 2007. The average contribution of food price 
increases  to  headline  inflation  increased  markedly 
across the euro area in 2007 compared to the period 
2000-2006  (cf.  European  Commission,  2008d). 
Graph  1.8  shows  the  development  of  food  and 
energy prices, as well as overall inflation. A major fac-
tor behind this development is the large increase in 
the prices of international agricultural commodities, 
such as cereals and dairy products31. Since the lows 
of 2001, the HWWI32 aggregate food price index has 
risen by about 160%, with a marked acceleration in 
recent months. And the strong rise in energy prices 
is  mainly  caused  by  sharp  increases  in  oil  prices, 
which rose by about 50% in 2007 in euro-denom-
inated  prices  (cf.  European  Commission  (2008f)), 
further increasing in 2008. Global oil demand has 
remained robust and continues to be driven by rapid 
economic growth in emerging economies, while the 
global oil supply increased only slightly in 2007 (IMF, 
2008a). In addition to demand and supply factors 
for crude oil, concerns about future oil market con-
ditions (expressed on the futures markets) play an 
important role33. High oil prices are likely to prevail in 
30   The OECD (2008) expects a slowdown for the OECD-area and the euro-
area.
31   Directions for EU action in response to higher food prices are presented 
in European Commission 2008d.
32   Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
33   See S. Dées, A. Gasteuil, R.K. Kaufmann, M. Mann (2008).30
European Competitiveness Report 2008
the medium and long term due to continued strong 
demand from emerging economies and supply con-
straints. Therefore, while the recent fall in oil prices 
will relieve some of the pressure on consumers and 
companies, it would be unrealistic to assume that 
prices will return to much lower levels. Also, though 
the  debate  is  far  from  settled  yet,  the  view  that 
speculators are driving the spot price of oil is being 
challenged, for instance because speculation should 
manifest itself in increasing oil inventories, which is 
not visible in the inventory data (see for instance Paul 
Krugman’s blog). According to the European Com-
mission’s World Energy Technology Outlook to 2050 
(European Commission, 2007c), the price of oil on 
the international market will be $110/bbl in 2050, 
while the International Energy Agency (2008) in its 
medium-term outlook predicts that oil markets will 
remain tight and prices high for the next five years. 
Finally,  upside  inflation  risks  are  also  triggered  by 
high capacity utilisation, tight labour market condi-
tions, and increasing wage pressures.
It should be noted that the inflationary pressures in 
the EU are being dampened by a strong euro (though 
the weak dollar is also an explanatory factor behind 
the increasing demand for commodities and energy 
outside the dollar area). The euro stood at USD 1.58 
in April 2008, which represents an appreciation of 
17% over the preceding year (cf. European Commis-
sion, 2008b), and the longer-term trend is illustrated 
in Graph 1.9. The other side of the coin is that a 
strong currency in the euro area reduces the external 
competitiveness of European industries. This makes 
it even more urgent to continue implementing the 
EU’s growth and jobs strategy.
1.5.  Summary and conclusions
While economic growth in the EU was still strong in 
2007, at 2.6%, the growth rate decreased compared 
to 2006. This strong economic growth performance 
was  supported  by  a  relatively  high  employment 
growth rate of about 1.7% in 2007. Labour produc-
tivity growth, typically more cyclical than employ-
ment  growth,  dropped  to  1%  during  the  fourth 
quarter  of  2007.  Nonetheless,  the  overall  growth 
performance was better than in the US, where GDP 
per capita increased by 1.2% in 2007. In terms of per 
capita income levels, the EU is still lagging behind 
the US. The reasons for this gap vary across EU Mem-
ber States. For the five richest EU members this gap is 
fully explained by lower labour utilisation, with EU-5 
hourly labour productivity actually outweighing US 
levels, while for the new Member States lower GDP 
per capita levels are mainly due to labour productiv-
ity disadvantages.
This introductory chapter to the European Competi-
tiveness Report further presented growth account-
ing analyses at both macro level and sectoral level 
for a selection of EU countries. The macro growth 
accounting exercise for the period 1995-2006 reveals 
that the slower growth performance in the EU-15 
compared to the US is mainly due to lower growth 
of the native population and labour productivity, the 
latter due to an underperforming TFP trend and, to a 
lesser extent, less capital deepening in the EU. These 
conclusions are broadly confirmed by the analysis at 
sectoral level, though there are important differences 
across industries.
Finally,  competitiveness  developments  in  the  EU 
have  to  be  placed  in  the  context  of  a  changing 
international  environment,  with  rising  commodity 
and energy prices, a weakening of the dollar against 
other major currencies, and turmoil on international 
financial  markets.  Rising  commodity  and  energy 
prices have spurred inflation in the EU, though the 
impact is dampened by a weak dollar (most com-
modities and energy carriers are traded in US dol-
lars).  Furthermore,  tightening  labour  markets  and 
upward pressure on wages could worsen the EU’s 
competitive position on world markets.
It is therefore of paramount importance to maintain 
the momentum in the growth and jobs strategy, and 
to continue the reform agenda in order to improve 
the functioning of labour markets and to boost pro-
ductivity levels. For example, Member States have 
undertaken to increase investments in research and 
development and in human capital formation. Reach-
ing these 3% targets would bring substantial eco-
nomic benefits (see Gelauff and Lejour, 2006), and 
the benefits for individual countries would be greater 
when national reform policies are coordinated (cf. 
last  year’s  European  Competitiveness  Report).  The 
Lisbon  strategy  for  growth  and  jobs  promotes  a 
combination of market dynamism, social cohesion 
and environmental responsibility.
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B. Topical issues on the structural   
reforms agenda
2.  Trade costs, openness and 
productivity: market access 
at home and abroad
2.1.  Introduction
The post-World War II era has been characterised by 
high growth rates in the world economy and a pro-
gressive reduction in barriers to international trade 
and investment. Productivity increases in agriculture 
and  manufacturing,  and  more  recently  in  services 
have been a major driver in the generation of income 
and wealth. There is massive empirical evidence that 
open  economies  are  richer  and  more  productive 
than closed economies. Studies focusing on income 
level find that one percentage point increase in the 
share of trade in GDP raises the level of income by 
between 0.9 to 3 per cent34. In an overview of stud-
ies about the income effects of openness Lewer and 
Van den Berg (2003) found that a percentage point 
increase in the rate of growth of international trade 
increases the growth rate of the economy by about 
0.22%. It is hard to believe this is a permanent effect, 
but even if it dies out after 10 years, income is still 
about 2.5% larger.
The link between openness and income is convinc-
ing, but it is more difficult to establish an empirical 
link between trade policy and income35. Moreover, 
it is hard to identify empirically which factors limit 
openness and the accompanying productivity gains. 
The theoretical channels between openness and pro-
ductivity are clear (such as reallocation of resources, 
more competition, economies of scale, bigger variety 
of products, innovation, and knowledge spillovers), 
but  their  quantitative  importance  less  so.  Against 
34   Examples are Badinger (2005), Frankel and Romer (1999), Frankel and 
Rose (2002), Wacziarg and Horn Welch (2003) and the overview of Nordas 
et al. (2006).
35   See Nordas et al. (2006) and Wacziarg and Horn Welch (2003), among 
others.
this backdrop, this chapter identifies which factors 
hamper trade and which are policy-related. It also 
discusses the relevance of the main channels linking 
more openness to productivity. From a policy per-
spective the main question addressed is whether the 
European Union (and the Member States) can imple-
ment policies to increase openness and to magnify 
the benefits from the productivity gains induced by 
openness.
These issues are not new, but the chapter examines 
them from a different perspective: the ‘heterogene-
ous firms’ literature that uses firm-level data. Most 
of the policy advice to liberalise trade is based on 
macroeconomic or sectoral analyses. Recently, trade 
economists have shifted their focus towards the char-
acteristics and trading behaviour of individual firms. 
This new approach is better known as the ‘hetero-
geneous firms’ literature, and it is changing the way 
we think about openness and globalisation. Among 
other things, the new literature captures a real-world 
feature not captured by traditional core-trade mod-
els: the fact that exporting and non-exporting firms 
co-exist  in  the  same  industries.  The  literature  has 
shown that firms are very heterogeneous, not only 
in size, capital and R&D intensity but also in export 
and import performance. Trading firms are different, 
and some of the differences may already exist before 
trading begins.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 gives 
a theoretical account of the main transmission chan-
nels between openness and productivity. Section 3 
presents selected stylised facts on the trading and 
foreign  investment  behaviour  of  heterogeneous 
firms.  One  main  conclusion  of  this  section  is  that 
firms’ productivity has to be high to overcome mar-
ket entry costs that exist for each new export market 
and for each product. Section 4 looks at whether or 
not  firms  experience  trade  and  investment  barri-
ers and how they respond to them. Since different 
reactions to hampering factors have often not been 
considered  in  the  past,  this  section  could  deliver 34
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interesting policy insights regarding openness and 
productivity.  The  section  concludes  that  the  lack 
of knowledge of export markets and regulations in 
other countries are the main trade barriers. Import 
tariffs and duties are less important. In addition, EU 
firms perceive the internal market to be very helpful 
for doing business because of a common currency, 
no border controls, and a Single Market legislation. 
Section 5 elaborates on the links between the find-
ings that emerge from the micro data and the tradi-
tional findings from macro and sectoral data. It then 
presents  some  policy  insights  for  EU  trade  policy. 
Finally, section 6 summarises the main results of the 
chapter and presents some concluding remarks.
2.2.  Transmission channels between 
openness and productivity
The relationship between openness and productivity 
is a widely researched topic at the macroeconomic 
level. Many studies have focused on the empirical 
relation  in  particular  between  trade  liberalisation 
and income36. Many of these cross-country studies 
conclude that there is a positive correlation between 
(trade)  openness  and  income  or  productivity, 
although researchers are in general unable to find a 
permanent effect on income or productivity growth. 
The causality between openness and income is not 
undisputed,  however.  Many  researches  have  tried 
to pin down the causal relation using sophisticated 
econometric  techniques  (e.g.  Frankel  and  Romer, 
1999), and have found that it most likely runs from 
openness to income. Although the positive relation 
between openness and income is well established, 
the relation between trade liberalisation policy and 
income is less clear. The reason is that openness is 
affected by many factors such as geography, tech-
nological progress, transport and communications. 
Trade policy is only one of these factors37. However, 
this does not imply that trade liberalisation policies 
affect income and productivity negatively. The corre-
lation is most likely to be positive, because trade lib-
eralisation increases openness and openness leads to 
improved income and productivity. This conviction 
is also based on the channels linking openness to 
productivity. These channels are described below.
First, increased openness leads to a better allocation 
of resources. Due to a larger market, countries can 
specialise in products where they have a compara-
tive advantage and are able to use their inputs for 
production more efficiently. This increases income 
and  productivity.  Moreover,  competition  will  also 
36   Edwards (1998) and Lopez (2005) provide some overviews.
37   See  Wacziarg  and  Horn  Welch  (2003),  Lopez  (2005),  Nordas  et  al. 
(2006) among others. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) and Irwin and Tervio 
(2002) even argue that trade is not a significant determinant of productivity 
when geography and institutional quality are included.
increase as markets are opened up internationally. 
In a given market, the least efficient firms cannot 
compete and resources are reallocated to the more 
efficient firms, which also increases productivity and 
income.  These  mechanisms  increase  productivity 
in the economy as a whole and within sectors, but 
the productivity of individual firms can also increase 
because more competition induces firms to innovate 
and reduce direct competition from other firms.
Second, openness increases the effective market size 
for exporting firms. They have more opportunities 
to specialise and to exploit economies of scale. For 
importing firms, a bigger variety of imports is avail-
able. Often these imported inputs have lower prices 
and/or better quality. According to the endogenous 
growth theory this increase in the variety of inputs 
stimulates productivity38.
Third,  opening  up  markets  increases  productivity 
not only directly but also via investment. Levine and 
Renelt (1992) have established a robust link between 
the investment share and ratio of trade to GDP. First, 
the allocation of capital to better performing sectors 
increases the productivity of capital and stimulates 
further investment. This is the case not only at sec-
toral level but also at firm level. Second, increased 
opportunities  for  foreign  investment  (opening  up 
capital markets) also increase the allocation of capital 
over countries and consequently the return to capi-
tal.
Fourth,  trade  in  goods  and  services  and  foreign 
direct  investment  facilitate  the  diffusion  of  knowl-
edge, technology and new ideas. This is one of the 
contributions of the endogenous growth literature 
to the trade productivity debate. An open economy 
(via trade and FDI) has more access to technology 
and knowledge embodied in traded goods, services 
and FDI.
This classification has no clear demarcation and, in 
general, these channels cannot be empirically dis-
tinguished. For example, increased export opportu-
nities and import competition can both affect each 
mechanism separately. Knowledge and technology 
spillovers  can  be  theoretically  attached  to  exports 
and  imports.  For  FDI  a  similar  reasoning  applies. 
Knowledge  and  technology  can  be  embodied  in 
outward and inward direct investment. Inward FDI 
increases competition and induces a better alloca-
tion of factor inputs and productivity and innovation 
effects. Outward FDI could increase the market for a 
firm, enabling it to exploit better the economies of 
scale39.
38   See the overview chapters of Feenstra (2004).
39   FDI and trade are also not independent from each other; see Markusen 
(2002) for the interplay between these two decisions.35
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Traditionally,  policy  options  focus  on  increasing 
openness  via  trade  measures,  trade-liberalisation 
deals and/or promoting FDI. Indeed the EU’s exter-
nal trade policies can help to further increase trade 
openness, but can Europe exploit the benefits of this 
openness? Are the channels between openness and 
productivity working to the net benefit of Europe? 
Can EU policies help to improve the functioning of 
these  channels?  The  trade  literature  on  firm  level 
data could identify hampering factors for productiv-
ity and export performance at firm level for different 
types of firms, which cannot be identified using a 
macro perspective.
2.3.  Stylised facts from the ‘heterogeneous 
firms’ literature
The  micro-economic  trade  literature  has  mostly 
focused on exports, and the burgeoning empirical 
research on international trade under this approach 
has delivered a number of stylised facts on exporting 
firms. Although empirical studies on imports and for-
eign direct investment are less abundant, there are 
nevertheless also some general findings.
2.3.1.  Firms and exporting behaviour: the export 
premium
The trade literature on heterogeneous firms has been 
largely motivated by the stylised facts for US firms 
reported by Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999)40. These 
authors found significant differences in firm charac-
teristics between exporting and non-exporting firms. 
In particular, they state that: ‘Exporters are dramati-
cally larger, more productive, pay higher wages, use 
more skilled workers, and are more technology- and 
capital-intensive than their non-exporting counter-
parts. The statement that exporters tend to outper-
form non-exporters on several aspects has proved to 
hold for longitudinal data and for a number of coun-
tries where firm-level data are available41.
The differences between exporters and non-export-
ers are summarised as the ‘export premium’. This 
denotes the difference between exporters and non-
exporters,  for  a  specific  economy  or  sector,  once 
other firm-level characteristics are controlled for (i.e. 
size, sector, and year)42.
40   Before them some other papers also used firm-level data (Tybout et al., 
1991), but the Bernard and Jensen results for US data attracted much more 
attention.
41   See, for example, International Study Group on Exports and Productivity 
(2007) and Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).
42   The export premium refers to any difference between exporting and 
non-exporting. However, it is commonly used to denote the export produc-
tivity premium, i.e. the differences in competitiveness between both sets of 
firms.
Two hypotheses are used to give a more profound 
explanation for the export productivity premium:
–   Learning-by-exporting hypothesis: firms participat-
ing in foreign markets are exposed to best-practice 
technology and receive knowledge and informa-
tion about processes and products. Export markets 
could also be more competitive, stimulating firms 
to reduce X-inefficiency and to innovate. Exporting 
thus will make a firm more productive.
–   Self-selection  hypothesis:  the  existence  of  fixed 
costs in international markets (market research to 
enter a new market, modification of existing prod-
ucts, setting up of new distribution channels, etc.) 
forms a barrier for firms to export, which only the 
most efficient firms can overcome. The combina-
tion of firm heterogeneity in terms of productivity, 
and trade entry costs leads to the self-selection of 
firms into exporting (see Box 1). In contrast to the 
learning-by-exporting hypothesis, the self-selection 
hypothesis  assumes  that  the  exporting  firm  has 
higher productivity before starting to export.
Box 1: The Melitz model: relation between 
openness and productivity
To explain the export premia Melitz (2003) intro-
duced  firm-heterogeneity  in  a  trade  theoretical 
model. In his framework only the most efficient 
firms can overcome fixed entry-costs into foreign 
markets and self-select into export markets. When 
these entry-costs (which include tariffs and NTBs, 
and sunk operation costs) are reduced, exporting 
firms expand and low-productivity non-exporting 
firms exit the market. The outcome is an aggregate 
increase in productivity. The interaction between 
the entry costs and firm productivity heterogene-
ity is thus fundamental to explain why some firms 
export while others do not. The channel between 
openness and productivity in the Melitz model is 
resource allocation due to more competition at 
the  firm  level.  Intersectoral  reallocation  due  to 
comparative advantages does not play a role in 
this model. Bernard et al. (2003a), Yeaple (2005), 
and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), among others, 
have followed and extended the theoretical results 
by Melitz.
Self-selection  and  learning-by  exporting  are  not 
two mutually exclusive hypotheses: most produc-
tive firms may self-select into exporting, but once 
firms  enter  export  markets  they  may  see  further 
productivity growth. Ultimately this is an empirical 
issue.  Reviews  of  empirical  studies  conclude  that 
exporters  are  more  productive  than  non-export-
ers, and that there is strong evidence to support 
the  self-selection  hypothesis,  while  evidence  for 36
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learning-by-exporting is less clear43. For developing 
and transition countries the learning-by-exporting 
hypothesis  is  more  firmly  established44.  This  dif-
ference in outcome for developed and developing 
countries is not well explained in the literature. It 
could  be  the  case  that  the  latter  exporters  con-
centrate  on  markets  and  export  products  where 
they can learn before being wiped out of the mar-
ket through fierce competition or that firms from 
developed countries already have access to all the 
relevant knowledge and are already used to fierce 
competition.
The stronger evidence in favour of the self-selection 
hypothesis has important consequences from a pol-
icy perspective as it indicates that causality may run 
from intra-firm productivity to exports, while causal-
ity in the opposite direction seems less clear. As more 
micro-level  datasets  containing  the  required  infor-
mation to test the learning-by exporting hypothesis 
become available, more insights into the relationship 
between exporting and intra-firm productivity will 
emerge (see Box 2).
2.3.2.  EU firms and exporting behaviour: stylized 
facts
In many EU countries, national firm-level databases 
are now available to analyse the export behaviour of 
firms. The coverage and quality of these databases 
varies in terms of the years reported, the sectoral 
coverage,  the  minimum  size  of  firms  in  terms  of 
employment and the degree of under-representation 
of small firms, and the number of firm characteris-
tics. Moreover, researchers use different methodolo-
gies. As a consequence, different studies for the same 
country present different figures for export perform-
ance. These caveats have to be borne in mind in 
interpreting and comparing the results of all these 
studies.
The International Study Group on Exports and Pro-
ductivity ((ISGEP) has taken the initiative to use a 
common  methodology  to  present  and  interpret 
facts  for  14  European  countries  for  which  these 
databases  are  available  for  the  national  research-
ers. All the methodological problems with respect 
to  the  coverage  and  time  span  of  the  databases 
remain, but at least the same definitions are used. 
Table 1 presents some stylised facts on export par-
ticipation rates (share of exporting firms), export 
intensity rates (share of exports in production) and 
export premia:
43   See Wagner (2007), Greenway and Kneller (2007), Mayer and Ottavi-
ano (2007), and Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2004). The latter also provided 
evidence that new exporters were already among the best and differed sig-
nificantly from the average non-exporter.
44   See Kraay (1999) for Chinese manufacturing firms, Bigsten et al. (2000) 
for African manufacturing firms, and De Loecker (2007) for Slovenian firms.
–   The export premia based on labour productivity 
are often in the range from 3% to 10% for the 
EU Member States, slightly lower than for the US, 
although given all the pitfalls in the data this can 
be hardly interpreted as a comparable fact. Box 
3  presents  additional  empirical  evidence  on  the 
export premia.
–   The size of a country seems to be negatively related 
to the export participation rate of the country. Ger-
many, France, UK, Italy and Spain have a participa-
tion rate in the range of 60%-75%45. Sweden, Den-
mark, Ireland, Belgium, Austria, and Slovenia have 
export participation rates of between 70%-90%46. 
For the EU as a whole the (weighted) export par-
ticipation rate is 70%.
–   For the export intensity rate the pattern is similar. 
The five large EU-countries have export intensity 
rates of about 30%. In the smaller countries the 
average firm in the data base exports about 50% 
of its production.
45   An exception is the rate of 28% for the UK, according to Mayer and 
Ottaviano (2007). The likely explanation is that all firms are included without 
any restriction on firm size (and smaller firms are less likely to export).
46   Norway has a low rate of 39% because its database includes almost all 
Norwegian firms; see Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).
Box 2: Empirical methodology to test 
self selection and learning-by-exporting 
hypothesis
Testing self-selection versus learning by exporting 
has attracted a considerable amount of research 
efforts. Self selection is empirically tested by using 
longitudinal data for plants to document differ-
ences in levels and growth rates of productivity 
(labour  or  total  factor)  between  exporters  and 
non-exporters  (following  the  methodology  of 
Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999). The exporters 
premia, defined as the ceteris paribus percentage 
change of labour productivity between exporters 
and non-exporters, is estimated from a regression 
of log labour productivity on the current export 
status  controlled  for  industry,  region,  firms  size 
and year.
The  idea  to  learning-by-exporting  is  that 
exporting  firms  get  access  to  knowledge  at 
international markets and foreign countries and 
that tougher competition increases productiv-
ity. This is tested by comparing firms or plants 
starting to export with hypothetical firms with 
the  same  characteristics  (based  on  matching 
methodologies) to over a period of time start-
ing the period before exporting and including 
some periods after this start. The crux is to find 
a good matching methodology. Data samples 
are much more limited by only selecting those 
firms which start exporting in the sample. See 
Wagner (2007).37
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These results are consistent with the fact that large 
economies  are  less  open.  Firms  in  small  countries 
have to export or import to benefit from large mar-
kets. The preliminary results from the heterogene-
ous firms literature seems to suggest that the higher 
openness  in  small  countries  can  be  explained  by 
more exporting firms (higher extensive margin) and 
by higher export intensity (intensive margin).
The national averages for export participation and 
intensity  rates  hide  remarkable  differences  at  firm 
Table 1: Characteristics of exporters in various EU countries
Export participation rate 
(EPR) in %
Export Intensity Rate 
(EIR) in %
Export premia (%)
Country 11 22 3 11 2 Lab. Prod.1 Value Added2
Germany 69 59 30 7.2
France 75 67 723 24 213 7.6-1.32 2.7
UK 70 28 32 3.9 1.3
Italy 69 74 72-674 33 38-304 3.6 2.1
Spain 75 31 8.1
Belgium 80 44 9.8 14.8
Hungary 48 13.5
Sweden 83 895 44 365 -0.1
Austria 71 44 5.3
Denmark 77 31 6.6
Norway 39 8.0
Ireland 70 846 53 7.3
Slovenia 81 467 557 5.0 29.67
EU8 69.5 31.3
US9 31 12 12.4 16.9
1Source: ISGEP (2007). The “-0.1” for labour productivity in Sweden is not significant. Values for Germany are based on the values 
for West Germany.
2Source: Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).
3Source: Bellone et al. (2007).
4Source: Basile (2001) and Serti and Tomasi (2007), respectively.
5Source: Hansson and Nan Ludin (2004).
6Source: Gleeson and Ruane (2007).
7Source: De Loecker (2007).
8Source: Estimates using GDP as weights.
9Source: Bernard and Jensen (1999 and 2004). Labour Productivity is based on a TFP-value.
level. Table 2 shows that exports are concentrated in 
a small percentage of firms: the happy few47. These 
are the largest firms with the highest export intensity 
rates.
A series of papers using micro datasets for France and 
Slovenia with export transactions broken down by 
destination have found that exports are concentrated 
in a few exporting firms that export many products 
47   From Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).
Table 2: Share of exports for top exporters in 2003, total manufacturing
Top one percent Top five percent Top ten percent
Germany 59 81 90
France 44 73 84
UK 42 69 80
Italy 32 59 72
Hungary 77 91 96
Belgium 48 73 84
Norway 53 81 91
Source: Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).38
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to many destinations, while many exporting firms 
export few products to few destinations.48 In addi-
tion, Damijan et al. (2004) find that the incursion of 
firms into new markets is gradual. On average, Slov-
enian firms export to a new market every two years. 
Moreover, this export expansion path follows gravity 
model predictions, i.e. geography (proximity) and 
size (GDP) condition where exporting firms expand 
their foreign sales. These papers also find evidence 
that the extensive margin (number of firms export-
ing)) is more important than the intensive margin 
(average exports per firm).
48   To obtain such conclusions, the firm-level databases have to be com-
bined with international trade transactions data. Trade transactions at firm 
level are hard to obtain and only few countries have been studied. Exceptions 
are Eaton et al. (2004) using French data from 1986, and Damijan et al. 
(2004) using Slovenian data for the period 1994-2002.
2.3.3.  EU firms and importing behaviour: stylized 
facts
There is less data material on the import behaviour 
of firms than on export behaviour. Recently, Muûls 
and Pisu (2007) presented results for the exports and 
imports of Belgian firms. For imports, they derive the 
same conclusions as for exports. The most produc-
tive firms import. The import premium in terms of 
productivity is 17% (compared to non-trading firms), 
while  it  is  9%  for  Belgian  exporters49.  Looking  at 
the intensive and extensive margins, empirical data 
49   If two-way traders are distinguished from the import-only and export-
only  groups,  the  import-only  and  export-only  premia  are  15%  and  6% 
respectively. The premium for two-way traders is then 27%. The distinction 
of  two-way  traders,  exporters-only  and  importers-only  suggests  that  the 
exporter productivity premium in other studies (in which two-way traders are 
not distinguished as a separate group) may have an upward bias since the 
exporter premium coefficient also captures the higher import productivity 
premium of the two-way traders.
Box 3: Export premia using Observatory of SMEs survey
Analysis of survey data from the “Observatory of European SMEs” (Gallup Organization, 2007) also con-
cludes that export premia is positive and highly significant. A distinctive feature of this survey is that it 
provides firm-level data for a broad group of countries: EU member states (except Bulgaria and Romania), 
Iceland, Norway and Turkey. Despite its name, the survey is representative of the firm population for all 
size classes.
Following the empirical literature on firm heterogeneity, regressions on labour productivity are run using 
export characteristics as explanatory variables. The estimating equation is
where LPi is labour productivity of firm i defined as total sales per employee, X is either the exporter identi-
fier (exporter dummy) or the export intensity ratio, and C is the vector of control variables, which include 
country, sector, and size.
Using a similar econometric specification, results (not reported here) show that exporters are bigger (by 
number of employees), use more imported inputs and have a higher proportion of skilled workers (defined 
as the percentage of workers with a university or another higher education diploma).
Export productivity premia (OLS regressions)
  2005  2006
  Export dummy  Export intensity  Export dummy  Export intensity
Export variable    0.34  0.23  0.43  0.49
  [0.04]***  [0.07]***  [0.04]***  [0.08]***
Premia (%)  40.8  26.3  54.3  63.4
Observations  6,392  6,392  6,299  6,299
Control variables (country, sector and size class) not reported.
Standard errors in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: Observatory of SMEs survey. Estimations from background material prepared for the Competitiveness Report.39
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show that most importers only trade with a limited 
number of countries. The number of importing firms 
falls as the number of importing countries increases, 
and  a  similar  pattern  is  observed  for  the  number 
of products. Most importing firms only buy a lim-
ited number of imported products and the number 
of  importing  firms  decreases  with  the  number  of 
imported products.
In Italy two-way traders are larger than just importers 
or exporters, which are also bigger than no-traders 
in terms of employment. The same applies to the 
share of non-production workers and wages based 
on a dataset of 20000 firms. Serti et al. (2007) do not 
estimate the labour productivity premium, but the 
results for white collar workers and wages suggest 
the presence of such a premium for two-way traders, 
exporters and importers.
As in the case of exports, the import premium could 
be the consequence of self-selection or productivity 
gains from importing. Fixed costs of imports could 
mean that importing is only profitable for the most 
productive firms. In this case, the import premium 
could be the consequence of self-selection, as would 
seem to be the case for exports: importers first have 
to raise productivity in order to cover the sunk costs of 
importing. On the other hand, endogenous growth 
theory suggests that firms could raise productivity 
through access to cheaper and higher-quality inter-
mediate supplies (including imports) and knowledge 
spillovers  from  domestic  and  foreign  intermediar-
ies. These two theories are not empirically tested at 
firm level, but empirical work at sectoral and macro 
level suggests a clear positive relationship, in most 
cases  running  from  imports  to  productivity50.  As 
with exports, however, the theories are not mutually 
exclusive, and the most productive firms could self-
select into importing but then become even more 
productive  through  access  to  better  intermediates 
and  imported  capital  goods  that  embody  foreign 
technology.
2.3.4.  Innovating firms and trade in the EU: stylised 
facts
Innovation (measured by public, business and for-
eign R&D)51 and productivity across firms are posi-
tively related in OECD countries52. The literature on 
heterogeneous  firms  also  suggests  that  the  more 
50   See, among others, Lee (1995), Eaton and Kortum (2001), Baumann 
and di Mauro (2007), Halpern et al. (2005).
51   Although  a  considerable  proportion  of  innovations  are  produced  by 
firms that have no R&D facilities, R&D is seen in many instances as a good 
proxy to assess innovative activity in firms, specially in the high-tech sectors.
52   Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2001a).
productive firms are those which are more technol-
ogy and capital intensive.
Innovating  firms  are  also  more  internationally  ori-
ented and are more likely to export than non-inno-
vators  (see  Table  3)53.  The  more  innovations  they 
have,  the  higher  the  probability  of  entering  the 
export  market.  Innovative  effort  is  a  more  impor-
tant determinant of trade performance than relative 
wage costs or relative investments. Innovators not 
only export more, they also export to more destina-
tions: the geographical markets of innovative Euro-
pean firms are larger and more diversified than those 
of non-innovative firms.
Empirical  analysis  of  firms’  innovation  efforts  and 
export  behaviour  shows  a  significant  and  sizeable 
innovation premium: exporters have five times more 
sales of new or improved products than non-export-
ers (see Box 4)54.
Innovation (proxied by relative R&D and patenting 
activity) helps explain import volumes55, but as dis-
cussed in section 2, the causality between innova-
tion and trade also runs the other way. Lelarge and 
Nefussi (2007) study the responses of French firms to 
competitive pressures from low-wage countries. They 
find that competition from low-wage countries is an 
incentive for innovation expenditures, specifically for 
the most productive firms56. The results also indicate 
that innovation indeed contributes to a change in 
the activities of firms and to an increase in the qual-
ity of their exports. This result seems to imply that 
more intensive import competition increases innova-
tion and productivity (for surviving firms). However, 
other studies using UK firm-level panel data suggest 
an  inverted  U-curve  for  the  relationship  between 
competition and innovation. If competition becomes 
too intense, profits will erode along with opportuni-
ties to finance innovation57.
It can be concluded that there is empirical evidence 
for causality running from imports to innovation and 
from innovation to productivity as a consequence 
of increased competition up to a certain extent (the 
turning point of the inverted-U curve). Nevertheless, 
the causality links between innovation, exports and 
productivity require further research.
53   See Wakelin (1998). She used as innovation proxies both R&D expendi-
ture and number of innovations produced and used for exporters and non-
exporters.
54   Since most firm-based datasets do not have information on innovation, 
it is hard to interpret and compare these results.
55   See Anderton (1999) for both Germany and the UK.
56   Note that this mechanism works through increased competition. In sec-
tion 2.3.3 the focus is on the effects of imported intermediate inputs on the 
productivity of firms.
57   Aghion et al. (2005) and Aghion and Griffith (2005).40
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Table 3: Firm characteristics for innovators and non-innovators
Innovators Non-innovators
Exporters Non-exporters Exporters Non-exporters
Propensity to export 0.43 0.38 (0.31)
Average capital intensity 0.49 0.39 (0.34) 10.51 (0.49) 0.43 (0.65)
Unit labour costs 0.22 0.20 (0.11) 0.23 (0.10) 0.26 (0.16)
Number of innovations 3.9 (9.6) 1.7 (2.5)
Number of observations 355 200 350 180
Source: Wakelin (1998). Standard deviations are in brackets.
Box 4: Estimating export innovation premia
The Observatory of SMEs survey (Gallup 2007) contains information on the percentage of sales gener-
ated by new or significantly improved products or services for each firm. This percentage can be used 
as an indicator of the firm’s innovation efforts, which is run against export variables: an export dummy 
(whether or not the firm exports) and an export intensity dummy (ratio of export to total sales). Using the 
export dummy the results show that exporters are more innovative and have 5 times more sales of new 
or improved products. When export intensity is used, the innovation premia is even higher. Additional 
empirical analysis (not reported) also showed that the innovation indicator is positively related to the pro-
portion of imported inputs.
Export innovation premia (OLS regressions)
  2005  2006
  Export dummy  Export intensity  Export dummy  Export intensity
Export variable    5.43***  10.75***  5.28***  8.41***
  [0.77]  [1.42]  [0.78]  [1.53]
Observations  3,617  3,613  3,690  3,690
Control variables (country, sector and size class) not reported.
Standard errors in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: Observatory of SMEs survey. Estimations from background material prepared for the Competitiveness Report.
2.3.5.  Stylised facts on multinationals and 
productivity
The  role  of  the  multinationals  (MNEs)  was  intro-
duced  into  the  heterogeneous  firms  theory  by 
Helpman et al. (2004), who concluded that these 
companies outperform non-exporting and (solely) 
exporting firms in terms of productivity. They esti-
mate  that  MNEs  are  15%  more  productive  than 
other (exporting) firms. In addition, Bernard et al. 
(2005) conclude that multinationals play a key role 
in  US  employment  and  trade  patterns  (they  are 
responsible for roughly 90 per cent of US exports 
and imports in their sample).
Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) confirm these views for 
European multinationals. The value added premium of 
MNEs (compared to non-MNEs) is 11% for Norway, 23 
% for France, 25% for Belgium, and 31% for German 
MNEs58. These FDI value added premia are much higher 
than the exporter premia discussed in section 2.3.2. 
Analysis  of  UK  data  also  shows  that  foreign-owned 
companies operating in the UK enjoy higher levels of 
productivity and foreign-owned subsidiaries are almost 
12% less likely to close than UK-owned firms. Further-
more, high-productivity firms become on average even 
58   The estimation for Germany is based on Arnold and Hussinger (2005).41
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9% more efficient two years after having been acquired 
in the UK59. This is in line with the theory that mul-
tinational firms transfer a range of intangible propri-
etary assets to their affiliates (Caves, 1996, Markusen, 
2002). MNEs may also positively affect productivity in 
host countries through human capital by training and 
on-the-job learning. Empirical and anecdotal evidence 
indicates  that  MNEs  tend  to  provide  more  training 
than domestic firms. Subsidiaries may also have a posi-
tive influence on human capital enhancement in other 
domestic firms with which they develop links60.
2.3.6.  Stylised facts on knowledge and technology 
spillovers
The  international  transmission  of  R&D  knowledge 
through trade has been a significant contributor to 
TFP growth61. Through imports, domestic producers 
have indirect access to the foreign stock of knowl-
edge which they can draw on to increase productiv-
ity. This is the main conclusion of the seminal work 
of Coe and Helpman (1995). Their methodology has 
been often criticised62, but the overall result that for-
eign sources of knowledge are important for most 
countries is widely accepted.
For larger countries foreign sources of technology and 
knowledge are less important: for the G-7 countries 
the relative contribution of foreign R&D to produc-
tivity is about one fifth, while for the smaller OECD 
countries its relative contribution is about 60%63. In 
the same vein, empirical evidence for Belgian indus-
tries points to the existence of productivity- enhanc-
ing R&D spillovers from both imports and domestic 
intermediates to manufacturing sectors. A weak pro-
ductivity effect of industry-own R&D is found, but 
this is significantly smaller than the effect generated 
by international R&D spillovers64.
At  firm  or  plant  level,  Barrios  et  al.  (2007)  found 
for  Irish  plants  that  while  domestic  plants  benefit 
from local R&D spillovers, these spillovers are spa-
59   See Harris and Li (2007) and Girma et al. (2007).
60   See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2001b) and OECD (2007).
61   Coe et al. (1997); Crespo et al. (2004); Del Barrio-Castro et al. (2002); 
Engelbrecht (1997); Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2001b and 2004); Keller 
(2004), Lumenga-Neso et al. (2005).
62   First of all the role of trade patterns in determining the foreign R&D 
stocks has been disputed by Keller (1998), showing that randomly gener-
ated import ratios can lead to similar or even higher international spillovers. 
Second,  Lichtenberg  and  van  Pottelsberghe  (1998)  have  shown  that  the 
weighting schemes of Coe and Helpman (1995) bias the measurement of 
foreign R&D capital stocks while their indexation scheme also biases the esti-
mates of spillover coefficients. Using their own proposed alternative weight-
ing scheme, they find significant spillovers, although of a somewhat reduced 
magnitude. Third, Kao et al. (1999) do not find evidence of the effect of 
foreign R&D capital stocks on international spillovers, which appears insignifi-
cant when using a dynamic OLS estimator (with better power properties). 
63   See Coe and Helpman (1995) and Keller (2002). Frantzen (2002) cal-
culates the elasticity of TFP with respect to domestic R&D capital, which is, 
on average, about 50% larger in the G7 economies compared to the smaller 
OECD economies.
64  See Biatour and Kegels (2007).
tially  bounded.  Furthermore,  domestic  plants  do 
not appear to benefit from R&D done by foreign 
affiliates. Cassiman and Veugelers (2004) find that 
Belgian firms that have access to international tech-
nology are likely to generate local spillovers. How-
ever, it turns out that multinationals do not trans-
fer  technology  more  intensively  than  exporters  or 
than  local  firms  with  access  to  world  technology, 
once their superior access to international technol-
ogy is accounted for. Using Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS) data, Crespi et al. (2008) find that the 
main sources of knowledge in the UK are competi-
tors, suppliers and plants that belong to the same 
business group (these three sources of knowledge 
together account for about 50% of TFP growth). The 
main free information spillover is from competitors, a 
result robustly correlated with MNE presence65.
Evidence of positive spillovers is strongest and most 
consistent in the case of vertical linkages, in particu-
lar  backward  linkages  with  local  suppliers.  MNEs 
are found to provide technical assistance, training 
and other information to raise the quality of sup-
pliers’  products.  Horizontal  spillovers  seem  to  be 
more  important  between  firms  operating  in  unre-
lated industries, probably because foreign affiliates 
want  to  avoid  knowledge  spillovers  to  immediate 
competitors. In all cases the productivity effect of 
foreign R&D is affected by absorption capacity. The 
same applies at country level, with some countries 
benefiting more from foreign technology than oth-
ers  because  of  their  higher  absorptive  capacity66. 
Domestic R&D is key for tapping into foreign knowl-
edge, and countries that invest in their own R&D 
benefit most from foreign R&D.
To sum up, the literature provides empirical positive 
evidence on aggregate international knowledge spill-
overs, but firm-level tests that take into consideration 
geographical and technological distance place some 
conditions on the link from inward FDI to productiv-
ity gains.
Finally, when considering knowledge spillovers, it is 
important to note how the protection of knowledge 
is related to trade and FDI. Weak patent regimes are 
significant barriers to manufacturing trade, particu-
larly in goods that are sensitive to intellectual prop-
erty  rights  (IPRs).  Nevertheless,  these  barriers  are 
only  important  for  industrialising  economies  that 
pose a credible imitation threat. As these countries 
strengthen their IPR regime, they should attract ris-
ing import volumes of high-technology goods. FDI 
in the form of complex but easily copied technolo-
gies is also likely to increase as IPRs are strengthened, 
65   CIS is an official EU-wide survey of innovation inputs, outputs and factors 
hampering innovation.
66   See OECD (2007) and Acharya and Keller (2007), among others.42
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because patents, copyrights and trademarks increase 
the  value  of  knowledge-based  assets,  which  may 
be efficiently exploited through internalised organi-
sation.  In  any  event,  the  likelihood  that  the  most 
advanced technologies will be transferred raises as 
IPRs are strengthened. This is particularly the case for 
capital and knowledge intensive sectors67.
2.4.  Factors hampering trade
2.4.1.  Concept of trade costs
In  an  extensive  survey  of  the  literature,  Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2004) define trade costs as all the 
costs incurred in getting a good from one country to 
its final user in the destination country68. They divide 
these  costs  into  three  broad  categories:  transport 
costs,  border  costs  (which  include  policy  barriers, 
but also language and currency barriers), and retail 
and wholesale distribution costs. Combining direct 
evidence on international policy barriers (tariffs, quo-
tas), transport costs, and retail and distribution costs 
with indirect evidence on trade costs, they find a 
170% ad-valorem tax equivalent of all trade costs for 
a developed country69. This can be roughly divided 
into 21% for transport costs, 44% for border-related 
trade  costs  and  55%  for  retail  and  wholesale  dis-
tribution  costs70.  One  of  their  main  conclusions  is 
that policy-related costs (tariffs and non-tariff policy 
barriers)71 account for only 8% of the 44% border 
costs, suggesting important additional barriers asso-
ciated with national borders. In fact, other non-pol-
icy border barriers such as language (7%), currency 
(14%), information costs (6%) and security barriers 
(3%) are much more important. All this suggests that 
direct policy instruments (tariffs, quotas and trade 
barriers associated with exchange rate systems) are 
less important than other policies for trade in devel-
oped countries, i.e. transport infrastructure invest-
ment,  regulations,  informational  institutions,  lan-
guage, law enforcement and related property-rights 
institutions (including intellectual property rights)72. 
67   See Maskus (2000); Maskus and Penubarti (1995); Smith (1999).
68   In this section, trade and trade costs refer to international trade between 
two countries. From an EU policy perspective it is important to distinguish 
internal trade (in the Internal Market) from external trade. For the former, 
the trade barriers are lower, in particular the border costs. In the economic 
literature this difference is often neglected. This is also the perception of firms 
responding to the survey discussed later on in this section. Wherever possible 
the distinction between internal and external trade is made.
69   The authors complement the (incomplete and sometimes inaccurate) 
direct measures of trade costs with indirect measures, mainly inference from 
trade flows using gravity models.
70   Note that the tax equivalent of 170 is calculated as: (1+tax equivalent) = 
(1+21)*(1+44)*(1+55).
71   Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) include: price and quantity measures; anti-
dumping and countervailing duty investigations and measures; standards, 
licensing requirements and other quality measures.
72   Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) also find that overall trade costs vary 
considerably between goods and countries. The broad ad-valorem estimates 
are only an indicator for the relative importance of the different trade costs.
For the Internal Market in the EU these border costs 
are much lower, but not negligible (see below).
In the literature, other categorisations of trade costs 
are also commonly found. The most common dis-
tinguish the variable and fixed costs of entering a 
foreign  market.  Variable  costs  include  transporta-
tion, insurance and direct trade-policy costs such as 
tariffs and quotas. Fixed costs are also called sunk, 
entry and/or beachhead costs. These include tech-
nical barriers to trade (TBTs, which include health, 
safety  and  environmental  certifications),  costs  of 
introducing  new  varieties,  distribution  channels, 
and the information costs related to marketing and 
policy regulations. In Anderson and van Wincoop’s 
categorisation, these fixed trade costs mainly come 
under information costs, security barriers and retail 
and wholesale distribution costs.
Specific  country  regulations  include  licences  and 
authorisation requirements, insurance liabilities and 
bank  account  conditions,  administrative  and  tax 
procedures, and restrictions on inputs, suppliers and 
personnel73. In a survey of a large number of busi-
ness-service firms in the EU, 78% of the responding 
firms mention that the setup costs for selling services 
in other EU countries are ‘significant’ or ‘very signifi-
cant’ trading barriers. Of those firms able to estimate 
the amount of the setup costs, 30 per cent estimated 
that these are in the order of 3-6 months sales pro-
ceeds, and 43 per cent estimated that the costs are 
more than 6 months sales proceeds74. The setup-cost 
effects are largest for small and medium-sized enter-
prises.
2.4.2.  Empirical linkages between trade costs and 
productivity
Firm-level  databases  do  not  provide  information 
on trade costs. Thus, it is not possible to arrive at a 
direct assessment of the productivity impact of trade 
cost changes. However, some papers have estimated 
trade costs at the macro level and integrated them 
into firm-level datasets to assess the effects of trade 
policy on aggregate productivity.
A first approach combines gravity model estimations 
of trade costs with calibrated firm-level models and 
data.  Following  the  predictions  of  the  theoretical 
firm-heterogeneity  models,  aggregate  productiv-
ity will increase due to within-industry reallocations 
associated with decreasing trade costs. As these trade 
costs fall, two effects are present. First, increased for-
eign competition in the local market results in low-
productivity firms exiting. Secondly, firms that are 
73   Kox and Lejour (2005) provide a much longer list, in particular relevant 
for services.
74   CSES (2001).43
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currently not exporting will begin to export while 
currently exporting firms will increase their foreign 
sales. Note that the increase in aggregate produc-
tivity emerges mainly from these two effects rather 
than from higher individual firm-productivity from 
exporting. The theoretical models delivering these 
predictions were developed to explain the empirical 
relevance of the self-selection hypothesis. The first 
study  using  this  methodology  was  for  the  United 
States. Bernard et al. (2003b) constructed a measure 
of trade costs by US industry and found that pro-
ductivity growth is faster in sectors with decreasing 
trade costs. The largest growth is found in industries 
with high levels of imports. This result points to the 
importance  of  pro-competitive  effects  of  reduced 
trade costs. The findings also show that within-sector 
reallocation is driven by low-productivity firms exit-
ing the market and by increases in the production of 
new exporting firms. This suggests that extensive-
margin changes have a greater role in the realloca-
tion process than intensive-margin changes75.
For the EU, Del Gatto et al. (2006) have also used 
macro-level trade costs and calibrated heterogene-
ous firm models to assess the impact of trade policy 
on productivity76. They simulated two scenarios. In 
the  first  scenario,  they  estimate  that  average  pro-
ductivity is reduced by 13% if bilateral trade within 
the EU is eliminated (i.e. the costs of non-Europe). 
In the second scenario, trade barriers within the EU 
are reduced by 5%, and they estimate a productivity 
increase of 2%. These numbers point to significant 
gains from trade in the Internal Market. In a subse-
quent paper, Corcos et al. (2007) extend the analysis 
by disaggregating France into 23 regions, in combi-
nation with another 10 EU countries. They obtain a 
similar result in estimating the costs of non-Europe. 
When behind-the-border costs (BTBs) are eliminated, 
trade costs are reduced by 34% and an average pro-
ductivity gain of 20% is obtained, though with con-
siderable heterogeneity across countries (from 1% 
in Portugal to 60% in Germany)77. In both papers, 
productivity changes associated with trade may be 
underestimated since other major EU trading part-
ners (US, China, India) are not included.
For a dataset of UK manufacturing firms, Kneller et 
al. (2008) confirm the previous gravity model find-
ings: hostile business environments in foreign coun-
tries (EU and non-EU) represent greater trade barriers 
than those related to traditional measures of trade 
75   These results are confirmed by Helpman et al. (2007), but seem to con-
tradict the findings of Tybout (2001), who concludes that plants rationalise 
their production and do not exit because of fixed costs.
76   First, they obtain firm productivity (TFP) and its distribution using firm-
level data from Amadeus and macroeconomic data (i.e. bilateral trade data) 
to estimate trade costs from a gravity equation for 11 EU countries.
77   These large country differences are due to country size and level of inte-
gration within the EU.
costs such as tariffs. An improvement in the business 
environment of foreign countries leads to an increase 
in both the export intensity of established exporters 
and export market entry. These results are driven by 
the EU component of the trade costs.
A  second  approach  to  assess  the  impact  of  trade 
costs on average productivity consists in using direct 
micro-level information on trade costs and other fac-
tors hampering exports. Survey data for the UK on 
the perceived importance of trade barriers among 
individual  firms  point  towards  the  same  barriers 
identified  using  gravity  equations:  trade  costs  are 
associated  with  imperfect  information  (on  export 
markets, potential customers, decision makers and 
contact  persons),  different  languages,  currencies, 
law  enforcement  and  property  rights,  and  regula-
tion78.  Reported  trade  barriers  decrease  only  with 
the export experience of the firm, while size, pro-
ductivity and other firm characteristics do not have a 
significant impact. This suggests that sunk costs are 
significant and play an important role in the decision 
by firms to export.
The ‘Observatory of European SMEs’ survey also con-
tains information on factors hampering trade. It pro-
vides information on constraints affecting exporting 
(inside and outside Europe) and the importance of 
the EU internal market for European firms79. Table 4 
classifies the answers by sector80. Import tariffs have 
an above-average importance for the wholesale and 
retail sector, but are not important for hotels and res-
taurants, or for health and social work services. Lack 
of knowledge of foreign markets is more important 
for other services. Lack of management resources is a 
bigger constraint for health and other services. Lan-
guage problems are more significant for real estate 
and  business  activities.  For  the  financial  interme-
diation sector, different EU regulations (typically an 
internal market issue) are the main export constraint, 
while  non-EU  regulations  are  the  most  important 
export constraints for health and social work and for 
other services.
One noteworthy result is that information restrictions 
(i.e.  lack  of  foreign  market  knowledge)  are  more 
important  than  the  traditional  direct  policy-based 
trade constraints represented by import tariffs and 
duties. Moreover, the combination of EU and non-
EU regulations is the main export restriction, espe-
cially for service sectors. These results are consistent 
with the trade cost findings in the other studies sum-
78   Kneller and Pisu (2007).
79   17283 firms are sampled, with information on number of employees, 
sales, exports for 2005 and 2006, main export destination country, and per-
centage of imported inputs.
80   Since the question is designed to obtain a single answer, the choice of 
a specific constraint as the most important does not mean that other con-
straints are not relevant for a firm’s export decisions. 44
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marised above, where import tariffs are only a minor 
trade hampering factor, while other constraints, such 
as lack of information, internal regulations and bor-
der costs are more significant.
To analyse the relationship between trade barriers 
and firm characteristics, regressions on each export 
constraint category were estimated using as control 
variables a number of possible determinants includ-
ing: export intensity in 2005, country-specific dum-
mies, EU membership, being a large EU economy, 
production sector, size of firm, and main export des-
tination being within the EU. The estimation can be 
interpreted as showing how each of these control 
variables affects the probability of perceiving a given 
constraint as the main trade barrier.
Table  5  presents  the  regression  results.  Given  the 
qualitative nature of the question on trade barriers, 
the focus is only on the sign and significance of the 
variables and not on the possible size of the effects. 
For example, higher labour productivity and having 
the  EU  as  the  main  export  destination  diminishes 
the  probability  of  perceiving  import  tariffs  as  the 
main export constraint. By determinants, the results 
show that export intensity is highly significant in the 
regression for the probability of considering lack of 
knowledge of foreign markets as the main constraint. 
Firms with a higher proportion of exports in total 
Table 4: Main (perceived) constraints to export by sectors
Main constraint to export Percentage by sector
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Import tariffs and duties 8.6 4.2 10.6 0.0 8.1 7.0 3.7 0.0 5.3
Lack  of  knowledge  of  foreign 
markets
10.5 14.6 11.6 2.9 9.0 11.6 14.2 14.3 21.1
Lack of management resources 4.0 4.2 4.4 8.6 4.5 4.7 7.4 14.3 10.5
Language problems 2.5 2.1 2.2 5.7 3.6 0.0 6.8 0.0 5.3
Different regulation in EU coun-
tries
5.5 10.4 7.9 5.7 5.4 18.6 9.5 7.1 5.3
Regulations in non-EU countries 8.7 7.3 4.9 2.9 4.5 7.0 4.7 21.4 10.5
Lack of capital 5.9 8.3 5.4 11.4 8.1 2.3 8.4 7.1 5.3
No constraints at all 39.3 28.1 36.2 37.1 39.6 23.3 29.5 28.6 26.3
Product or service not suited to 
export
2.0 6.3 3.0 2.9 1.8 2.3 2.1 0.0 0.0
DK/NA 13.1 14.6 13.8 22.9 15.3 23.3 13.7 7.1 10.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
NACE sector classification: 1. Manufacturing; 2. Construction; 3. Wholesale and retail; 4. Hotels and restaurants; 5. Transport 
and communication; 6. Financial intermediation; 7. Real estate and business activities; 8. Health and social work; 9. Other 
services.
Source: ‘Observatory of European SMEs’ survey (Gallup 2007).
sales on average find lack of knowledge less impor-
tant as a trade constraint. They could have learned 
precisely in order to enter the export market. On the 
other hand, export intensity increases the probability 
of finding lack of capital as more relevant or finding 
no constraints. The skill level of a firm’s employees is 
only significant in explaining an increase in the prob-
ability of finding EU regulations as the main export 
barrier.
It is important to note that firm size (proxied by the 
number  of  employees  in  2005)  is  only  significant 
in increasing the probability of non-EU regulations 
being perceived as the main trade constraint. This 
means that the size of the firm is not an important 
determinant for the perception of most trade con-
straints. This is a counter-intuitive result, since SMEs 
are expected to have a different set of trade con-
straints than larger firms81. Finally, labour productiv-
ity significantly lowers the probability for three bar-
riers: import tariffs, language problems and lack of 
capital. This negative impact is in accordance with 
the theoretical predictions for self-selection whereby 
more efficient firms are more likely to overcome sunk 
trade costs. Most of the other results are intuitive and 
present  a  straightforward  interpretation  for  some 
export  barriers.  For  example,  larger  firms  usually 
81   This was also the conclusion in Kneller and Pisu (2007).45
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have more export destinations and are thus more 
concerned  about  regulations  in  non-EU  countries 
than smaller EU firms, which export mainly within 
the EU’s single market.
Firms were also asked to gauge the importance of 
four EU internal market policies for their ability to do 
business within the EU. Approval percentages were 
defined as the number of firms that consider each 
policy  as  very  important  and/or  rather  important. 
Each of the four internal market policies considered 
was accordingly ranked as follows: same currency in 
most member states (71%), single market legislation 
(69%), no border controls (59%), and ability to hire 
workers from other EU countries (40%). This distribu-
tion of responses confirms the previous results point-
ing to differences in regulation, border controls, and 
different currencies as important trade barriers. To 
assess these interpretations, the probability of select-
ing each EU internal market policy as important was 
estimated using the set of control variables presented 
in Table 6.
As expected, being an exporter increases the prob-
ability of considering internal market policies to be 
Table 5: Logit regressions for each export barrier
Export Export Export Export Export Export Export Export
barrier 
1
barrier 
2
barrier 
3
barrier 
4
barrier 
5
barrier 
6
barrier 
7
barrier 
8
Export intensity 0.51 -1.35*** -0.56 -0.60 0.13 0.50 0.91** 0.34*
[0.32] [0.34] [0.45] [0.64] [0.35] [0.34] [0.19] [0.19]
EU member state -0.66 0.79 1.95* 0.93 1.37* 1.05* -0.62**
[0.44] [0.45] [1.06] [0.80] [0.78] [0.61] [0.27]
EU large country 0.41 0.23 0.49 0.66 0.25 -0.19 -0.03 -0.29*
[0.26] [0.23] [0.30] [0.43] [0.26] [0.28] [0.32] [0.15]
Main export destination EU -0.45** 0.41** -0.06 0.64 0.96*** -0.49** 0.20 0.31**
[0.22] [0.21] [0.28] [0.47] [0.28] [0.23] [0.27] [0.13]
Skill levels -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Employment in 2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0002** 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Labour productivity 2005 -0.18* -0.08 -0.12 -0.34* 0.12 0.16 -0.43*** 0.05
[0.10] [0.09] [0.14] [0.20] [0.11] [0.11] [0.12] [0.06]
Observations 1203 1244 1244 1144 1239 1244 1239 1244
Country and sector dummies are not reported. None of the sectoral dummies where significant in any specification. Standard 
errors in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Export barriers are: 1. Import tariffs and duties; 2. Lack of knowledge of foreign markets; 3. Lack of management resources; 
4. Language problems; 5. Different regulation in EU countries; 6. Regulations in non-EU countries; 7. Lack of capital; 8. No 
constraints.
Source: ‘Observatory of European SMEs’ survey (Gallup 2007). Estimations from background material prepared for the Com-
petitiveness Report.
very  important,  except  for  the  hiring  of  other  EU 
workers. Moreover, having a higher proportion of 
imported inputs has the same effects as being an 
exporter. Finally, higher labour productivity -as with 
export  constraints-  reduces  the  perceived  impor-
tance of the internal market. Since we also find that 
exporters are significantly more productive than non-
exporting firms, these results suggest that the three 
internal market policies in question benefit mostly 
those exporters with lower than average exporters-
productivity. In other words, those European export-
ers can probably only overcome the sunk trade costs 
in the EU, but not in other markets.
2.5.  What has the heterogeneous firms 
literature delivered?
2.5.1.  Bringing together micro and macro level
Many empirical studies using plant or firm-level data 
have shown that exporting firms are more produc-
tive than non-exporting firms. Moreover, most firms 
export only a few products to only a few destina-
tions. The results also suggest that exporting firms 46
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Table 6: Probit regressions for each EU internal market policy
Border controls Same currency EU workers Single market
Exporter in 2005 0.18* 0.36*** -0.14* 0.21**
[0.09] [0.12] [0.08] [0.11]
EU member state 0.25*** 0.46*** 0.17** 0.02
[0.08] [0.09] [0.08] [0.10]
EU new member -0.03 -0.21* -0.03 0.02
[0.10] [0.11] [0.09] [0.11]
Main export destination EU 0.08 -0.05 0.16* -0.01
[0.10] [0.13] [0.09] [0.12]
Labour productivity 2005 -0.04* -0.05* 0.00 -0.04*
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
Imported inputs 0.003*** 0.01*** -0.001 0.0003**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Sectoral dummies and non significant coefficients not reported. Standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Number of observations 3808.
Source: ‘Observatory of European SMEs’ survey (Gallup 2007). Estimations from background material prepared for the Com-
petitiveness Report.
are already more productive than others before enter-
ing the export market. Although some productivity 
improvements  due  to  exporting  are  not  excluded 
(but hard to identify in most databases), they cannot 
explain the productivity premium of exporters versus 
non-exporters. A related result is that (fixed) market 
entry costs seem to matter more for trade than tariffs. 
To overcome these entry costs firms have to increase 
productivity  before  entry.  This  reasoning  suggests 
that the causality runs from intra-firm productivity 
increases to exports. The macro-economic results for 
the causality between openness and growth are not 
undisputed, but the hypothesis that trade increases 
productivity seems to be the most likely relationship. 
Does the micro and macro literature deliver contra-
dictory results on the relationship between openness 
and productivity? Not necessarily.
First, self-selection could be ‘conscious self-selection’, 
a conscious decision by firms that increase their pro-
ductivity in order to enter export markets: firms learn 
to export (through investment in new technologies 
leading to pre-entry increases in productivity) rather 
than learn by exporting. If this is the case, the desire 
to expand internationally comes before the produc-
tivity  increase  needed  to  overcome  market  entry 
costs.  The  causal  link  runs  then  from  (perceived) 
trade openness to productivity increases to trade82.
Second, even if firm-level productivity is not driven 
by exporting, aggregate productivity may still rise 
82   López (2005) presents some anecdotal evidence from developing coun-
tries that supports this hypothesis.
as a result of trade liberalisation through a selection 
effect. Intensified competition drives out less efficient 
firms and reallocates resources to more productive 
firms that can afford the additional cost of interna-
tionalisation and thus benefit from market access. 
According  to  the  self-selection  hypothesis,  reallo-
cation  is  the  main  transmission  channel  between 
exports and productivity (see Box 1).
Third, the new literature focuses mainly on exports. 
The  openness-income  debate  in  the  macro  litera-
ture considers imports and exports together (in one 
openness indicator). As discussed in the stylised facts 
section,  importers  are  more  productive  than  non-
importers, but the causal link in the case of imports 
has not been deeply analysed using firm-level data. 
It could be the case that firms become more produc-
tive through importing, as the endogenous growth 
literature suggests: the greater variety of inputs and 
the  knowledge  spillovers  associated  with  imports 
increase productivity. The productivity premium for 
importers also suggests that importing entails some 
fixed costs. This would be in line with the transaction 
costs theories. In any case, importing, like exporting, 
also increases aggregate productivity through com-
petition and reallocation.
Fourth,  Sieber  and  Silva-Porto  (2007)  show  that  a 
1% increase in the import penetration ratio increases 
labour productivity growth by 0.027% for manufactur-
ing sectors in the EU and US. If exports increase by 1%, 
labour productivity grows by only 0.016%. According 
to this result, importing could be a more important 
source of productivity growth than exporting.47
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Fifth, openness in the form of FDI also increases pro-
ductivity. Inward FDI increases aggregate productiv-
ity through the reallocation of inputs to more produc-
tive firms and through foreign knowledge spillovers. 
Foreign knowledge also spills over from inward FDI 
to competitors and suppliers of intermediate inputs. 
Often  the  foreign  affiliates  stem  off  from  highly 
productive, high-tech firms. The relevance of these 
spillovers depends on distance from the headquarter 
countries  and  absorption  capacity  (human  capital 
and innovation) on the host market. Outward FDI 
increases the market for a firm enabling it to exploit 
economies of scale.
A  superficial  overview  of  this  new  literature  could 
easily lead to the conclusion that reallocation due to 
exporting activities is the main transmission channel 
between  openness  and  productivity.  As  the  argu-
ments  above  point  out  this  is  not  necessarily  the 
case. The new heterogeneous firms literature mainly 
concentrates on exports and less on imports and FDI. 
With  its  focus  on  firms’  heterogeneity  and  export 
behaviour,  the  importance  of  other  transmission 
channels is not well covered.
2.5.2.  Trade policy insights
2.5.2.1.  Extending market integration
Traditional  trade  policies,  like  import  tariffs,  have 
become less relevant, at least in the industrial coun-
tries and for manufacturing goods. This can be seen 
as the success of the negotiation rounds on trade lib-
eralisation starting in 1948 (WTO, 2007). Of course, 
for  some  (mainly  industrial)  sectors  as  well  as  for 
trade with some developing countries, import tariffs 
are still high; however, this does not call into ques-
tion the overall trends towards low tariffs. Nowadays, 
other trade costs are much more important: informa-
tion costs, non-tariff barriers, country-specific regula-
tion, customs procedures, exchange rate risks and 
cultural barriers.
EU trade policy should be directed to deep integra-
tion  with  third  countries,  preferably  by  removing 
behind-the-border barriers, and by enhancing inter-
national  regulatory  co-operation83.  Further  multi-
lateral  liberalisation  (WTO)  should  continue  to  be 
a main priority, as import tariffs for particular sec-
tors and countries are still the main trade barriers 
for European firms exporting abroad. But also deep 
trade  agreements  with  main  (potential)  partners 
are important. Deep trade agreements could allow 
us to go beyond the Doha Round currently under 
negotiation on a number of significant issues such 
as services, NTBs, trade facilitation and foreign direct 
83   The discussion that follows is not intended to suggest that this is all new. 
On the contrary, many points are already part of EU trade policy.
investment. More ambitious elements such as (elec-
tronic) information contact points for exporters and 
investors on regulation and market access as well as 
on distribution networks and intermediary agencies 
are likewise important.
EU trade policy should emphasise trade with coun-
tries bordering the EU and technologically advanced 
countries  such  as  the  US,  Canada  and  Japan  and 
other Asian countries, where, again, tariffs may be 
less important than other border and internal dis-
tribution  costs.  For  many  neighbouring  countries, 
ambitious  agreements  could  be  developed  in  the 
context  of  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy84. 
The Transatlantic Economic Council on international 
regulatory co-operation and deep regional and bilat-
eral  agreements  with  Asian  countries  pursue  this 
approach.
The  results  presented  in  section  2.4.2  stress  the 
importance of the Single Market, a common currency 
and eliminating border controls for doing business 
within the EU and suggest possible improvements 
within the internal market. Simplified and standard-
ised regulation procedures could help to integrate 
markets further. By removing legal and administra-
tive barriers to the development of service activities 
between Member States, the Services Directive aims 
at achieving a real internal market in services. A well 
developed internal market also plays an important 
role as it enables Europe to take the lead in setting 
benchmarks  and  bringing  about  convergence  of 
rules worldwide.
A final point is the fact that decreasing trade costs in 
the past have been driven by decreasing transport 
costs and tariffs. The focus in the future on ‘soft’ trade 
costs (thus to a large extend related to information 
asymmetries) could benefit SMEs, which are believed 
to suffer more from such soft barriers. Providing pub-
lic information on export markets (e.g. customers, 
contacts, and distribution networks) could be help-
ful in reducing the lack of information among SMEs. 
This could increase exports at the extensive margin, 
which will be more effective than efforts to increase 
export volumes to current markets.
2.5.2.2.  Export promotion
The heterogeneous firms literature shows that firms 
seem to face fixed market entry costs for each export 
market and for each product. It also shows that total 
exports  increase  mainly  through  increases  in  the 
number of exporters, exported products and export 
markets (extensive margin). The volume of exports 
to a particular market for a particular product is not 
so sensitive to changing market conditions. This sug-
84   See CPB/SCP (2008).48
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gests that it could be more effective to focus export 
promotion on market entry for new firms, new mar-
kets and products than to focus on existing export 
relations.
Very  productive  firms  can  overcome  the  market-
entry costs and trade to many destinations, but for 
low-productivity firms these market entry costs can 
represent substantial hurdles. Firms within a certain 
range of productivity where market entry costs rep-
resent a constraint could develop their export poten-
tial if these costs were reduced to some extent. These 
hindrances  include  a  lack  of  information  on,  for 
example, markets, country-specific regulations, and 
distribution channels. Governments can help reduce 
these information costs. This is a kind of intermediary 
function and can be important in helping prospec-
tive exporters to find new markets, foreign contacts, 
distribution networks, customers, etc.
It is a challenge to design effective promotion poli-
cies.  Evaluations  of  past  export  promotion  pro-
grammes have yielded varying outcomes85. Export 
promotion policies have to be accompanied by com-
plementary policies designed to improve firm char-
acteristics. For example, large grants (e.g. for capital, 
training, technology acquisition, etc.) seem to lead 
to additional exports. These grants primarily seem 
to have the aim of improving productivity instead of 
increasing exports directly, which fits with the self-
selection hypothesis86.
2.5.2.3.  IPR regimes as incentives to innovate and trade
For  more  than  a  century,  innovation  has  been 
protected  in  order  to  limit  imitation  (Rodríguez, 
2003). Following the previous standards under the 
Paris Convention, the Agreement on Trade-related 
Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPs)  was 
established  within  the  scope  of  the  World  Trade 
Organisation.  Developing  countries  (that  are  not 
least-developed) had to apply the TRIPs Agreement’s 
provisions by 1 January 2000. However, TRIPs is not 
effectively implemented everywhere, and the stylised 
facts show that this hampers exports from developed 
countries to developing countries. It also reduces FDI 
to the latter countries and limits the flows of royal-
ties and license fees to the developed countries. The 
EU should strive within the WTO for effective pro-
tection of innovations in markets with a high threat 
of imitation. In addition, violations of TRIPs should 
be monitored and EU-based firms should easily be 
able to approach an EU office (electronically) with 
85   Alvarez (2004) finds that trade shows and missions have no significant 
effect on exports. Bernard and Jensen (2004) conclude the same for state 
expenditures on export promotion in the US. On the other hand, the World 
Bank (2006) concludes that export promotion agencies are very successful in 
generating extra exports.
86   See Görg et al. (2008).
complaints and questions. This policy is of particular 
importance for growing markets in South-East Asia 
and China.
2.6.  Summary and concluding remarks
2.6.1.  Summary
This  chapter  has  reviewed  the  main  findings  on 
trade matters emerging from the use of firm-level 
databases. With its focus on the characteristics of the 
individuals firms that actually make trade decisions, 
the  new  approach  is  changing  the  way  we  think 
about many trade issues. Among the main findings 
discussed here are the following:
–   The existence of an ‘export premium’, or better 
performance  by  exporters,  largely  explained  by 
self-selection of more productive firms into export-
ing (rather than by learning-by-exporting). ‘Export 
premia’  based  on  labour  productivity  in  the  EU 
range from 3% to 10%. Even if, at firm level, cau-
sality  runs  only  from  productivity  to  exporting, 
empirical evidence shows that exporting increases 
aggregate productivity.
–   Exports are concentrated in a small percentage of 
firms, the happy few, which export many products 
to many destinations. The extensive margin (more 
firms exporting different products to different des-
tinations) is more important than the intensive mar-
gin (average exports per firm).
–   The existence of an ‘importer premium’: importers 
have a higher productivity that could be explained 
either by self-selection or –as endogenous growth 
theory suggests- by productivity gains from import-
ing. Empirical evidence at the macro and sectors 
level  also  points  to  the  productivity-enhancing 
effects of importing.
–   Exporters  have  five  times  more  sales  of  new  or 
improved  products.  Innovating  firms  export  on 
average more than non-innovating firms, and do 
so to a large number of countries.
–   Firms engaged in FDI (multinationals) outperform 
exporting firms in terms of productivity (15% pro-
ductivity premium). For smaller countries, access 
to foreign knowledge is very important, and is usu-
ally  associated  to  imported  inputs  and  spillovers 
from FDI.
This chapter has also looked into trade hampering 
factors (trade costs). These consist of transport costs, 
border  costs  and  retail  and  wholesale  distribution 
costs. For EU countries, these might add up to 170%, 
although  formal  import  tariffs  and  duties  account 
for a relatively unimportant part of total trade costs. 
Information restrictions (e.g. lack of knowledge of 
export markets) and regulations in other countries 49
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are more important than the traditional policy-based 
trade constraints of import tariffs and duties. In addi-
tion, the chapter has provided evidence that EU firms 
perceive internal market policies to be very helpful 
for doing business because of a common currency, 
no border controls and a Single Market regulation 
(including harmonised technical standards).
These summarised results suggest a number of inter-
esting policy insights:
–   The  benefits  of  openness  for  productivity  and 
income stem from exports as well as from imports 
and inward FDI. This gives support to policies that 
aim to open home and foreign markets.
–   Lack of knowledge of export markets and regula-
tions in other countries are important export bar-
riers for European firms. EU trade (exports) policy 
should  concentrate  on  reducing  behind-the-bor-
der costs. These results reinforce the importance 
of international regulation cooperation and deep 
trade agreements with key (potential) partners.
–   Decreasing trade costs in the past have been driven 
by decreasing transport costs and tariffs. The new 
focus on ‘soft’ trade costs, in particular lack of infor-
mation, could benefit SMEs, which are believed to 
suffer more from such soft barriers.
–   Successful  export  promotion  policies  should  not 
apply  to  very  productive  firms  that  have  already 
managed to overcome entry costs. It is also ineffec-
tive to support very low-productivity firms, because 
support will not transform them into exporters or 
importers.
2.6.2.  Concluding remarks
In the context of a changing global environment, the 
external dimension of the Lisbon Strategy empha-
sises the need to complement the internal agenda 
with an external agenda to create opportunities at 
home  and  abroad.  Having  the  right  internal  poli-
cies at home and ensuring openness to trade and 
investment as well as greater openness and fair rules 
abroad are critical, linked requirements for European 
competitiveness.
The  trade  policies  discussed  (export  promotion, 
strengthening the IPR system, etc) are not new. In 
October 2006 the European Commission published 
its strategy for a new external trade policy. This pro-
vides  a  framework  for  putting  trade  policy  at  the 
service  of  EU  competitiveness.  The  new  strategy 
focuses on a multilateral trade-liberalisation agree-
ment  within  the  WTO,  bilateral  free  trade  agree-
ments with key partners (e.g. China) concentrating 
on market access, intellectual property rights, public 
procurement, and trade defence instruments. Within 
bilateral  free  trade  agreements,  trade  in  services, 
FDI, non-tariff barriers and other behind-the-border 
mechanisms are the key issues.
Given the productivity gains associated with exports, 
imports and FDI activities, policies aimed at open mar-
kets abroad, as well as open domestic markets are well 
placed.  However  more  (foreign)  competition  at  the 
home markets could translate into job losses in the 
short-run  as  low-productive  firms  are  forced  out  of 
the market. These reallocation processes of resources 
towards more productive firms and activities are, at the 
individual level, not painless. EU governments are well 
aware of the costs associated to the restructuring of 
their economies induced by openness, and initiatives 
have been put in place to smooth the transition: exam-
ple include policies such as training schemes, job-search 
support, providing short-run financial relief for workers, 
etc. At EU level and with a long-term perspective, the 
EU Structural Funds are a support mechanism to facili-
tate this restructuring. Also, the European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund (with a shorter term perspective) is an 
important initiative at EU level. Nevertheless, the over-
all benefits of opening up domestic markets are clear: 
lower prices, greater variety of inputs and consump-
tion goods, higher productivity, stimulus for innova-
tion  and  better  accessibility  of  foreign  knowledge 
and technology. A policy response aiming not only to 
eliminate remaining import tariffs but also to simplify 
customs procedures, reduce NTBs, and open offices 
and information points for potential foreign investors 
and importers is in order here. Many of the initiatives 
to promote exports could also be used to stimulate 
imports and inward Foreign Direct Investment.
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3.  The economics  
of entrepreneurial 
activity and SMEs: Policy 
implications for the EU
3.1.  Introduction
Entrepreneurship and small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) are increasingly recognised as impor-
tant drivers of the economic performance of sectors, 
regions and countries. At the macroeconomic level 
entrepreneurship is seen as an engine of structural 
change and employment growth, at the microeco-
nomic level as a process that is behind the creation 
of new enterprises and their growth. Aside from the 
dynamics of entrepreneurship, SMEs receive atten-
tion because they represent a sizeable share of overall 
business activity — in fact most firms are SMEs. The 
increased  importance  of  SMEs  and  entrepreneur-
ship is closely related to structural change towards a 
knowledge-based economy: Technical change, glo-
balisation, an increasing share of services in employ-
ment and production, and progress in the liberalisa-
tion of closed sectors have led to a situation where 
small and medium-sized enterprises enjoy growing 
opportunities to introduce innovations, discover new 
market niches, benefit from the globalisation of trade 
and production, and grow fast. These changes cre-
ate new challenges and opportunities for SMEs and 
the need to address them is now high on the EU 
agenda and has been recently given policy content 
by the “Small Business Act” for Europe (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2008).
This  chapter  provides  an  overview  of  the  main 
empirical facts on business structure and dynamics, 
assesses  the  importance  of  entrepreneurship  and 
SMEs for competitiveness and growth, and investi-
gates  the  main  obstacles  to  entrepreneurship  and 
the development of SMEs. This will allow discussion 
of  the  economic  rationales  for  public  intervention 
and of possible priorities for SME and entrepreneur-
ship policies in the EU. The chapter also provides a 
broad overview of public policy initiatives aimed at 
fostering SMEs and entrepreneurship at the level of 
the individual Member States.
This chapter is also an opportunity to supplement 
the information presented in the impact assessment 
of the “Small Business Act for Europe” by present-
ing further analysis of the relative performance of EU 
SMEs and the role they can play in fostering eco-
nomic growth.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 surveys 
the major stylised empirical facts on entrepreneurship 
and SMEs as well as their impact on competitiveness 
and  growth.  Section  3  presents  the  overall  policy 
framework as well as obstacles to entrepreneurship 
and SME development. Here, an assessment of the 
importance of policy areas is carried out for different 
stages of enterprise development and different types 
of opportunity entrepreneurship. Section 4 presents 
a survey of SME and entrepreneurship policy in the 
EU-27  countries,  where  special  attention  is  given 
to regulation, bankruptcy law and the financing of 
entrepreneurship and SMEs. Section 5 summarises 
and concludes.
3.2.  Entrepreneurship and SMEs: stylised 
results and evidence for the EU-27
One of the most important theories linking entrepre-
neurship and economic growth was put forward in 
Schumpeter (1911), who argued that entrepreneurs 
who create new opportunities to earn a profit are 
the  single  most  important  source  of  growth  and 
economic development. Aghion and Howitt (1992, 
2006) provided a formal restatement of Schumpet-
er’s notion of creative destruction where new entrants 
displace  inefficient  incumbent  firms.  Acemoglu, 
Aghion  and  Zilibotti  (2006)  as  well  as  Michelacci 
(2003)  emphasise  that  innovation-based  growth 
requires  entrepreneurial  capabilities  and  an  effec-
tive  selection  among  entrepreneurs.  This  relation-
ship is also emphasised by the knowledge filter the-
ory of entrepreneurship (e.g. Acs et al. 2004, 2005, 
Audretsch, 2007), which identifies entrepreneurship 
as a transfer mechanism that facilitates the process of 
knowledge spillovers and transforms new knowledge 
into economic opportunities and growth.
In  the  modern  competitiveness  debate,  entrepre-
neurship is one of the most intriguing yet elusive 
concepts (Baumol 1968). Audretsch, Grilo and Thurik 
(2007) state that the field of entrepreneurship is not 
known for its consensus, but is characterised by a 
plethora of theoretical as well as eclectic approaches 
and definitions. A large portion of the contempo-
rary literature can be subsumed under the general 
definition  of  entrepreneurship  as  the  pursuit  and 
exploitation of profit opportunities. In order to under-
stand how entrepreneurial behaviour contributes to 
competitiveness and growth, one must distinguish 
at least three specific economic functions (Peneder, 
2006). First, the alert discovery and exploitation of 
given  opportunities  improves  market  coordination 
through the detection of imbalances in the price/
quantity relationships, thus equilibrating supply and 
demand. Second, the exploitation of novel opportu-
nities incites technology diffusion through the adop-
tion of novel practices and techniques introduced by 
others. Finally, entrepreneurs drive innovation, which 
is synonymous with the creation of novel opportuni-
ties.55
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Innovation  is  the  single  most  recurrent  theme  in 
the  study  of  entrepreneurship.  Successful  innova-
tion pushes forward the technological frontier and 
provides competitive advantages in the form of new 
knowledge,  products  or  production  techniques. 
However, the empirical evidence on scale effects of 
innovative activity is ambiguous. Early empirical stud-
ies pointed out that the share of process R&D relative 
to that of product R&D increased as firm size grew 
and that in R&D-intensive industries the same share 
rose  as  markets  became  more  concentrated  (e.g. 
Scherer 1991, Vaona and Pianta 2008). Meanwhile, 
there is a consensus that sectoral specificity related 
to  technological  opportunities  and  appropriability 
conditions shapes the pattern of innovation (e.g. Acs 
and Audretsch 1987 and 1988, Sutton 1998, Breschi 
et al. 2000, Malerba 2004). Sectors where techni-
cal change is mainly incremental and based on the 
persistent  accumulation  of  new  knowledge  within 
the firm favour established incumbents, while sec-
tors characterised by more radical innovation pat-
terns that do not require an extensive knowledge 
base  internal  to  the  firm  favour  newcomers.  This 
largely accords with the results of Cohen and Klep-
per (1994), who found that large firms tend to have 
an  advantage  in  process  innovation  because  their 
innovation costs can be spread over larger output 
volumes, while small firms tend to have an advan-
tage in product innovation. For small firms, prod-
uct innovations are often related to advantages in 
niche markets, while for larger firms they are related 
to the control of new and dynamic markets (Vaona 
and Pianta 2008). When a market niche develops 
in a major new market, small firms have the oppor-
tunity to grow into large enterprises. This suggests 
a division of labour between small and large firms 
with respect to innovation. Baumol (2007) argues it 
is the speciality of entrepreneurial small firms to drive 
radical innovation, while incremental, less spectacu-
lar,  improvements  are  the  province  of  established 
incumbents  and  large  firms.  Economic  institutions 
that foster entrepreneurial experimentation, provide 
incentives  for  radical  innovation,  and  allow  small 
firms to challenge established firms, are central to 
fostering overall innovation.
This  notion  of  the  entrepreneurial  firm  is  closely 
related  to  start-ups  and  firms  that  are  especially 
successful in the creation and exploitation of novel 
opportunities. It is important to recognise that due to 
its complex and multidimensional nature, entrepre-
neurship does not constitute a single and uniquely 
defined unit of observation. The self-employed are 
probably the most traditional target of analysis. Not 
surprisingly, this group is closely associated with the 
importance of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), which represent the corresponding empirical 
unit at the firm level. These two variables are used in 
this chapter to capture business structure, since they 
allow us to assess the static dimension of entrepre-
neurship. For assessing business dynamics these indi-
cators are less well suited. In order to assess entrepre-
neurial dynamics, the start-up of a novel business is 
of particular importance, as it not only represents a 
characteristic instance of Schumpeterian innovation, 
but  simultaneously  gives  birth  to  the  general  and 
manifold potential of opportunity-seeking business 
behaviour  (Wennekers  and  Thurik,  1999).  Conse-
quently, many empirical studies of entrepreneurship 
deal with firm entry and new venture creation, but 
also with firm survival, exit and the turnover of firms. 
Finally,  with  respect  to  their  impact  on  economic 
performance, it is the high-growth firms in particular 
which manifest the highest degree of entrepreneur-
ship in terms of the successful exploitation of oppor-
tunities.
Before discussing the importance of entrepreneur-
ship  and  SMEs  for  competitiveness  and  economic 
performance,  it  is  important  to  consider  the  styl-
ised facts that summarise some persistent empirical 
observations  on  business  structure  and  dynamics, 
and how they differ in the EU and the US88.
3.2.1.  Business structure
Self employment: Macroeconomic data reflect a long-
term trend of declining business ownership rates, 
measured as the number of self-employed in % of 
the total labour force.89 The major reason is struc-
tural change away from agriculture, which is also 
why the negative relationship between self-employ-
ment and per capita GDP diminishes at growing 
levels of income (Figure 1). Excluding agriculture, 
the negative correlation between self-employment 
rates and per capita GDP almost disappears. The 
particular patterns differ across countries. In terms 
of  change,  among  23  OECD  countries  over  the 
period 1994-2004, about half experienced a decline 
in self employment rates, while the remainder saw 
an increase (excluding the agricultural sector) (see 
table A.1 in Annex A). In terms of levels, Southern 
European Member States have substantially higher 
self-employment  rates  than  Northern  European 
Member states. Self-employment rates are on aver-
age higher in the EU countries than in the US, giv-
ing a first impression of a more fragmented Euro-
pean business landscape.
Small  and  medium  sized  enterprises  (SMEs):  SMEs, 
responsible  for  roughly  67%  of  total  employment 
88   The US is an appropriate benchmark for the EU given its similarities in 
terms of state of economic maturity and distance to the technological fron-
tier.
89   The total labour force consists of employees, self-employed persons, 
unpaid family workers, people employed by the Army and unemployed per-
sons.56
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Figure 1: Business ownership and GDP per capita (US$) for 23 OECD countries, 1972-2002
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Note: Dots represent actual data, the line is a non-parametric fractional prediction using GDP per capita as a predictor for the 
business ownership rate. The business ownership rate is the number of self-employed over total labour force.
Source: EIM - COMPENDIA database; WIFO calculations.
and 58% of value added creation in the EU, are a 
very heterogeneous group along many dimensions, 
starting  with  size.  There  is  a  significant  difference 
between the size distribution of firms and the size 
distribution  of  employment.  Most  enterprises  are 
very small, but employment is nevertheless heavily 
concentrated in large and medium-sized companies. 
In the EU-27, for example, more than 90% of firms 
have fewer than 10 employees, but account for less 
than  30%  of  total  employment.  Along  the  same 
lines, the 0.2% of enterprises with more than 250 
employees account for one third of all jobs, and the 
1.3% of all enterprises with more than 50 employees 
account for more than half of total employment. The 
differences  between  countries  are  not  particularly 
large, but the differences across sectors are substan-
tial. The same holds true for the differences in labour 
productivity  between  small  and  large  enterprises. 
Smaller firms have in general a lower level of labour 
productivity than large firms, with the exception of 
certain service industries. The differences across sec-
tors between large and small firms are mostly due 
to  different  production  technologies  determining 
different efficient scales of operation. A comparison 
with the US reveals that both the number of micro 
firms ( 1-9 employees) and their employment share 
are on average substantially higher in Europe than in 
the US90 (see Table 1). These differences are present 
in the manufacturing sector but also in broad serv-
ice sectors. For example, while 44.7% of European 
employees in the Hotel and Restaurant sector work 
in micro enterprises this share is only 8.4% in the 
United States. This result is mirrored by the finding 
that American firms are on average larger than their 
European counterparts, again indicating a more frag-
mented business landscape in Europe (Bartelsman, 
E., J. Haltiwanger, and S. Scarpetta, 2005).
3.2.2.  Business dynamics
Firm entry and survival: There is a substantial asso-
ciation between firm entry and exit rates. First, both 
are strongly correlated over time and across sectors. 
Second, entry and exit rates are substantial in most 
industries. For example, in the manufacturing sector 
the share of newly founded firms in the total number 
of firms is on average 7.3%, while the share of failed 
businesses is 6.9%. For computers and related activi-
ties the respective rates are 15.9% and 9.3%. Given 
the small average size of entering and exiting firms, 
the  employment-weighted  entry  rate  is  1.4%  and 
90  On the basis of official firm size class data, only the number and employ-
ment of micro enterprises can be directly compared between Europe and the 
US.57
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the  employment  weighted  exit  rate  1.5%  for  the 
manufacturing  sector  (see  Table  2).  According  to 
Bartelsman,  Scarpetta  and  Schivardi  (2005),  who 
report evidence for 10 OECD countries, about 20% 
to 40% of entering firms fail within the first 2 years 
of life, while only 40% to 50% survive beyond the 
seventh year. Data on the survival rates for selected 
NACE sections confirm the results of this study (see 
Table 3). The first year is survived by at least 86% of 
new entrants, while only between 68% and 46% of 
all entrants survive beyond the fifth year. Data for 
10 EU Member States indicates that about half of all 
Table 2: Average entry, turnover and net entry rates for selected NACE sections and industries in %
Number of firms Employment
Entry 
rate
Exit 
rate
Turnover 
rate
Net entry 
rate
Entry 
rate
Exit 
rate
Turnover 
rate
Net entry 
rate
Mining (C) 6.71 4.99 11.80 2.11 0.94 0.74 1.68 0.10
Manufacturing (D) 7.31 6.94 14.74 0.78 1.35 1.46 2.92 -0.06
Electricity, gas and water 
supply (E)
7.93 3.78 11.88 4.20 0.82 0.28 0.91 0.38
Construction (F) 10.98 7.42 18.60 3.79 3.86 2.80 6.50 0.90
Retail and wholesale trade (G) 9.02 8.85 17.97 0.38 3.23 3.30 6.63 0.04
Hotels and restaurants (H) 9.60 8.98 18.80 1.04 4.48 3.75 8.24 0.74
Transport (I) 8.86 7.54 16.88 1.80 1.68 1.46 3.22 0.27
Computer and related 
activities (K72)
15.93 9.35 25.90 7.18 5.71 3.32 9.39 2.61
Note:   Data refer to the period between 1998 and 2005 and are average values. The business demography indicators are calculated 
in terms of impact on the number of firms (e.g. entry rate is entering firms over stock of firms), and in terms of impact on 
employment (e.g. entry rate is employment in entering firms over employment in the industry). The turnover rate provides a 
measure of the turbulence and is defined as entries plus exits over the stock of firms. The net entry rate is a measure of change 
in the stock of firms. Turnover rates and net entry rates are not equal to sums or differences of entry and exit rates. This is due 
to the fact that the data are averages. Country coverage: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, 
Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and UK.
Source: Eurostat Structural Business Statistics, WIFO Calculations.
Table 1: Share of micro enterprises in Europe and the US by broad sectors, 2003
Europe USA
Enterprises Employment Enterprises Employment
C Mining and Quarrying 71.3% 4.9% 73.0% 7.9%
D Manufacturing 79.4% 13.4% 58.3% 4.1%
E Energy, Electricity, Gas 91.0% 2.2% 71.9% 2.3%
F Construction 93.5% 41.7% 81.9% 23.9%
G Wholesale and retail trade 91.1% 40.2% 77.2% 12.0%
H Hotels and Restaurants 91.2% 44.7% 66.3% 8.4%
K Real Estate, Buss. Services 94.9% 34.0% 84.7% 16.0%
Note:   Numbers refer to NACE sections C, D, E, F, G, H, I and K for Europe and to comparable NAICS codes for the US. For 
Europe: In the firm size distribution, section C is excluded for Sweden, as data is missing. Section E is excluded for Cyprus 
and Ireland. Section F is excluded for Ireland as data is missing. Data for Sweden (sections D, E, F, G) and Finland (section 
E) is interpolated. For the distribution of employment section C is excluded for Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, 
Slovenia and Sweden, as data is missing. Section E is excluded for Austria and Slovenia. Sections H and K are excluded 
for Slovenia. Section F is excluded for Ireland as data is missing. Data for Sweden (sections D, E, F, G) and Finland (sec-
tions C and E) is interpolated.
Source: SBS database, Eurostat, US Bureau of Census, WIFO calculations.58
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firms born in 2000 survived to 200591. Employment 
wise, job losses due to firm exit in 2005 were on aver-
age compensated by employment created in newly 
born firms.92 International comparisons (Bartelsman, 
Scarpetta and Schivardi 2005, Bartelsman, Haltiwan-
ger and Scarpetta 2005) suggest that there is not 
much difference with regard to firm entry, firm exit 
and firm survival between Europe and the US. If any-
thing, turnover rates measured in terms of firms are 
slightly higher in the US, while the turnover impact 
in terms of labour reallocation due to entry and exit 
is slightly higher in Europe.93 This evidence connects 
well with an important difference between Europe 
and  the  US.  As  Bartelsman,  Scarpetta  and  Halti-
wanger (2005) report, the contribution of entry to 
aggregate productivity growth is on average slightly 
higher in Europe than in the US but the contribution 
of exit is much higher in the US. The higher contribu-
tion of entry to productivity in the EU is linked to the 
fact that the US has a larger variation in the produc-
tivity level of new firms than Europe.
Firm growth: One stylised fact which has been con-
firmed by several studies is that the distribution of 
firm growth rates is such that very few firms grow or 
decline drastically, whereas most of the firms exhibit 
91   Based on data for Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Romania, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. See Eurostat, 
Statistics in Focus 44/2008.
92   In 2005 roughly 2 million jobs, representing about 3.3% of the total 
business economy workforce, were created by new firms across 15 Member 
States (Belgium, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom).
93   Cincera and Galgau (2005) find that the US has higher entry and exit 
rates. Their dataset on entry and exit, constructed using the commercial 
Dunn and Bradstreet database, is somehow less reliable than the dataset used 
by Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2005) and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger 
and Scarpetta (2005), which relies on comparable administrative data.
very modest growth rates (Figure 2).94 This finding is 
robust to the use of different growth measures, sec-
tors of economic activity and countries. Higson et al. 
(2002, 2004) observe that the central mass of the 
growth rate distribution responds more strongly to 
the aggregate shock than do the tails. This confirms 
that rapid growth and rapid decline at the firm level 
are largely triggered by idiosyncratic processes that 
are not closely related to developments at the mac-
roeconomic level. Additionally, Bottazzi et al. (2002) 
observe that firm growth patterns display a ‘mem-
ory process’ and persistent asymmetries, and Coad 
(2007) and Acs, Parsons and Tracy (2008) find that 
larger firms have a tendency towards positive auto-
correlation and smoother growth dynamics. In con-
trast, small firms are more likely to experience nega-
tive autocorrelation, where high growth in one year 
is followed by low growth in the following year (and 
vice versa). While these stylised facts apply to both EU 
countries and the US there are remarkable differences 
regarding the post-entry performance of firms in the 
US and Europe. Figure 3 presents the evidence on 
post-entry (employment) performance obtained by 
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2005). In the 
US, surviving manufacturing firms on average increase 
their employment by more than 60% by their seventh 
year, while employment gains among European firms 
are in the order of 10 to 25% on average. In this sense, 
surviving firms in the US outperform EU-15 firms in 
all broad sectors. Only in two catching-up countries, 
Slovenia and Portugal, do surviving firms have com-
94   Technically this means that the distribution is fat-tailed and approxi-
mately follows the tent-shaped form of the Laplace density function, see e.g. 
Stanley et al. 1996, Amaral et al. 2001, Bottazzi and Secchi 2003, 2006, Hölzl 
and Friesenbichler 2008.
Table 3: Average survival rates for selected NACE sections and industries in %
Sur-
vival
Min-
ing
Manu- 
facturing
Electricity, 
gas and 
water  
supply
Construc-
tion
Retail and 
wholesale 
trade
Hotels and   
Restau-
rants
Trans-
port
Compu-
ter and 
related 
activities
Years (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) k72
1 87.40 89.12 88.20 89.35 86.30 87.10 90.04 88.09
2 80.45 78.06 79.64 77.78 72.60 72.46 79.02 75.94
3 71.28 68.44 70.98 68.47 62.01 61.08 69.92 65.78
4 70.05 61.50 66.98 61.11 54.26 52.21 63.35 57.57
5 68.03 54.81 64.99 54.66 47.64 45.65 56.09 50.39
Note:   Data refer to the period between 1998 and 2005. The survival rate is calculated as the number of enterprises in the refer-
ence period (t) newly born in t-i having survived to t divided by the number of enterprise births in t-i with i being the 
survival year indicated in the first column. Country coverage: Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, 
Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia and UK.
Source: Eurostat Structural Business Statistics, WIFO calculations.59
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parable employment expansion over a 7-year period. 
In addition there is evidence that in the US the high 
productivity firms are those with higher employment 
growth, while this seems not to be the case in the EU 
countries, where the link between productivity and 
growth is less clear-cut (Aghion et al,. 2008).
High-growth firms: Job creation by SMEs has received 
substantial attention from both policy makers and 
scholars  over  the  last  decade.  The  relative  impor-
tance of entry and high-growth firms for job crea-
tion has been the subject of debate (e.g. Davidsson 
and  Delmar  2003,  2006).  Most  studies  find  that 
employment in new firms is crucial for total employ-
ment growth and is at least of equal importance as 
the net job contribution of existing (high-growth) 
firms.95 Concerning the role of the SMEs in net job 
95   However,  the  positive  employment  effects  of  firm  cohorts  tend  to 
decline over time. Thus the turbulence of entry and exit is an important ele-
ment of job creation.
creation, the newer research suggests that the small 
number of fast-growing firms, more than the average 
SME, accounts for a considerable proportion of net 
employment  gains96.  Although  most  high-growth 
firms are SMEs, there is also an important fraction 
that does not fit the SME definition. For the US, Acs, 
Parsons and Tracy (2008) find that job creation is 
almost evenly split between small and large high-
growth firms. There is no evidence that these firms 
are over-represented in high-technology industries. 
This implies that high-growth firms are primarily an 
economic  phenomenon,  not  a  technological  one. 
High-growth firms testify to the varied entrepreneur-
ial alertness and ability of firms to exploit opportuni-
ties on the market. There is evidence that the impor-
tance of innovation for high-growth firms is higher in 
96   See Henrekson and Johansson (2008) for a literature survey on the role 
of high-growth firms in job creation. See also Schreyer (2000).
Figure 2: Growth rate distribution of employment for the manufacturing sector across 19 countries
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industrial countries close to the technological fron-
tier. Hölzl and Friesenbichler (2008) find that, within 
the EU-15, high-growth firms are characterised by 
above-average innovativeness, whereas in the new 
Member States they mainly appear to exploit oppor-
tunities  other  than  own  technological  innovation. 
It is difficult to assess whether there are any differ-
ences in terms of the presence of high growth firms 
in Europe and the US as there are no directly com-
parable studies (cf. Henrekson and Johansson 2008). 
Hoffmann (2006) provides evidence that most EU 
countries trail the US in terms of the number of high 
growth firms. Moreover, the substantial differences 
in the post-entry performance of firms and the fact 
that there is a substantial difference between the US 
and Europe in the number of large companies cre-
ated in recent decades (e.g. see Cohen and Lorenzi 
2000 or Philippon and Veron 2008) suggests that 
Europe has a deficit regarding high-growth firms.
Turbulence  and  market  experimentation:  The  high 
turbulence of firm populations has ignited debates 
reflecting  two  somewhat  conflicting  views  on  the 
significance of entry and exit for the process of eco-
nomic development. The first view considers it mere 
‘turbulence’, where many sectors are characterised 
by a fringe of firms operating on a suboptimal scale, 
where the likelihood of survival is low with ‘revolv-
ing door’ firms continuously entering the market and 
being replaced by similar ones (see e.g. Santarelli and 
Vivarelli, 2007). In contrast, Henrekson and Johans-
son (2008) for example argue that net job creation 
must be considered within the broader context of 
creative destruction, where net employment is gen-
erated by restructuring and ‘churning’ (job gains in 
Figure 3: Post entry employment growth at 7 years of age across countries and broad sectors in 
the 1990s
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entries less job losses in exits) in a dynamic proc-
ess of entry, expansion, survival, decline and exit. 
Hence, gross job flows are critical for net job growth, 
as gross job flows are a prerequisite for the discov-
ery of new business opportunities that create jobs 
in the long run. In the end, whether ‘turbulence’ 
or ‘churning’ dominates is a matter of degree and 
depends on whether higher turbulence leads to an 
increase  in  the  variety  of  entrepreneurial  experi-
mentation or simply to an increase in the amount 
of entrepreneurial experimentation. It is likely that a 
sector’s characteristics — such as the importance of 
sunk costs, innovation intensity, or the duration of 
typical product life cycles — play an important role. 
Aghion et al. (2008) document a larger variance in 
the productivity level of new firms in the US than 
Europe. Table 4 captures the difference between the 
EU and the US concerning labour productivity dis-
persion in ICT-producing and ICT-using industries. 
The main differences between the US and Europe are 
seen in the top and the bottom quartile. In the top 
quartile American firms are on average more produc-
tive than their European counterparts. The bottom 
quartile shows that American low-productivity firms 
are less productive than their European counterparts. 
Together with the evidence on firm growth this sug-
gests that there is a greater variety of market experi-
mentation in the US than in Europe.
3.2.3.  Entrepreneurship/SMEs, growth  
and competitiveness
The  multidimensional  nature  of  entrepreneurship 
and the wide diversity among SMEs and entering 
firms makes it difficult to pin down the contribution 
of entrepreneurship and SMEs to economic growth 
and competitiveness. Aggregate analysis should be 
complemented  by  comprehensive  firm-level  stud-
ies in order to provide consistent evidence. Several 
studies have investigated this link from an aggregate 
perspective. Audretsch and Thurik (2001) obtain evi-
dence that entrepreneurial activity — proxied as the 
share of economic activity accounted for by small 
firms — has a positive impact on subsequent eco-
nomic growth for EU countries. On the other hand, 
Pagano and Schivardi (2003) find a positive relation-
ship between firm size and growth. Studies using data 
from  the  Global  Entrepreneurship  Monitor  (GEM) 
have shown that entrepreneurship is associated with 
the level of GDP per capita and that the ‘sign’ of 
the effect depends on a country’s economic devel-
opment stage: the level of entrepreneurship seems 
to be higher for rich countries getting richer (Stel, 
Carree, and Thurik, 2005). In a recent contribution, 
Erken, Donselaar and Thurik (2008) included entre-
preneurship — measured as the business ownership 
rate97  —  within  a  number  of  aggregate  empirical 
growth models and found entrepreneurship to have 
an important influence in all of them, while the other 
effects remained robust to its inclusion. Conversely, 
Wong, Kam and Autio (2005) report that only high 
growth potential TEA (Total Entrepreneurial Activity, 
as measured in the Global Entrepreneurship Moni-
tor) has any explanatory effect on GDP growth rates, 
whereas necessity TEA, opportunity TEA, and over-
all TEA do not. This suggests that distinct types of 
entrepreneurship have a different impact on employ-
ment and growth. Thurik, Carree, Stel and Audretsch 
(2008) show that the relation between level of entre-
preneurship and level of economic development has 
two causalities: they influence each other with lags 
and different ‘signs’. Hence, it is not obvious to inter-
pret figures consisting of entrepreneurship and eco-
nomic growth data in terms of causalities.
In what follows, the relationship between indicators of 
firm structure (i.e. the share of SMEs) or firm dynam-
ics  (i.e.,  corporate  demography  and  fast-growing 
firms), and sectoral growth in terms of employment, 
value  added  or  labour  productivity  is  investigated 
using EU KLEMS98 sectoral data at the level of NACE-
2-digit industries for the period 1995 to 2004. When 
the average rate of growth (labour productivity, value 
97   Number of business owners per workforce, corrected for the level of 
economic development.
98   The EU KLEMS database is the result of a three-year research project 
funded by the European Commission and involving 16 European research 
institutes, which has recently become available for free public use at http://
www.EU KLEMS.net. See Timmer et al. (2007) for further details on the con-
struction of the database.
Table 4: Labour productivity dispersion among entrants, US and Europe
ICT producing ICT using
Quartile US EU US EU
Top 123 118 74 58
3 88 87 51 48
2 61 72 40 46
Bottom 38 68 26 41
Note: Source Aghion et al. (2008), The index refers to labour productivity relative to the average of incumbents (=100).62
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added, or employment) is regressed on a set of con-
trol variables (initial level of labour productivity and 
industry size) and a business demography indicator, 
SME share indicator or growth-firms’ indicator99, the 
results  indicate  that  employment  growth  is  more 
significantly associated with business demography, 
SME shares and growth-firm indicators than is the 
case for value added or labour productivity growth. 
In other words, the results confirm that ‘turbulence’, 
measured as firm turnover, firm entry or the pres-
ence of growth firms, is positively correlated with 
employment growth. In addition, firm turnover and 
growth-firm indicators are positively associated with 
value added and labour productivity growth.
To go one step further, quantile regression analysis100 
can be used to allow for non-linear relationships.101 
The results show that the association between both 
entry  and  turnover  rates  and  labour  productivity 
growth slightly increases with higher labour produc-
tivity growth rates, while the results for the SME share 
and the growth-firm indicators display no significant 
deviation from their respective linear regression coef-
ficients. There is however substantial evidence of a 
non-linear relationship between both the entry and 
turnover rates and employment growth for the time 
period 1995-2004, with the importance of turnover 
or entry much higher for sectors that display a higher 
employment growth rate than for sectors that display 
low employment growth. Quantile regression for the 
SME shares and a growth firm indicator (top 5%) 
reveal that the SME indicator is not different from 
the linear estimate, but is statistically significant and 
positive, while the growth-firm indicator shows that 
high-growth industries have a higher share of growth 
firms. Similarly, the importance of the turnover rate 
and the growth-firm indicator is higher for sectors 
that display higher value added growth. The reverse 
appears to be true for the SME share indicators, as 
they gain importance in sectors with low value added 
growth rates. In short, this empirical analysis demon-
strates the special role of turbulence and growth firms 
and suggests that entry, exit and the share of high-
growth firms has more impact on economic growth 
than the share of SMEs. Overall, the non-linear esti-
mations demonstrate that industry growth increases 
more than proportionally with firm dynamics.
99   High-growth firm’s indicators are constructed using CIS3 data. Growth 
is measured in terms of employment using the Birch index which combines 
proportional and absolute change. High growth firms are SMEs in the base 
year (1998) and have above average growth across countries and sectors for 
the period 1998-2000. The count of high-growth firms includes those firms 
belonging to the top 5% (alternatively 10% and 20%) fastest growing firms. 
Three indicators are constructed using the share that these firms represent for 
each country and sector in the overall firm population.
100   Compared to an OLS regression, quantile regression provides a more 
“complete” story of the relationship between variables and allows us to the 
examine of how partial correlation changes across the quantiles.
101   The specifications of the quantile regressions were the same as in the 
OLS  regressions  but  did  not  include  any  industry  dummies,  instead  only 
including a set of country dummies and the control variables.
It should be stressed that because most entrepre-
neurship and SME variables show substantial tempo-
ral persistence, the use of regression analysis, even 
allowing for time lags, is not guaranteed to establish 
causality but only correlation.
Turning  to  the  firm-level  evidence,  the  available 
studies  on  high-growth  firms  suggest  that  these 
firms drive an important share of labour reallocation, 
especially in more dynamic economies such as the 
US. Turbulence (entry and exit) is also shown to be 
an important driver of labour reallocation and job 
creation and destruction (Henrekson and Johansson, 
2008).
While the contribution of growth firms to the growth 
of  employment  and  value  added  follows  directly 
from the definition of this group of firms, not much 
is known about their effect on productivity growth. 
Productivity  growth  can  be  decomposed  into  the 
productivity  growth  of  existing  firms,  changes  in 
market shares among them and the productivity of 
firms entering and exiting the market. Bartelsman, 
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2005) show that over the 
short term productivity growth is largely driven by 
within-firm performance. Over the longer run (more 
than 5 years) net entry plays a more important role 
in promoting productivity growth. The contribution 
of net entry positive for all countries. The direct con-
tribution of entry is lower in the US than in most 
European countries, while exit is usually positive. The 
contribution of net entry to productivity growth is 
higher in industries affected by rapid technological 
progress than for traditional industries. The evidence 
that creative destruction is important for productivity 
growth has also been confirmed by other studies.
For  productivity  growth  market  selection  makes  a 
difference, as new firms are usually small and have a 
below-average productivity level (Jensen et al. 2001, 
Castany  et  al.  2005,  Bartelsman,  Haltiwanger  and 
Scarpetta 2005, Brouwer et al. 2005). It is the rapid 
failure of inefficient entrants that selects in favour 
of agents of creative destruction with high levels of 
productivity. With regard to high-growth firms and 
market  selection  the  comparison  of  allocative  effi-
ciency  between  countries  is  important.  Following 
Olley and Pakes (1996), allocative efficiency can be 
measured by the covariance between market shares 
and productivity. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scar-
petta (2005) find that all countries display positive 
allocative efficiency but that the allocative efficiency 
is higher in the US than in the EU, thus providing 
additional fuel for the call to make firms’ growth a 
policy priority in the EU.
To summarise, Figure 4 provides a stylised view of the 
“distribution of entrepreneurship”. On the horizon-
tal axis it depicts the degree of successful exploita-63
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tion of opportunities in terms of survival and growth, 
and on the vertical axis it depicts the smoothed fre-
quency distribution of firms. The basic intuition is 
simple, with the strongly skewed shape of the distri-
bution reflecting the declining number of firms that 
successfully achieve longevity and high growth. Out 
of the large number of potential entrepreneurs con-
sidering starting up their own businesses, only a frac-
tion actually decide to do so. The observed statistical 
regularities cannot tell us much about the precise size 
and sources of error in the decision-making process. 
In any case, the fact that so many new enterprises 
do fail within a relatively short period of time reflects 
a high degree of uncertainty and the highly experi-
mental,  trial-and-error  nature  of  the  process.  The 
graph illustrates the fact that entry is only a first stage 
in the development of a business, with survival and 
growth  implying  even  more  demanding  ventures. 
The review of the evidence suggests the need for 
policy emphasis on creating framework conditions 
to foster the growth of firms. The fact that barriers 
to firm growth, more than barriers to entry, are a 
characteristic of the differences between Europe and 
the US (Bartelsman et al. 2005, Hoffmann 2006) also 
suggests this need to address firms’ growth.
3.3.  Policy framework
3.3.1.  Rationales for policy intervention
There is a considerable amount of literature on the 
determinants affecting entrepreneurship activity and 
the development of SMEs (e.g. Bridge et al., 2003; 
Audretsch, Grilo and Thurik 2007; Hoffmann, 2007). 
Here, one can distinguish three broad categories of 
influential factors, i.e. opportunities, resources and 
entrepreneurship  environment  and  infrastructure. 
Beginning with opportunities, one can further distin-
guish between regulatory measures and knowledge 
creation.  For  example,  the  removal  of  barriers  to 
entry, the balancing of incentives for investors and 
entrepreneurs in cases of failure, or the reduction of 
administrative costs can be achieved through regula-
tory reform. Justification for policy interference in the 
Figure 4: The distribution of entrepreneurship: Linking latent entrepreneurship, turbulence and 
high growth firms
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process of knowledge creation builds on the partially 
public-goods  nature  of  innovation,  where  positive 
spillovers and limited appropriability are due to miss-
ing or incomplete markets for new knowledge.
Entrepreneurial activity also depends on the avail-
ability  of  human  and  financial  resources.  Market 
imperfections  in  the  financial  markets  are  mainly 
related to problems of asymmetric information due 
to moral hazard and adverse selection, which result 
in  a  financing  gap  that  particularly  affects  small, 
young and innovative firms (Peneder, 2008A). This, 
compounded with positive externalities due to firms’ 
innovation,  may  lead  to  suboptimal  firms’  invest-
ments. Public policies addressing human resources 
have,  among  others,  the  aim  of  tapping  into  the 
positive externalities generated by skilled and edu-
cated people. Furthermore, from a dynamic perspec-
tive, the efficiency of capital and labour markets has 
an important impact on the speed of reallocation 
between promising and failing ventures. The third 
set of influential factors is broadly called entrepre-
neurship environment and infrastructure. In this cat-
egory the rationales for policy intervention mainly 
relate to some form of network externality or public 
good.
In short, market failures due to lack of competition, 
limited appropriability, spillovers, asymmetric infor-
mation,  network  externalities,  and  public  goods 
affect incentives to pursue opportunities, the avail-
ability of resources, and entrepreneurial infrastruc-
ture. These in turn determine the degree of entrepre-
neurial activity in an economy, which further affects 
the efficiency of market co-ordination, the speed of 
technology diffusion, and the rate of own innovation, 
each of these being an important driver of economic 
growth at both firm and aggregate level. Table 5, 
second column, reports possible types of market fail-
ures for broad policy fields.
3.3.2.  Obstacles to entrepreneurship
Distinguishing  between  opportunities/obstacles, 
resources,  and  entrepreneurship  environment/
infrastructure, one can accordingly systematise the 
empirical evidence on the main obstacles to entre-
preneurship and SME development as identified in 
representative surveys: the Eurobarometer Entrepre-
neurship Survey 2007, the Observatory of European 
SMEs Survey 2007 and the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS 4):
1. Opportunities/obstacles: The most important obsta-
cles as mentioned by the firms themselves, though not 
by the population at large as an impediment to self-
employment, are related to regulation. For instance, 
administrative regulation is generally emphasised as 
an important constraint (see Figure 6). A different 
history of public services may explain why the regu-
latory burden is perceived as more troublesome in 
the new member states (NMS) than in the EU-15. 
While Figure 5 does not indicate that administrative 
complexities are considered to be major barriers to 
self-employment, more refined analysis shows that 
administrative complexities hinder both the willing-
ness to become self-employed and the actual choice 
to become self-employed (Grilo and Irigoyen, 2006). 
At the same time, only a few responses in the avail-
able business surveys suggest that the quality and 
amount of ideas are constraining factors. Even when 
asked directly about barriers to innovation (in CIS 4), 
neither the innovative nor the non-innovative busi-
nesses in the survey mention knowledge factors as 
being extraordinarily important.
2. Resources: Financing constraints are perceived as 
an  important  potential  obstacle  to  entrepreneur-
ship in both Europe and the United States (Figures 5 
and 6). Although there is no evidence of a general-
ised market failure in financing SMEs, research has 
shown that market imperfections limit the financing 
of both early-stage and growth-oriented (e.g. Hall 
2005). Potential entrepreneurs and SMEs in the NMS 
mention financing constraints as a highly important 
obstacle more often than do their counterparts in the 
EU-15, which points towards less developed financial 
systems in the NMS. Indeed, market-based solutions 
to funding gaps are more limited in countries where 
equity markets are not highly developed (Hall 2005). 
However, the importance of financing constraints for 
entrepreneurship is not that clear-cut once survey 
data are studied in detail. For example, using survey 
data  (Entrepreneurship  Survey,  Flash  Eurobarom-
eter), Grilo and Thurik (2005) find that the percep-
tion of financing constraints has no influence on the 
probability of being self-employed nor on the ease 
with which people move along the entrepreneurial 
process (Zwan, P van der, Thurik and Grilo, 2008); 
it is however possible that existing entrepreneurs be 
held back from furthering expanding their business 
due to financing constraints though the survey data 
used do not allow for testing such hypothesis. When 
looking forward, this question has also to be seen in 
the context of the ongoing financial crisis. While the 
full impact of the crisis is still unknown, including its 
repercussions on SMEs, it appears highly likely that 
small businesses -start-ups as well as already existing 
firms- will find it much more difficult in the future 
to obtain external funding of their activities, be it 
through raising additional equity or in the form of 
(bank) loans.
An important issue on the agenda – especially as an 
obstacle to growth and as an obstacle to innovation 
– is the lack of skilled labour. Surprisingly, the lack of 
skilled labour and the cost of labour carry the same 65
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Table 5: Summary assessment: policy rationales and relative importance of broad policy fields
Stages of enterprise  
development
Expected  
opportunities
Policy rationale pre-
start
start-
up
maintenance 
expansion low medium high
Regulation
Administrative entry 
regulation 
Competition, Transaction 
costs • •
Administrative 
exit regulation 
(bankruptcy)
Incentives to entrepreneurs 
and investors • • • • •
Administrative 
burdens 
Transaction cost & 
economies of scale • • •
Single market Competition, market size, 
transaction cost • • •
Knowledge Creation
Science Policy External effects, public good • • • •2
IPRs Appropriability  • • •
R&D promotion External effects • • •2
Networking and 
collaborative 
research
External effects, transaction 
costs • • •2
Technology 
adoption
External effects • • • •
   
Financial Resources
External equity Asymmetric information  • • •
Credit and Loans Asymmetric information • • • •
Taxes Public goods • • • • • •
Subsidy External effects •1,2 •2 •1 •2
Human resources
Entrepreneurial 
capabilities
External effects, dynamic 
capabilities • • • • •
Labour skills External effects, dynamic 
capabilities • •
Labour regulation Labour reallocation • • •
Entrepreneurship environment/ infrastructure
Awareness/Culture Supply of entrepreneurship  • • • • •
Export promotion  Transaction cost & network 
externalities • • •
Advice & counselling Transaction cost & network 
externalities • • • • •
Legal system Public good (property rights) • • • • • •66
European Competitiveness Report 2008
level of importance. Concerning barriers to innova-
tion in these survey data, the actual costs of inno-
vation are reported as being the largest hampering 
factor.
3.  Entrepreneurship  environment  and  infrastructure: 
This involves a heterogeneous group of policies more 
indirectly linked to opportunities and resources. This 
set of factors mainly includes the provision of com-
munity goods, the facilitation of social co-ordination, 
and help in reducing transaction costs that weigh par-
ticularly heavily on SMEs as high fixed costs that are 
independent of size. If entrepreneurial culture is con-
sidered a public good, this is the policy field to which 
all  awareness  raising  measures  can  ultimately  be 
allocated. The importance of such policies becomes 
evident when we consider that, compared to their 
US counterparts, Europeans are much more hesitant 
to start a new business if they perceive any risk that 
it might fail. This also reflects the difference between 
the perception of risk as an opportunity to ‘win’ and a 
possibility to ‘lose’. Another example of policies affect-
ing this set of factors is the support of SMEs through 
networking, advice, or guarantor schemes aimed at 
easing their expansion onto new export markets. The 
enterprise surveys show that, aside from regulatory 
barriers, the main exporting obstacles are related to 
sunk costs such as a lack of knowledge of foreign mar-
kets or a lack of management resources. Stel, Storey 
and Thurik (2007) examine the relationship between 
regulation and entrepreneurship and find that mini-
mum capital requirements to start a business lower 
entrepreneurship rates across countries, as do labour 
market regulations. However, administrative consid-
erations in starting a business seem to be unrelated 
to the aggregate formation rate of either nascent or 
young businesses.
When interpreting the results, one must keep in mind 
the subjective nature of replies given in such sur-
Interfaces to other policy areas
Competition Policy Allocative & dynamic 
efficiency • • •
Industrial Policy Dynamic efficiency • •
Regional Policy Public good (regional 
cohesion) • • • • • •
Welfare system Public good (social 
cohesion), risk taking • • • •
Note:     • indicates that the policy area is of potential importance for this type of entrepreneurship. However, the marks do not 
suggest the necessity of policy intervention, since the existence of a potential market failure does not a priori imply that 
policy intervention can do better.
1 for entrepreneurship in highly disadvantaged groups. 2 especially for high-technology entrepreneurship.
Source: WIFO.
Figure 5: Reasons for not becoming self-employed within the next five years, country groups in 
comparison, 2007
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Figure 6: Difficulties/constraints faced by SMEs in the last two years as a percentage of total 
replies, country groups in comparison, 2007
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veys. For example, mentioning problems like limited 
demand (cited by European firms as the most impor-
tant growth constraint) or financing constraints may 
also mask problems in the knowledge base and the 
strategic or operational management of that firm. In 
particular, low scores for reported knowledge obsta-
cles may be distorted, as managers may be more 
reluctant to blame areas within their own responsi-
bility than point to external factors like financial insti-
tutions or limited demand. Consequently, one must 
be very careful about drawing far-reaching conclu-
sions based on direct reading of the survey results 
alone. As mentioned above, more refined studies of 
such data suggest that the effect of perceived financ-
ing constraints does not translate directly into latent 
(e.g. Grilo and Irigoyen 2006) or actual entrepre-
neurship (e.g. Grilo and Thurik 2005)102. The sub-
jective perception of lack of access to finance does 
not automatically point to the need for public inter-
vention, but can also reflect an efficient process of 
selection among competing uses. Policy intervention 
is only called for if there is good reason to suspect 
102   These data do not allow investigation of the impact of perceived financ-
ing constraints on firm growth.
systematic distortions in the financing decisions of 
investors, i.e. market failure or presence of externali-
ties (Peneder, 2008A).
3.3.3.  Types of entrepreneurship
There is a close relationship between SME and entre-
preneurship policy but they cannot be equated (e.g. 
Audretsch,  Grilo  and  Thurik  2007).  SME  policies 
mainly  relate  to  existing  small  firms  while  entre-
preneurship  policy  focuses  on  the  dynamics  of  a 
business, i.e. from pre-entry to entry, survival and 
growth. Thus a differentiation between the firm life 
stages of firms is useful when discussing individual 
policy  fields.  The  following  stages  can  be  distin-
guished:
1. The pre-start phase includes culture and aware-
ness, idea generation and entrepreneurial spirit in a 
specific population. Policies targeting this phase are 
essentially oriented towards the supply of entrepre-
neurs. If we look at the individual level, educational 
and family background, know-how and earlier career 
experience are important influences on the choice to 
become self-employed.68
European Competitiveness Report 2008
2. The start-up phase follows the decision to found 
a new firm. Here, both structural and administrative 
entry barriers as well as start-up business support and 
financing are primary policy areas.
3.  The  maintenance/expansion  phase  usually  falls 
under  the  heading  of  SME  policy.  All  measures 
designed to reduce disadvantages related to size have 
their place here. Also, policies orientated toward the 
removal of structural and administrative barriers to 
growth are both considered to belong to this phase.
However,  while  this  distinction  is  important,  the 
stylised results suggest that there is a need to assess 
entrepreneurship  policy  more  with  regard  to  its 
impact on growth and the selection of new firms 
than with regard to the mere number of start-ups 
or firms. Rather than treating start-ups as a homog-
enous group, one should additionally distinguish dif-
ferent degrees of opportunity-seeking behaviour:
1. A first group consists of start-ups with high growth 
potential. These start-up firms are the Schumpeterian 
‘innovators’ that attempt to introduce new business 
concepts, new production processes or new products. 
To succeed they need the right combination of ideas, 
means and spirit for exploiting and creating opportu-
nities that allow them to grow into larger enterprises.
2.  Conventional  start-ups  are  not  much  different 
from incumbent firms. These firms are characterised 
by average productivity and tend to survive over a 
longer time horizon (i.e. more than 5 years) but do 
not have the entrepreneurial aspirations or capabili-
ties to grow into large companies.
3. The last group of new firms are ‘turbulence’ start-
ups  that  are  characterised  by  low  entrepreneurial 
capabilities and/or ambitions. These firms enter the 
market but most of them do not necessarily aspire to 
grow. Their primary challenge is to survive. Most of 
these firms exit within a short time (5 years).
Unfortunately it is impossible to distinguish the dif-
ferent types of business start-ups on the basis of offi-
cial statistics or even on the basis of commercial firm 
level data. In fact, it is often very difficult to assess ex 
ante the growth prospects of a start-up. This is due 
to asymmetric information and uncertainty related 
to both the quality of the entrepreneurial idea and 
the  quality  of  the  entrepreneur  or  the  entrepre-
neurial team. Market screening by financial institu-
tions, product markets, and consultants is necessary 
in order to select the best projects. Similarly, policy 
officers would not be able to make an accurate ex 
ante  assessment,  which  makes  any  attempts  to 
directly target these winners futile.
To  conclude,  the  difficulties  in  identifying  ex-ante 
a firm ability to seize opportunities for survival and 
growth does not lend support to any attempt to pick 
the  winners  through  public  intervention.  Instead, 
policy should provide a regulatory framework con-
ducive to undistorted competition and a broad set of 
framework conditions that do not hamper business 
dynamics and in particular firm growth.103 This will 
generally ensure the most efficient means of selec-
tion among firms and the allocation of resources in 
the market.
3.3.4.  Policy rationales
Starting  from  the  general  policy  framework  and 
rationales discussed in Section 3.1, Table 5 addresses 
the  corresponding  broad  policy  fields  and  their 
relative importance with respect to the two differ-
ent  firm  typologies  distinguishing  between  differ-
ent  stages  of  development  and  between  different 
degrees of opportunity. The individual policy fields 
are organised along five dimensions: (i) regulation 
and (ii) knowledge creation, both of which reflect 
opportunity conditions; (iii) financial and (iv) human 
resources; and finally, (v) entrepreneurship environ-
ment and infrastructure. It is important to note that 
the tick signs in Table 5 do not suggest priorities for 
policy  action  or  need  for  policy  intervention.  The 
existence of a potential market failure does not a pri-
ori imply that policy intervention can do better. A 
detailed cost-benefit analysis needs to precede inter-
vention.
Regulation
Regulations  are  generally  introduced  under  the 
rationale  that  the  market  mechanism  itself  would 
fail to provide sufficient co-ordination or would not 
generate what is considered a desirable outcome for 
society at large (quality standards, consumer protec-
tion, protection of creditors, proper functioning of 
the markets, etc.). Regulations thus affect the market 
process and change the rules of selection. However, 
over time, regulations once felt as appropriate may 
become obsolete or overly restrictive, in which case 
regulatory  reform  is  needed  to  avoid  government 
failures due to outdated regulations and/or regula-
tory capture by interest groups.
The first policy area administrative entry barriers, which 
make setting up a new business difficult. While low 
administrative barriers generally reduce transaction 
costs, the reform of sector-specific barriers to market 
access aims to increase competition. While low entry 
barriers are an essential ingredient for a competitive 
economic  environment  in  general,  administrative 
simplification will have effects on the start-up phase 
and more particularly on lower-opportunity entre-
103   Policies that aim to overcome the effects of market imperfections and 
externalities can also contribute to business dynamics.69
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preneurship. The Small Business Act addresses this 
area by calling on Member States to reduce both the 
costs and time needed to set up a business.
The second area is exit regulation. Even if most entre-
preneurial ventures leave the market without going 
through a bankruptcy procedure, bankruptcy regu-
lation has an important effect on entrepreneurship. 
The finance literature (e.g. Hart 1995, La Porta et al. 
2000, De Meza 2002, Djankov et al. 2006) empha-
sises the protection of creditors and the order of pri-
ority, which safeguards incentives for the financing of 
entrepreneurial ventures. However, there is a trade-
off,  as  harsh  bankruptcy  procedures  may  increase 
the personal risk of entrepreneurs and thus reduce 
their willingness to undertake the venture (e.g. Fan 
and White 2003). Theoretical and empirical evidence 
suggests that the possibility of a fresh start through 
the discharge of debt has positive effects on the sup-
ply of entrepreneurship (Ayotte 2007, Armour and 
Cumming 2005, 2006).104 This was taken up by the 
European Commission in the Communication “Over-
coming the stigma of business failure – for a second 
chance policy’ (Commission of the European Com-
munities 2007A) and is also emphasised in the Small 
Business Act (Commission of the European Commu-
nities 2008). Bankruptcy regulations that minimise 
the length of the process, administrative costs and 
the social stigma of bankruptcy are attractive to both 
entrepreneurs and creditors. Bankruptcy regulation is 
thus important for the start-up and expansion phase 
and for all three opportunity types of entrepreneur-
ship. Mergers and acquisitions are also an important 
exit mechanism in the modern markets for corporate 
control, and it is important that this market is allowed 
to fulfil its function as a facilitator of firm’s entry and 
exit. Especially for small family businesses, business 
transfers are necessary to dissociate the active live of 
an owner from the fate of the firm. Facilitating the 
transfer of business ownership could avoid the loss 
businesses simply as a result of the complex proce-
dures and transaction costs associated with business 
transfers.
The third field among regulatory policies comprises 
red tape (administrative costs associated with licenses, 
permits  and  communications).  As  these  require-
ments have a large fixed cost component, they imply 
indivisibilities to the disadvantage of SMEs. Admin-
istrative burdens are important for small firms (and 
thus  especially  for  low-and-medium  opportunity 
entrepreneurship), in particular in the maintenance/
expansion phase. Therefore this policy field receives 
104   Landier (2005) suggests that a bankruptcy regulation that favours entre-
preneurial experimentation is more efficient for knowledge-based economies 
characterized by risky entrepreneurial projects and low capital intensity, while 
a strict bankruptcy regulation is more efficient for economies dominated by 
sectors that are characterized by less risky projects and high capital inten-
sity.
particular attention in the Small Business Act (Com-
mission of the European Communities, 2008), where 
it  is  emphasised  that  the  EU  and  Member  States 
should take into account SMEs’ characteristics when 
designing  legislation  and  simplifying  the  existing 
regulatory environment.
The last of the policy areas considered under this 
heading involves regulations that affect the European 
Single Market. By lowering transaction costs through 
the  harmonisation  of  norms  and  regulations,  the 
Single Market Programme is especially beneficial to 
export-oriented SMEs. It is especially important for 
firms in the expansion phase (in the start-up phase 
only for “born-global” firms) and most likely to affect 
medium-and  high-opportunity  entrepreneurship. 
The recent initiative to introduce a harmonised stat-
ute for a European Private Company, as launched by 
the Small Business Act, is a notable step in that direc-
tion. Allowing entrepreneurs to set up subsidiaries 
with the same legal structure in all the EU Member 
States would be a decisive step forward in levelling 
the playing field for SMEs, and would especially ben-
efit fast-growing companies that reach out to the 
larger EU market. The evidence on business structure 
and business dynamics, together with the available 
evidence on the home bias in consumption, strongly 
suggests that in many industries the European market 
is still fragmented and local. Especially for the service 
sectors, fostering market integration is required to 
increase competition. This is also true of the mar-
ket for venture capital (see “Removing obstacles to 
cross-border investments by venture capital funds”, 
Commission of the European Communities, 2007C). 
Only when emerging high-growth firms are able to 
challenge  local  champions  all  over  Europe  and  in 
most sectors will the Single Market be able to deliver 
its economic promises.
Knowledge creation
The creation and adoption of new knowledge is the 
fundamental source of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
From a market failure perspective, the partly public 
good  nature  of  new  knowledge  causes  problems 
of appropriability for the originator of new knowl-
edge, whereas customers, suppliers and even com-
petitors may largely benefit from positive external 
effects (spillovers). System failures indicate missing 
or malfunctioning links in the institutional fabric of 
innovation. The policy areas listed under this head-
ing  are  especially  important  for  high  opportunity 
entrepreneurship associated with innovation activi-
ties  –  thus,  from  an  entrepreneurship  perspective 
this especially applies to new technology-based firms 
(NTBFs),  which  are  likely  to  embody  the  ‘creative 
destruction’ role of new firm formation. The first area 
is science policy, which primarily concerns the crea-
tion of new knowledge. Available evidence suggests 70
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that academic research is also a stimulus for business 
R&D and entrepreneurial experimentation (Guellec 
and van Pottelsberghe 2004). Universities generate 
new ideas, which are then transferred to the private 
sector. This area also includes policy measures that 
increase knowledge generation and the exploitation 
and commercialisation of new knowledge (technol-
ogy transfer). These policy measures are important 
to all three stages of business development but espe-
cially to high technology entrepreneurship.
The second area is intellectual property rights (IPRs), 
though  new  paradigms,  like  ‘open  innovation’, 
which  emphasise  the  commercialisation  of  new 
technologies  through  market  transactions,  are  also 
becoming increasingly important among small firms. 
In some areas, such as the biotechnology sector, pat-
ents are an essential means of appropriating returns 
and attracting financial resources. IPRs are therefore 
especially important for high-opportunity entrepre-
neurs in some sectors, and in the start-up and main-
tenance/growth phase. However, given the high cost 
of patenting and litigation, the current system is far 
from providing a level playing field, instead favour-
ing large over small and medium-sized companies.105 
The introduction of a single Community patent and a 
EU-wide patent jurisdiction therefore remains a prior-
ity for both SME and entrepreneurship policy, com-
bining aspects of knowledge creation and regulation. 
Patents,  trademarks  and  access  to  standards  also 
receive particular attention in the Small Business Act 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008).
The third policy area is the promotion of R&D activities 
in firms. These policies are usually associated with R&D 
grants and are important for high-opportunity firms 
in the start-up phase and the maintenance/growth 
phase. The same holds for networking and collabora-
tive research. Collaborative research also has the func-
tion of increasing spillovers. This last goal is of course 
central to those of policies aimed at fostering technol-
ogy adoption and diffusion. High expected opportu-
nity entrepreneurship in particular likely to profit from 
these programmes in the start-up and maintenance/
growth stage. The Small Business Act emphasises that 
Member  States  should  further  promote  the  devel-
opment of SMEs’ R&D competencies by simplifying 
access to research infrastructure, the use of R&D serv-
ices and access to R&D promotion programmes.
Financial resources
Regarding financial resources, asymmetric informa-
tion  between  the  owners  of  capital  and  entrepre-
neurs is a potential source of market failure. Financial 
105   The gap to the other countries is considerable. The cost for a 20-year 
protection examined by EPO and valid in 12 member states was in 2004 
more than 20.000 Euro, while the same protection was available for 1.800 
Euro in the US and 1500 Euro in Japan (van Pottelberghe 2008).
markets are an important selection mechanism for 
entrepreneurial projects, and a well developed finan-
cial system is therefore crucial to fostering entrepre-
neurial activity and creative destruction (Aghion, Fally 
and Scarpetta. 2007, Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar, 
2007).  An  inefficient  financial  sector  can  signifi-
cantly hamper the creation of new businesses and 
the growth of SMEs. If the capacity for self-financing 
from own cash-flow or wealth is insufficient, the first 
source of external finance that established firms typi-
cally turn to is credit and loans. In the economic lit-
erature there is some controversy on the existence of 
credit constraints (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; De Meza 
and  Webb,  1987;  De  Meza,  2002).  The  evidence 
suggests that instruments to fight credit constraints 
should primarily target the provision of credit, not 
the price of credit. Policy measures that relax credit 
constraints are important for low-and high-opportu-
nity entrepreneurs in the start-up and maintenance/
expansion phases.
The second major financing instrument is external 
equity106,  which  is  particularly  important  for  inno-
vative firms with high growth potential. Economic 
theory suggests that high-risk projects that are not 
backed by appropriate collateral should primarily be 
financed by equity. Therefore, policy measures that 
lead to a stronger supply of external equity finance 
– such as venture capital or business angels – are par-
ticularly important for high opportunity and particu-
larly innovative entrepreneurship in the start-up (seed 
finance) and maintenance/growth phases (Peneder, 
2008B). These issues were taken up by the European 
Commission in the Communication “Financing SME 
Growth  –  Adding  European  Value”  (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2006) and are also 
emphasised in the Small Business Act.
Taxes  affect  entrepreneurial  activity  levels.  High 
corporate taxes lower the opportunities for entre-
preneurial profit and reduce the returns for risk tak-
ing. Moreover, tax rates and exemption rules that 
put specific incomes at a disadvantage may distort 
incentives in favour of, or against, self-employment. 
It is important to design a tax system which does not 
distort incentives for entrepreneurship or provides 
implicitly  different  incentives  for  entrepreneurship 
in different sectors. Overall, taxation affects entre-
preneurship in all stages of enterprise development 
and affects all types of opportunity entrepreneur-
ship. This can also be deduced from the fact that 
many policy measures, including those in the fields 
of R&D promotion and human resources, come in 
the form of preferential tax treatments for specific 
expenditures.
106   This also includes quasi-equity products such as mezzanine capital that 
allow investor to assume higher levels of risk.71
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With regard to subsidies it is important to note that 
the fact of entry or that of being small does not, as 
such, establish a sufficient rationale of market fail-
ure to support the direct provision of public fund-
ing (see e.g., Santarelli and Vivarelli 2002). In this 
respect,  pre-commercial  and  commercial  activities 
require  separate  consideration,  as  support  for  the 
first is more likely to respond to market failures and is 
less prone to distort competition.107 Even when clear 
rules for discrimination among potential applicants 
are in place, the selection of beneficiaries raises two 
problems. On the one hand, adverse selection con-
ditions make it difficult to assess the quality of the 
entrepreneurial project on an ex-ante basis, raising 
the risk of misallocating funds. On the other hand, 
even when high-quality entrepreneurial projects are 
selected, subsidies may have little leverage due to 
crowding out.
In short, the focus of SME policy should be on safe-
guarding  a  level  playing  field,  eliminating  distor-
tions in favour of large firms within existing subsidy 
schemes,  e.g.  for  R&D  or  regional  cohesion,  and 
preserving equal for access of SMEs. In practice, this 
may  e.g.  imply  simplified  rules  for  tendering  and 
application  procedures.  Another  instance  where 
government support may be warranted in the case 
of entry subsidies for highly disadvantaged groups. 
Overall,  subsidies  may  be  important  for  low-and 
high-opportunity  entrepreneurship  in  the  start-up 
(and to a lesser extent in the pre-start-up) phase of 
business development. When targeting innovation, 
R&D promotion schemes are also important in the 
maintenance and growth phase.
Human resources
With regard to human resources, the first policy field 
is entrepreneurial capabilities. Here, policy interven-
tion concerns to the supply of entrepreneurship with 
regard to the type, quantity and/or quality of entre-
preneurship. This policy field is related to entrepre-
neurship education at different levels of educational 
attainment (see also the Small Business Act, Com-
mission of the European Communities 2008). Policy 
measures in this area benefit all three types of oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship.
The availability of skilled labour is cited by many firms 
as a barrier to growth. Market failures are related to 
asymmetric information and external effects and are 
more severe for small firms. Policy initiatives in this 
area are related to the skills structure of employment. 
In addition to policy measures that provide incentives 
to firms and workers, measures that affect the struc-
107   Along this line, aid intensities should generally be lower for activities 
linked to development and innovation than for research related activities 
(see Framework for State Aid for Research and Development and Innovation 
2006/C 323/01).
ture  of  the  educational  system  are  also  addressed 
here. Krueger and Kumar (2004) and Vandenbussche 
et al. (2006) provide evidence that differences in the 
structure of educational systems determine the con-
tribution to the growth of education expenditures. 
The availability of skilled labour is most important 
for  high-opportunity  entrepreneurs  in  the  growth 
phase. To a lesser extent, this also affects medium-
opportunity entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship 
in the start-up phase.
Finally,  labour  market  regulations  can  restrict  the 
reallocation  of  workers,  thereby  hampering  firm 
growth (e.g. Bertola 1999). Stel et al. (2007) sug-
gest that labour market regulation is more important 
than administrative entry regulation for opportunity 
entrepreneurship in high-income countries. On the 
other hand, rigid regulations may also trigger entre-
preneurial  responses  to  offset  and  circumvent  the 
rigidities, thereby leading to higher self-employment 
rates. Of special importance to entrepreneurship are 
regulations that affect the mobility of skilled labour. 
The  regulation  and  enforcement  of  ‘non-compete 
clauses’  has  received  attention  from  researchers 
studying the rise of Silicon Valley (e.g. Fallick et al. 
2005, Marx et al. 2008). Thus, labour market regula-
tion and contract enforcement may be important for 
high expected opportunity entrepreneurship in the 
expansion and start-up phases.
Entrepreneurship environment and infrastructure
This heading can be taken to cover all policies that 
primarily concern network effects and co-ordination 
failures  that  are  not  directly  related  to  opportuni-
ties and resources. The first policy area is awareness 
and culture. The main policy target is the supply of 
entrepreneurship, i.e. the willingness of individuals 
to engage in a new venture, be creative and per-
severe. As mentioned earlier, this is largely related 
to  entrepreneurship  education  and  measures  that 
aim to raise the awareness of entrepreneurship as a 
career option. These policy measures primarily tar-
get the pre-start phase but also provide motivation 
in the start-up phase, and may be used to target all 
three types of opportunity entrepreneurship. Meas-
ures that enhance the image of entrepreneurs and 
create an entrepreneurial culture in society can be 
seen as a part of the framework conditions foster-
ing entrepreneurship. More generally, trade policy 
initiatives aimed at improving external market access 
are an important element in creating opportunities 
for SMEs.108 Export promotion is also important, as 
exporting is associated with substantial sunk costs. 
Export promotion activities range from supporting 
entrepreneurs through networks of trade promotion 
108   See chapter 2 of this Report for a discussion of trade barriers for EU busi-
nesses.72
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agencies to export guarantees. These are relevant for 
expanding firms of medium size and high-opportu-
nity entrepreneurs in particular (see also the Small 
Business Act). Business advice, relevant for the start-
up and the maintenance/expansion phase, can be 
organised in very different ways and target different 
types of opportunity entrepreneurship. The effective-
ness of such policy measures should be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis. Finally, the efficiency of the legal 
system is a basic element in ensuring secure property 
rights and investor and creditor rights that foster the 
efficiency of capital allocation across entrepreneurial 
ventures. The legal system defines the ‘rules of the 
game’, with important effects on all types of oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship and all three stages of firm 
development.
Interfaces with other policy areas
A wide array of other policy areas are important for 
entrepreneurial  activity.  Competition  policy  focuses 
on curtailing the market power of established incum-
bents that attempt to create excessive entry barri-
ers or use anti-competitive behaviour to thwart their 
competitors. It is especially important for the start-
up  and  maintenance/expansion  phases,  and  most 
important  for  high-opportunity  entrepreneurship. 
Industrial policy aims to adjust the wider matrix of 
horizontal measures to the particular needs and busi-
ness environment within individual markets. Entre-
preneurship and SMEs are important elements likely 
to be affected by differences across sectors, e.g. in 
the nature of sunk costs, the degree of product dif-
ferentiation,  the  importance  of  technological  and 
other  innovations.  Co-ordination  and  a  coherent 
set of principles regarding the rationales and actual 
design  of  policies  are  therefore  important.  Special 
attention should also be devoted to Regional policy. 
With the notable exception of innovation procure-
ment programmes, Regional policy generally does 
not  discriminate  between  opportunity  types  of 
entrepreneurship and targets all stages of entrepre-
neurial  development.  Furthermore,  the  design  of 
welfare systems is highly important. Henrekson and 
Roine (2007) emphasise that a set of welfare state 
arrangements has negative effects on the return on 
entrepreneurial behaviour. However, they also claim 
that incentives to entrepreneurship and the core of 
a welfare state can coexist, especially if social secu-
rity arrangements are designed in a way that does 
not distort the choice between self-employment and 
employment. Sinn (1996) uses a stylised model to 
show that the allocative implications of redistributive 
taxation can enhance efficiency, as it creates a social 
insurance mechanism that stimulates risk-taking. The 
empirical evidence suggests that extensive welfare 
systems reduce “necessity entrepreneurship”. With 
regard  to  the  interaction  between  entrepreneurial 
activity and the welfare state, the specific incentive 
structures and regulations affecting movement into 
and out of self-employment are of high importance. 
Welfare systems have a stronger effect on medium 
and  high  expected  opportunity  entrepreneurship, 
especially in the start-up phases. However, specific 
regulations also have an impact on high-opportunity 
entrepreneurship and the pre-start phase.
To conclude, Table 5 shows that there are a large 
number of policy areas which affect SMEs and entre-
preneurship. For each of them, rationales based on 
market  failures  can  be  invoked  when  considering 
policy intervention. Nevertheless it is important to 
note that specific policy instruments require a sepa-
rate assessment of the costs and benefits of public 
intervention.  Reflecting  the  specific  circumstances 
in different countries, the selection of policy instru-
ments requires a careful and detailed assessment.
3.3.5.  Priorities for policy
As a thought experiment, SME policy can be seen as 
a combination of approaches. A first set of policies 
could aim to increase the number of new enterprises 
by attracting more entrepreneurial ventures into the 
production stage. This can, for example, be done by 
reducing regulatory barriers to entry or by providing 
start-up subsidies. The effect of such policies is likely 
to increase the number of trial and error processes, 
and thus stimulate overall firm turnover, with more 
firms  entering  and  failing  in  the  market.  Clearly, 
some of these additional entries would lead to surviv-
ing and growing firms, but the extent to which such 
increased turnover will result in improved productivity 
and technological progress will depend on whether a 
real process of creative destruction is set in motion109. 
Empirical evidence broadly confirms the productivity 
enhancing effects of firm turnover and indicates that 
in the EU the contribution of entry to productivity 
growth is higher than in the US. Such entry foster-
ing approach is more likely to lead to effective crea-
tive  destruction  and  therefore  enhanced  perform-
ance if complemented by a set of policies aimed to 
increase opportunities and the ability to seize them. 
This would lead to valuable entrepreneurial experi-
mentation and further increase the probabilities of 
survival and expansion, and therefore the number of 
entrepreneurial ventures with a high potential. Fig-
ure 7 takes up the basic idea in Figure 4 of a stylised 
frequency distribution of firms according to ability to 
exploit opportunities and shows the complementa-
rities between these two sets of policies. Under the 
second approach the mass of the frequency distribu-
109   In other words, whether restructuring and churning, rather than mere 
turbulence leading to revolving door firms (fringe firms entering the market 
and replacing similar ones) will take place. See section 3.2.2 under “turbu-
lence and market experimentation”.73
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tion in the graph is shifted slightly towards ventures 
with a better survival probability and higher growth 
potential. Under the first approach, the main effect 
would be a shift in the threshold above which ven-
tures enter the production stage.
The  optimal  combination  of  these  approaches 
depends on the specific characteristics of the econ-
omy for which the policy is designed. The evidence 
discussed in section 3.2 confirms the contribution of 
growth firms to economic performance and points 
to the existence of a growth deficit in the EU as well 
as to the stronger hindering role of growth barri-
ers in the EU relative to the US. The empirical evi-
dence presented in Section 3.2 also suggests that 
in the EU entry rates and the contribution of entry 
to economic performance do not significantly dif-
fer from those in the US. These findings have clear 
implications for the relative importance of the possi-
ble policy approaches. A general message from these 
findings  seems  to  be  that  spurring  entry  alone  is 
unlikely to provide the necessary boost to economic 
performance, so special attention should be devoted 
to creating the conditions for the growth of firms. 
Creating  the  framework  conditions  conducive  to 
firm growth will make policies promoting entry more 
likely to result in valuable market experimentation, 
increase the level of opportunity exploitation among 
new entrants and therefore increase the contribution 
of entry to economic performance.
Going beyond the individual benefits for the individ-
ual firm, this would further strengthen the process of 
structural change in the EU towards new markets and 
new technologies, characterised by higher opportu-
nities and more radical entrepreneurial ventures.
Figure 7: Distribution of entrepreneurship: effect of increasing entry vs capabilities for opportunity 
exploitation
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Note: This figure displays in a stylised way the effect of two extreme policy interventions on the distribution of entrepreneur-
ship, assuming that the two do not affect the overall frequency of entrepreneurship. The first kind of policy intervention, 
depicted by a shift of the boundary between latent entrepreneurs with or without actual entry, increases only the number of 
entrants. It leads to a rise of turbulence without affecting the long-term rate of entrepreneurial success. The second kind of 
policy is oriented towards increasing the capabilities for opportunity exploitation. It leads to an increase in the frequency of 
survival and growth.
Source: Adapted from Hölz et al. (2006).74
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From a dynamic perspective, SME and entrepreneur-
ship policy should therefore aim for
–    a varied population of small and large firms, pro-
viding a heterogeneous pool of entrepreneurs to 
generate new ideas and ventures, together with
–    the  mobilisation  of  productive  resources,  by 
enhancing  a  society’s  educated  workforce  and 
capacity to generate new knowledge, and finally
–    an undistorted process of competitive selection, 
where small firms have equal opportunities, and 
the  market  spurs  the  reallocation  of  resources 
from exiting firms with low performance to grow-
ing firms with high performance.
Apart from the many other policy fields that relate to 
these goals, which are displayed in Table 5, a focus 
on  the  fpost-entry  growth  performance  of  firms 
would point to the following priorities:
Fostering competition is a clear priority and concerns 
both product and factor markets. Regulations and 
other non-tariff barriers stifle competition within and 
across  countries  especially  in  services,  innovation 
and banking.110 Only a true single market enables 
opportunity-based  entrepreneurship  to  achieve  its 
growth potential and to challenge local incumbents 
on a European scale. The re-launch of the Single Mar-
ket Programme in 2007 (EC 2007B) is a step in that 
direction but needs to be complemented by Mem-
ber State action to empower markets by eliminating 
regulation with a home bias or incumbent bias in 
product and innovation markets.
Fostering  entrepreneurial  experimentation  requires 
more  than  increased  competition.  One  important 
element is bankruptcy regulation. Bankruptcy regula-
tion affects the behaviour of both entrepreneurs and 
creditors. The possibility of a fresh start and reduc-
tion of the stigma of failure increase the willingness 
to engage in entrepreneurial experimentation, while 
strong creditor rights and fast, predictable and inex-
pensive bankruptcy regulation are central for the pro-
vision of appropriately designed finance for growth 
firms. While most Member States have introduced or 
are introducing changes to their bankruptcy regu-
lations on a step-by-step basis, the true importance 
of bankruptcy regulation for high-growth entrepre-
neurship is still to be fully recognised in most Mem-
ber States. The simple message is that entrepreneur-
ial experimentation requires policies that reduce the 
costs and stigma of business failure.
Another  priority  is  the  mobilisation  of  resources 
in  the  realm  of  finance,  knowledge  creation  and 
110   “In Europe, sending a product from Amsterdam to Brussels is still con-
sidered an ‘export’, whereas in the US a product made in New York and sold 
in Los Angeles is labelled ‘distribution” (van Pottelsberghe 2008: p. 6).
human capital. With regard to financial resources, 
policy  should  foster  the  development  of  market-
based finance that channels resources towards firms 
with growth potential. The focus should be on the 
legal  and  regulatory  environment  and  on  market 
incentives. Knowledge generation is a cornerstone 
of innovation-based growth, so public policy should 
focus on providing the legal basis for an integrated 
market for innovation and technology. At Member 
State level, it needs to be recognised that innova-
tion-based  growth  strategies  at  firm  level  –  espe-
cially in countries close to the technological frontier 
- require a high level of quality in academic research, 
as academic research is a necessary complement to 
business R&D both as a provider of ideas and as a 
provider of researchers and entrepreneurs (Dosi et al. 
2005, van Pottelsberghe 2008). For catch-up coun-
tries academia can be a valuable instrument for tech-
nology transfer. In that regard, industrial policies also 
have an important role to play in providing commit-
ted and focused support for research and innovation 
while leaving the selection among competing ven-
tures to the markets.
Recent economic research has emphasised the role 
of  institutions  for  economic  growth  (Aghion  and 
Howitt  2006,  Acemoglu,  Johnson  and  Robinson 
2005).  Formal  and  informal  institutions  shape  the 
rules of the game – incentives and interaction – that 
govern the conduct of economic agents. The availa-
ble evidence suggests that “appropriate” institutions 
and policy choices change when countries catch up 
with the technological frontier. This finding is also 
reflected at firm level, where in countries close to 
the technological frontier the competitive strategies 
of high-growth firms are mainly based on innova-
tion, whereas in catch-up countries they tend to be 
based on comparative advantages other than own 
R&D (Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti 2006, Hölzl 
and Friesenbichler 2008). This implies that there is 
no single recipe that can be used as blueprint for fos-
tering enterprise growth in all Member States. Coun-
tries far away from the technological frontier need 
to choose other priorities than countries close to the 
technological frontier in order to foster firm growth. 
However, markets for technology, financial develop-
ment and a strong research and technology transfer 
system feature importantly in all of them.
3.4.  Entrepreneurship and SME policy  
in the EU Member States
This section describes the overall organisation and 
focus of SME and entrepreneurship policy in the EU 
Member States. In addition, a more specific inven-
tory of policies and good practice policies has been 
collected regarding policy instruments used in the 
EU Member States in the fields of financial resources, 75
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Box 3.1: A “Small Business Act” (SBA) for Europe
The March 2008 European Council expressed strong support for an initiative to further strengthen 
SMEs’ sustainable growth and competitiveness, named the “Small Business Act” (SBA) for Europe and 
requested its swift adoption. The symbolic name of an “Act” given to this initiative underlines the politi-
cal will to recognise the central role of SMEs in the EU economy and to put in place for the first time a 
comprehensive policy framework for the EU and its Member States through:
•   A set of 10 principles to guide the conception and implementation of policies both at Community and 
Member State level. These principles outlined in detail in chapter 4 are essential to bring added value 
at EU level, create a level playing field for SMEs and improve the legal and administrative environment 
throughout the EU:
–   Create an environment in which entrepreneurs and family businesses can thrive and entrepreneurship 
is rewarded
– Ensure that honest entrepreneurs who have faced bankruptcy get quickly a second chance
– Design rules according to the “Think Small First” principle
– Make public administrations responsive to SME needs
–   Adapt public policy tools to SME needs: facilitate SMEs’ participation in public procurement and bet-
ter use State Aid possibilities for SMEs
–   Facilitate SMEs’ access to finance and develop a legal and business environment supportive to timely 
payment in commercial transactions
– Help SMEs to benefit more from the opportunities offered by the Single Market
– Promote the upgrading of skills in SMEs and all forms of innovation
– Enable SMEs to turn environmental challenges into opportunities
– Encourage and support SMEs to benefit from the growth of markets
• A set of new legislative proposals which are guided by the “Think Small First” principle:
– General Block Exemption Regulation on State Aids (GBER)
This regulation exempts from prior notification categories of State aid already covered by existing 
regulations in the field of aid to SME, training, employment, R&D and regional aid and covers new 
categories of aid. The new regulation simplifies and harmonises existing rules for SMEs and increase 
investment aid intensities for SMEs.
– Regulation providing for a Statute for a European Private Company (SPE)
This regulation provides for a Statute for an SPE that could be created and operate according to the 
same uniform principles in all Member States. The Commission is also expected to come forward with 
the necessary amending proposals to ensure that this new company form can benefit from the existing 
corporate tax directives.
– Directive on reduced VAT rates
This envisaged directive will offer Member States the option to apply reduced VAT rates principally for 
locally supplied services which are mainly provided by SMEs.
Moreover, as part of the SBA the following proposals will be prepared:
–   A legislative proposal to further modernise, simplify and harmonise the existing rules on VAT invoicing 
to alleviate the burden on businesses.
–   Amendment to the Directive 2000/35/EC on late payments with a view to ensuring that SMEs are paid 
on time for any commercial transactions.
•   A set of new policy measures which implement these 10 principles according to the needs of SMEs 
both at Community and at Member State level76
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and  regulation  of  entry  and  exit.  The  policy  field 
“financial  resources”  has  been  selected  because  a 
large number of policy measures address the per-
ceived financing gap of small and entrepreneurial 
firms.  Similarly,  regulation  of  entry  has  received 
much  attention  in  the  last  decade,  whereas  exit 
regulation  has  been  rather  neglected,  despite  its 
importance for a forward-looking entrepreneurship 
policy. Bankruptcy legislation affects the behaviour 
of both entrepreneurs and creditors. The possibility 
of a fresh start increases the willingness for entrepre-
neurial experimentation, while strong creditor rights 
and a fast, predictable and inexpensive framework is 
central for the provision of finance for fast growing 
firms. Most Member States have introduced or are 
introducing changes to their bankruptcy regulations 
on a step-by-step basis.
3.4.1.  Organisation of SME and entrepreneurship 
policy in the EU Member States
In order to uncover the patterns and relative impor-
tance of SME and entrepreneurship policy in the EU, 
an investigation has been carried out in all 27 Mem-
ber States using a survey addressed to ENSR mem-
bers111. Table A.2 in Annex A presents an overview of 
the situation in each EU Member State. The picture 
provided by this overview is consistent with the gen-
eral perception of a gradual policy evolution from 
the traditional focus on SMEs towards a deliberate 
concern with the dynamics of entrepreneurship. in 
short:
–    All Member Sates pursue some form of SME pol-
icy. In all Member Sates, SMEs are considered an 
essential part of the economy. However, whether 
and/or to what extent the weaknesses of SMEs 
should be addressed by policy measures differs 
across Member Sates.
–    In  eleven  Member  Sates  the  focus  is  on  SME 
policy, in seven the focus is on general entrepre-
neurship policy (with some attention paid to the 
specific weaknesses of SMEs) and nine Member 
Sates  present  a  mixture  of  these  two  policies. 
‘Old’ Member States relatively often implement 
entrepreneurship policies, whereas in most of the 
new Member States the focus is on SME policies.
–    Almost all Member Sates have developed policies 
to foster innovation in SMEs. Howerver, only nine 
Member  Sates  have  a  policy  to  stimulate  fast-
growing firms. Given the importance of this goal, 
as revealed by the empirical evidence, this find-
111   National ENSR (European Network for Social and Economic Research) 
members were asked to provide a brief general description of the relevant 
policies  in  their  countries.  ENSR  member  organisations  include  all  27  EU 
member states and most ENSR partners have worked together since the early 
1990s. See www.ensr-net.com for further information on this network.
ing indicates a certain lack of emphasis on firm 
dynamics in many of the national policies.
–    In  most  Member  Sates,  ministries  (e.g.  of  the 
economy,  employment,  technology,  finance) 
are responsible for policy development. In many 
Member States policy implementation and exe-
cution are in the hands of a separate organisation, 
e.g. an agency. In a few Member States a single 
organisation  is  responsible  for  policy  develop-
ment, execution and evaluation.
–    In five Member Sates a special unit for fast-grow-
ing and innovative SMEs has been established.
All Member Sates focus on firm structure and aim to 
provide a level playing field that places SMEs on equal 
footing with large enterprises. A growing number of 
Member Sates focuses on initiatives to enhance the 
dynamics of entrepreneurship. While SME and entre-
preneurship policies are strictly complementary, the 
former appears to be better established and firmly 
rooted in the institutional fabric. Conversely, the lat-
ter has a growing momentum, especially in the ‘old’ 
member states.
3.4.2.  Policy instruments: Finance and regulation  
of entry and exit
Complementing the above evidence, a more spe-
cific inventory has been made of the policy instru-
ments used in the EU Member States in the fields 
of finance, and the regulatory aspects of start-up and 
exit. The policy field “regulatory aspects of start-
up and exit” focuses both on the current situation 
(existing rules and regulations) and on new initia-
tives to change or simplify regulatory and legislative 
frameworks.
In total, 237 policy instruments in the field of finance 
and 163 instruments in the field of regulation have 
been  identified.  Approximately  56%  of  the  policy 
instruments  in  the  field  of  finance  are  from  the 
EU-15. In the field of regulation the EU-15 accounts 
for 71%.
The  policy  field  “finance”  has  an  average  of  nine 
policy instruments per country.112 Although (access 
to) finance is often reported as a major bottleneck by 
entrepreneurs, there is reason to be cautious about 
these findings, as explained in Section 3.3.2. While 
it is true that financial bottlenecks exist for start-ups, 
emerging firms with high growth potential and new 
exporters, as well as for SMEs in the new Member 
States in general, it is still striking that so many finan-
cial policy instruments (of all kinds) have been imple-
mented.
112   Given the nature of this overview, which falls short of a complete inves-
tigation, the number of existing policies is likely to be even larger.77
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Only in about one third of the cases was the policy 
instrument reported to be in response to an identified 
market failure (see Table 6). The number is higher for 
finance than for regulation. Given the large amount of 
public money spent on these policies and the organi-
sational structures set up to develop, implement and 
administer them (both within governmental organi-
sations and in agencies acting at arm’s length from 
government) a more sound basis for policy initiatives 
could  improve  their  effectiveness.  However,  even 
more striking is the lack of proper evaluations, with 
only one fifth of the instruments for both finance 
and regulation having been evaluated (see Table 6). 
Despite the fact that evaluation needs to become a 
more central tool to inform the policy-making proc-
ess  (Storey,  2006),  in  most  Member  States  there 
appear to be few incentives (e.g. from parliaments 
or stakeholders) to carry out proper, independent 
evaluation of SME and entrepreneurship initiatives 
that allow to assess whether policy goals have been 
reached in an effective and efficient way.
As seen in Table 7, many policy instruments in the 
field of finance focus on entry and growth. In the 
field of regulation the majority of policies address the 
start-up phase.113
113   The survey used a finer distinction of stages than in the previous section 
but neglected the pre-start phase.
In  the  field  of  regulation  it  can  be  observed  that 
a  large  number  of  the  policy  initiatives  at  Mem-
ber  State  level  deal  with  deregulation  and  reduc-
ing administrative burdens on firms in all stages of 
the enterprise life-cycle. This is in line with the EU’s 
recently launched ambitious programme to reduce 
the  administrative  burden  on  enterprises  and  the 
Member States’ commitment to reduce these costs 
at national level.
Within the field of finance different types of instru-
ments can be distinguished. Table 8 shows that most 
initiatives provide subsidies to firms, followed by the 
provision of loans and credit, guarantees and equity 
capital measures. About 41% of the identified policy 
instruments in the field of finance are subsidies. One 
fifth of the instruments provide enterprises with a 
loan or credit, possibly under more favourable con-
ditions than the market. Approximately 11% of the 
instruments provide a guarantee to make it easier for 
enterprises to obtain a loan. The heading “capital” 
covers for instance the provision of equity funding and 
the establishment of a venture capital fund. “Taxes” 
refer, for example, to tax-free amounts for entrepre-
neurs transferring their business and tax deductions 
when  purchasing  or  producing  new  depreciable 
assets. Among the policy instruments, about 11% 
are related to capital and 10% to taxes. 5% of the 
initiatives  provide  information  and  10%  advice  & 
Table 6: Policy instruments: number, market failure and evaluation
Finance Regulation
Total number 237 163
% response to market failure 36% 29%
% official evaluation available 22% 21%
Table 7: Policy instruments and stages of entrepreneurial phase
Phase
Finance
EU-15*
Finance
NMS-12**
Regulation
EU-15*
Regulation
NMS-12**
Start-up 35% 22% 45% 18%
Expansion/growth 30% 34% 20% 12%
Transfer 10% 6% 19% 12%
Exit 3% 0% 15% 10%
Not specified 2% 0% 5% 0%
Note:   Policy instruments may be targeted at more than 1 phase of the lifecycle of an enterprise, therefore the sum of the 
columns Finance EU15 and Finance NMS12 exceeds 100%. The table should be read as follows: Out of all (237) policy 
measures in the field of finance 35% focus on the start-up phase of enterprises and are implemented in the 15 “old” 
Member States* EU15: The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Por-
tugal, Spain, Finland, Austria, Germany, France, Sweden.** NMS12: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.78
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counselling. “Information” refers for instance to the 
provision of information on tax benefits for business 
angel  investments.  “Advice  &  consultancy”  refers, 
for example, to advice and support for enterprises in 
finding a loan programme. Few policy instruments 
(3%) focus on training, an example being training 
in finance to support young disadvantaged persons 
in starting a business. The category ‘other’ includes, 
for example, a contest in which financing is awarded 
to young innovative enterprises or the creation of 
a business angel network that matches enterprises 
with business angels.
ENSR  partners  were  asked  to  select  examples  of 
good-practice policy responses from the long list of 
237 policy instruments in the field of finance and 163 
instruments in the field of regulation for each coun-
try. Annex B reports on the criteria for this selection 
and presents a short description of these selected 
examples.
3.4.3.  Exit and bankruptcy regulation
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  relatively  few  policy 
measures focus on the exit phase of a business. In the 
finance policy field only 3% of instruments target the 
exit of firms (cf. Table 6). The instruments include, 
among others, a reduced tax rate on business assets 
sold when the company stops its activities, a subsidy 
for entrepreneurs facing difficulties selling their com-
pany, and a subsidy to train new managers when 
companies are sold. With regard to regulation, the 
number of policy initiatives focusing on exit is higher 
but most still focus on start-ups.
As the results from the Eurobarometer Entrepreneur-
ship survey have consistently shown over the years, 
the fear of going bankrupt is a major concern among 
people starting a business. This is especially the case 
in the new Member States. Although this is a sub-
jective opinion, there is evidence (e.g. international 
comparisons)  to  suggest  that  this  opinion  ought 
to be taken seriously (cf. Grilo and Irigoyen 2006). 
Bankruptcy regulation affects the supply of entrepre-
neurs, their willingness to engage in entrepreneurial 
experimentation but also the supply of finance and 
the behaviour of creditors. Thus, one would expect 
to see more policy measures targeting exit regula-
tion in general and bankruptcy legislation in partic-
ular. The impression from this overview is that, in 
some ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States, policy-makers 
are becoming aware of this problem and are trying 
to develop specific policies; especially in the field of 
‘regulation’, e.g. new legislation for debt remission 
or reducing the stigma of failure.
Figure 8 illustrates the bankruptcy process. Entrepre-
neurs may experience financial problems and some 
countries  have  established  early  warning  systems 
aimed  at  detecting  financial  difficulties  before  the 
firm becomes insolvent. Entrepreneurs who experi-
ence financial problems – and have limited resources 
– are often not able to afford a long restructuring 
process  involving  external  advisors  and  consider-
able financial costs. Countries may have out-of-court 
procedures for restructuring business operations (to 
make the firm profitable again) and financial restruc-
turing (deferred payments, debt reduction, new cap-
ital brought in). Out-of-court settlement procedures 
are often quicker and cheaper than in-court proce-
dures. If it is not possible to reorganise a firm out-
of-court, the enterprise may be reorganised through 
formal court procedures. This will often involve draft-
ing a reorganisation plan and allowing discharge of 
Table 8: Policy instruments in the field of finance, type
Type Percentage
Subsidies 41%
Loan/credit 21%
Guarantee 11%
Capital/investment (equity capital) 11%
Taxes 10%
Information: guides, websites 5%
Advice & counselling 10%
Training (labour skills) 3%
Other 7%
Note: Policy instruments may be targeted at more than one type.79
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part of the debt. When reorganisation is not success-
ful then the enterprise may be closed (liquidation). If 
the entrepreneur has burdensome debt it might be 
difficult to finance a new start-up. In some countries 
there are discharge procedures that allow the entre-
preneur a fresh start.
With respect to the bankruptcy process it is important 
to  address  the  differences  between  corporate  and 
personal bankruptcy. Corporate bankruptcy refers to 
the bankruptcy of enterprises of any size, whereas 
personal  bankruptcy  refers  to  the  bankruptcies  of 
individuals.  The  bankruptcy  of  small  businesses  is 
often treated as personal bankruptcy because small 
businesses are often owned by individuals who are 
legally responsible for their businesses’ debts. Bank-
ruptcy law – either corporate or personal - provides a 
framework for determining how much of the debtor’s 
assets will be used to repay debt and how the assets 
will be distributed among creditors. Corporations fil-
ing for bankruptcy commonly have the possibility to 
liquidate or reorganise. In the first case all firm assets 
are divided among claimants, while in the second 
case the firm retains most of its assets and the funds 
to repay claimants come from future earnings. Under 
personal bankruptcy, individuals are not required to 
use all their assets to repay debts, as bankruptcy law 
determines a minimum amount of wealth that the 
individual is allowed to keep in order to maintain a 
certain standard living.
In order to take stock of existing bankruptcy regula-
tions in the EU Member States ENSR partners were 
asked to report on regulations governing bankruptcy 
in their countries. The focus of the investigation was 
on the possibility of a fresh start and the regulations 
that affect the stigma of failure. Table A3 (in Annex 
A) reports the findings concerning the possibilities 
for debt discharge and Table A4 describes the condi-
tions for a fresh start in each Member State.
In the majority of Member States (87%) debt dis-
charge is possible (see Table 9). If debt discharge is 
possible, this is often (75%) possible both for enter-
prises  and  individuals.  Individuals  may  be  persons 
who were previously sole proprietors and have shut 
down their company. These persons may then have 
to deal with the debts because of their legal liability. 
The discharge of debts of individuals is in most cases 
possible both before and after the liquidation of the 
enterprise.
In most countries the debts of an enterprise can be 
discharged following reorganisation. If reorganisation 
is successful and the enterprise survives, at least tem-
porarily, i some Member States impose restrictions on 
future reorganisations or bankruptcy conditions. For 
instance, in Finland only one reorganisation is possi-
ble. In Hungary one has to wait for two years.
In 55% of all Member States a debt discharge can 
only be granted after a certain period of time. The 
Figure 8: Bankruptcy process
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time period varies per country from 1 to 10 years. In 
the majority of Member States there is no restriction 
regarding the amount of debt that has to be repaid 
before a discharge is granted. 
With reference to restrictions on starting a new busi-
ness (see Table 10), most countries have some form 
of  prohibition  after  filing  for  bankruptcy.  In  most 
cases this is related to bankruptcy crime. In case of 
bankruptcy crime, the majority of Member States, 
bar entrepreneurs from starting a new company.
In a large part of the 27 EU Member States, there are 
no restrictions to engaging in certain trades, e.g. in 
the same industry where the business failed. Where 
such restrictions exist, it is generally not related to 
a specific industry. In a number of countries entre-
preneurs may be barred from engaging in a new 
business for a certain period of time. This period var-
ies per country and can go up to 20 years. In some 
Member States there are also specific restrictions that 
apply only to directors or managers.
Overall, this evidence suggests that the importance 
of a fresh start and reducting the stigma of failure 
has  yet  to  be  acknowledged  in  a  large  number 
of  Member  States.  With  the  transition  towards  a 
knowledge-based economy with high levels of risky 
entrepreneurial  experimentation  and  opportunities 
for  enterprise  growth,  bankruptcy  regulation  that 
reduces the stigma of failure and allows entrepre-
Table 9: Possibility of debt discharge in EU Member States
Subject Percentage
Debt discharge is possible 87%
Debt discharge is possible for:
– Enterprise 5%
– Individual 20%
– Both 75%
Debt discharge for the individual is possible:
– Before liquidation 6%
– After liquidation 11%
– Both before and after liquidation 83%
Debt discharge for the enterprise is possible in case of reorganisation 100%
After debt discharge, there are restrictions on future reorganisation or bankruptcy conditions 44%
Debt discharge is only allowed after a given period of time 55%
Debt discharge is only allowed after a certain amount of debt has been repaid 25%
Table 10: Possible prohibition of starting a new enterprise
Subject Percentage
After filing for bankruptcy...
An entrepreneur/manager who was not legally liable for debts, is legally prohibited from 
engaging in a new business.
65%
An entrepreneur who was legally liable for debts, is legally prohibited from engaging in a new 
business.
87%
An entrepreneur is only prohibited from engaging in a new business if bankruptcy crimes have 
been committed and confirmed by court.
70%
An entrepreneur is prohibited from engaging in a new business just for a given time period. 70%
An entrepreneur is prohibited from engaging in certain trades, e.g. in the same industry where 
their business failed.
5%
There are specific restrictions that apply just to directors/managers. 70%81
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neurs to learn from their own errors (fresh start) is 
more important than in economies based on capital-
intensive  traditional  industries  (Landier  2005).  An 
appropriate bankruptcy system finds the right trade-
off between protecting creditors, in order to increase 
willingness to fund start-ups or growing firms, and 
reducing the entrepreneur’s exposure to risk as much 
as possible. Table A.5 in Annex A presents recent pol-
icy initiatives and instruments that facilitate the exit 
of businesses. A large number of initiatives are geared 
towards making the bankruptcy process faster (e.g. 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Slovakia), improving re-
start possibilities (Denmark, Latvia), raising exemp-
tion levels (Belgium) and reducing the stigma of fail-
ure (Austria). However, it needs to be emphasised 
that not all Member States give the same priority to 
bankruptcy regulation in their entrepreneurship poli-
cies or focus on the same issues.
3.5.  Summary and conclusions
This chapter investigates the economics of entrepre-
neurial activity and SMEs and its policy implications. 
The main results can be summarised as follows:
•    The empirical regularities found for business struc-
ture indicate that most firms are SMEs and that 
the importance of SMEs differs more across sec-
tors than across countries. The entry and exit of 
firms is highly correlated and substantial for most 
industries. The selection environment is harsh – 
most  entrants  and  exiting  firms  are  small  firms 
with  a  short  life  span.  Only  about  50%  survive 
beyond  the  fifth  year.  Most  firms  display  mod-
est growth rates, whereas a few firms exhibit very 
high growth. These high growth firms are impor-
tant drivers of creative destruction and job crea-
tion. The comparison between the EU and the US 
reveals important differences in business structure 
and business dynamics. With regard to business 
structure,  American  firms  are  on  average  larger 
than European firms and firm size distribution in 
the US reveals a much smaller share of micro enter-
prises (1–9 employees) in terms of both number 
and employment. With regard to business dynam-
ics, entry and exit rates as well as survival rates are 
largely comparable across the EU countries and 
the US. The main differences are that (i) in the US 
successful new firms expand more rapidly than in 
the EU, (ii) entrants in the US display a higher dis-
persion of productivity levels than in Europe, and 
(iii) in the US the more productive firms have a 
stronger tendency to increase their market shares 
than in the EU. Taken together, these findings sug-
gest that the market environment is more com-
petitive in the US, but at the same time allows 
greater market experimentation. In addition, the 
evidence indicates that, relative to the US, barriers 
to growth pose a bigger problem than barriers to 
start a business in the EU.
•    The  available  evidence  shows  that  entrepre-
neurship  is  important  for  competitiveness  and 
economic growth. New and small firms play an 
important role in innovation, complementary to 
that of large firms. Small firms are often the carri-
ers of new radical product innovations, while large 
firms have advantages in incremental and process 
innovation. The positive association of turbulence 
(entry and exit) and the presence of high-growth 
firms with employment reallocation and produc-
tivity growth is confirmed by both aggregate and 
firm-level studies. Firm-level studies show that the 
contribution of high-growth firms to employment 
and value added growth is substantial. While pro-
ductivity growth in the short-run is largely driven 
by incumbents, over a longer time horizon firm 
turnover (entry and exit) plays a more important 
role. Competitive selection drives firms with low 
productivity out of the market and promotes the 
growth of high productivity firms.
•    Financing appears as a frequently identified obsta-
cle to entrepreneurship and the development of 
SMEs. While surveys suggest that financing is an 
important  barrier  to  entry  point  to  gaps  in  the 
early stages of firm life, more refined studies sug-
gest that financing is not a primary constraint for 
the  majority  of  established  firms.  However,  the 
financing gap is likely to be most relevant for fast-
growing enterprises. In addition, regulatory entry 
barriers, ‘red tape’, and product market regulation 
are consistently perceived as important obstacles 
by firms. Finally, the lack of skilled labour is often 
cited, especially as an obstacle to growth and as 
an obstacle to innovation.114
•    The empirical evidence clearly indicates that the 
challenge for the EU Member States is to create a 
business environment that leaves room for entre-
preneurial experimentation, ensures strong mar-
ket selection and fosters firm growth. This has led 
to the identification of a number of policy areas 
relating  to  opportunities,  resources,  and  entre-
preneurship environment and infrastructure. The 
importance of different policy areas depends on 
the varying stages in the development of an enter-
prise and on the differences in the quality dimen-
sion of entrepreneurship, i.e. the degree to which 
firms  exploit  opportunities.  While  the  manifold 
individual policies that affect SMEs and entrepre-
114   When interpreting the latter results, one must bear in mind the subjec-
tive nature of replies given in such surveys. For example, a lack of financing 
reported by the firm does not automatically point toward a need for public 
intervention. It can instead reflect an efficient process of selection among 
competing uses. Policy intervention is only called for if there is good reason 
to suspect systematic distortions to the financing decisions of investors, i.e. 
market failure.82
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neurship are summarised in Table 5, the following 
three goals emerge as crucial to enhancing entre-
preneurial experimentation and - firms’ growth in 
Europe:
  –    Fostering competition in order to improve mar-
ket access and reduce home and incumbent 
bias in product and innovation markets. The 
main instruments are the Single Market policy, 
better regulation and, when appropriate, mar-
ket liberalization in national product and factor 
markets.
  –    Enabling  entrepreneurial  experimentation  by 
reducing the cost and stigma of failure and by 
fostering development of market-based finance 
for entrepreneurial ventures with growth poten-
tial. The main instruments are bankruptcy leg-
islation, and the formation of effective markets 
for venture capital.
  –    Mobilising  human  and  knowledge  resources 
for entrepreneurial ventures. The main avenues 
are  fostering  a  more  entrepreneurial  culture, 
enhancing the level and quality of European 
research  and  uptake  of  its  results  by  SMEs, 
improving the quality of tertiary education sys-
tems and ensuring the efficient reallocation of 
high-skilled workers in the labour market.
Encouraging the growth potential of SMEs is one of 
the primary objectives of the Small Business Act (SBA) 
which is a key element in the EU Growth and Jobs 
strategy. To this end, the SBA contains a set of prin-
ciples and actions to support SMEs throughout their 
life-cycle,  promote  entrepreneurship  and  anchor 
the “Think Small First” principle in policy-making. 
The implementation of the SBA at both at EU and 
national level should translate into more competitive 
SMEs, better equipped to face today’s economic and 
environmental challenges.
Apart from the above goals, three general conclu-
sions emerge from the analysis:
First,  it  is  useful  to  recognise  the  complementary 
character of general SME policies and opportunity-
oriented  entrepreneurship  policies  as  elements  of 
an  overall  SME  and  entrepreneurship  approach. 
Even though they address a different set of firms, 
are based on different rationales and pursue differ-
ent objectives, they complement each other and are 
thus both relevant for Europe. SME policy is oriented 
toward the provision of a level playing field for firms 
of all sizes. Here, the reduction of administrative bur-
dens and policies to activate the innovation poten-
tial of SMEs are central concerns. When considering 
differential treatment of firms according to size, the 
benefits  of  such  policies  (e.g.  addressing  existing 
market  distortions)  should  of  course  be  weighted 
against a potential threshold effect that may reduce 
firms’ willingness to grow115 and, in doing so, have 
adverse effects on economic efficiency (e.g. Holtz-
Eakin 2000). In this case, SME policy could conflict 
with an opportunity-oriented entrepreneurship pol-
icy that aims to improve the business environment 
for firms’ growth.
Second, picking winners should be left to the market. 
Public intervention is not an appropriate response to 
the problem of selection for a number of reasons: (i) 
Selecting winners on an ex-ante basis is difficult even 
for private markets with strong incentives (e.g. ven-
ture capitalists) and the information problems here 
cannot be better handled by public business pro-
motion agencies; (ii) it is misguided, as it does not 
address the core problem of market failure; and (iii) 
the provision of specific support packages that tar-
get picking winners may weaken the incentives for 
regulatory reforms; and regulatory reforms are the 
cornerstone of a public policy that focuses on the 
selection of winners by the market.
Third, as is also the case for other policies, evaluation 
needs to become more central in the formulation of 
SME and entrepreneurship policies and in their ex-
post assessment. These policies need to be based on 
clear rationales such as market failure, subject to a 
cost and benefit assessment, and evaluation should 
be used to inform future but also current choices, 
e.g.  to  adjust  targets,  objectives  and  means.  The 
overview of SME and entrepreneurship policies in the 
EU Member States presented in section 3.4 suggests 
that only a third of policy instruments are based on 
identified  market  or  government  failures  and  that 
there is a lack of specific evaluation.
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Annex A
Table A.1: Self-employment as a % of all private sector employment from 1994 and 2004 for OECD 
countries according to different data sources
Compendia Compendia
OECD Labour force  
statistics
Country 1994 2004
change 
1994 to 
2004
1994 2004
change 
1994 to 
2004
1994 2004
change 
1994 to 
2004
private sector excluding 
agriculture
total private  
sector
total private  
sector
Australia 16.4 15.9 -0.5 19.0 17.6 -1.4 15.3 13.5 -1.8
Austria 7.2 8.9 1.7 11.3 12.0 0.7 10.4 11.7 1.3
Belgium 11.6 11.1 -0.5 12.9 12.2 -0.7 14.8 13.9 -0.9
Canada 12.1 12.1 -0.0 13.9 13.0 -0.9 10.3 9.2 -1.1
Denmark 5.9 6.3 0.4 7.8 7.5 -0.3 8.4 7.8 -0.6
Finland 7.7 8.2 0.5 12.3 11.1 -1.2 14.8 12.2 -2.6
France 9.0 8.2 -0.8 11.2 9.6 -1.6 11.0 8.7 -2.3
Germany 7.8 9.3 1.5 8.7 10.0 1.3 9.1 10.8 1.7
Greece 20.1 19.6 -0.5 31.1 27.2 -3.9 34.4 30.2 -4.2
Iceland 12.5 12.8 0.3 15.9 15.4 -0.5 16.7 14.1 -2.6
Ireland 11.3 11.7 0.4 19.1 16.4 -2.7 21.0 17.2 -3.8
Italy 17.7 19.3 1.6 20.7 21.2 0.5 23.9 25.5 1.6
Japan 10.5 9.1 -1.4 13.2 11.1 -2.1 12.3 10.4 -1.9
Luxembourg 6.6 5.5 -1.1 8.2 6.3 -1.9 8.4 6.7 -1.7
New Zealand 13.1 14.4 1.3 18.3 17.7 -0.6 19.8 18.6 -1.2
Norway 7.8 7.2 -0.6 10.6 9.0 -1.6 8.6 7.1 -1.5
Portugal 15.3 13.3 -2.0 23.3 22.2 -1.1 25.3 24.2 -1.1
Spain 12.6 12.6 0.0 16.2 14.7 -1.5 21.3 16.5 -4.8
Sweden 8.0 8.1 0.1 9.8 9.2 -0.6 10.6 9.6 -1.0
Switzerland 7.2 7.2 0.0 9.5 9.4 -0.1 9.4 9.4 -0.0
Netherlands 9.7 11.3 1.6 11.6 12.6 1.0 10.9 11.0 0.1
USA 10.5 10.1 -0.4 11.8 10.7 -1.1 8.6 7.4 -1.2
UK 11.3 11.2 -0.1 12.3 11.8 -0.5 13.7 12.7 -1.0
EU-15 11.1 11.7 0.6 13.5 13.4 -0.1 14.9 14.5 -0.4
Source: OECD Labour Force Survey, EIM – COMPENDIA database. Calculations WIFO.88
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Table A4: Possible prohibition of starting a new enterprise in EU Member States
Country After filing for bankruptcy...
An entrepreneur 
is only prohibited 
from engaging in 
a new business 
if bankruptcy 
crimes have been 
committed and 
confirmed by court
An entrepreneur 
is prohibited from 
engaging in a new 
business just for a 
given time period
An entrepreneur 
is prohibited from 
engaging in certain 
trades, e.g. in the 
same industry 
where their 
business failed
There are specific 
restrictions that 
apply just to 
directors/managers
Austria Yes Yes No Yes
Belgium Yes No Yes Yes
Bulgaria No No No Yes
Cyprus Yes Yes No Yes
Czech republic No Yes No Yes
Denmark No No No No
Estonia No No No Yes
Finland Yes Yes No No
France Yes Yes No No
Germany Yes Yes No Yes
Greece Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hungary No Yes No Yes
Ireland Yes No No Yes
Italy Yes Yes No Yes
Latvia No No No Yes
Lithuania Yes No No No
Luxembourg Yes Yes No No
Malta No No Yes Yes
Poland No Yes No No
Portugal Yes No No No
Romania Yes Yes Yes Yes
Slovakia No Yes No Yes
Slovenia Yes No No No
Spain Yes Yes No Yes
Sweden Yes Yes No Yes
Netherlands No No No No
United Kingdom No Yes No Yes95
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Table A.5: Instruments for improving the regulation of exit
Country Name in English Short description
Austria Reform of the Criminal Law 
concerning fraudulent bankruptcy
The reform aims to reduce the criminal stigma of busi-
ness failure. Since this reform, only particularly grave 
offences are liable to prosecution.
Austria Expansion of the fiscal privilege of 
restructuring gains
The continuation of the business after finalisation of the 
insolvency proceedings no longer is a prerequisite for 
using the fiscal privilege. The fiscal privilege is now also 
applicable for gains that result from remission of debts 
in cases of private insolvency (of sole proprietors). The 
limit of carry forward losses in connection with insol-
vency proceedings has been raised.
Belgium Protection of own house in case of 
bankruptcy
Better protection of own house against creditors in case 
of bankruptcy.
Belgium Bankruptcy insurance With this insurance, entrepreneurs receive a monthly 
allowance for one year.
Czech 
Republic
Act No. 182/2006 Coll., on 
Bankruptcy and Methods of its 
Resolution (The Insolvency Act)
The new legal regulation has an increased scope (com-
pared to the previous act) and accelerates the resolution 
of bankruptcy.
Denmark Improved restart opportunities The adjustments made to the bankruptcy legislation 
make it easier to obtain a debt discharge after bank-
ruptcy.
Denmark Speedier bankruptcy case handling Bankruptcy cases should be settled at a much faster 
pace.
Finland Development of insolvency 
legislation
This instrument encourages entrepreneurs to take part 
in a debt rearrangement programme. It also promotes 
the inclusion of enterprises with the potential of surviv-
ing, in reorganisation schemes and making the handling 
of reorganisation applications more efficient.
France Law to safeguard enterprises Enterprises with suspended payments for fewer than 
45 days benefit from the conciliation procedure (MAP). 
Enterprises that have not suspended payments benefit 
from the backup procedure (judicial).
Germany Law that protects old-age 
provision of self-employed against 
garnishment from 31.03.2007
Protection of old-age provision of self-employed per-
sons.
Germany Reform of the Insolvency Law from 
01.01.1999
New legal tool “insolvency plan” for the reorganisation 
of the debtor.
Hungary Act V of 2006 on Public Company 
Information, Company Registration 
and Winding-up Proceedings
This instrument aims to create a simpler, cheaper and 
faster system of creating and ending a company.
Latvia Insolvency Law This law provides more favourable legal conditions for 
renewal of debtors’ insolvency and continuation of eco-
nomic activity.
Slovakia On-the-spot liquidation In 2006 new legislation created fast-track procedures 
for voluntary liquidation of businesses. This reduces the 
number of procedures, the time and the cost of winding 
up a business.
Slovakia Act on bankruptcy and 
restructuring
With this instrument the procedural rights of bankruptcy 
creditors are significantly enforced and the overall role 
of courts is reduced.
UK www.businesslink.gov.uk Practical on-line information on all aspects of business.
Source: EIM 2008 in co-operation with ENSR partners.96
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ANNEX B: SELECTED GOOD POLICY PRACTICES
good practice policy instruments has been made, in 
consultation with the European Commission: 7 in the 
field of finance and 7 in the field of regulation. These 
are presented in Tables B1 and B2.117 Add text about 
the difference in approach relative to the Charter’s 
best practices.
In  this  respect  an  important  caveat  needs  to  be 
emphasised, which makes it difficult to say anything 
about  the  real  success  of  the  instruments.  This  is 
related to the fact that evaluation does not play an 
important  role  in  SME  and  entrepreneurship  poli-
cies. As reported in the overview of SME and entre-
preneurship policies in section 4.2, only a third of 
policy instruments is based on identified market or 
government  failures  and  there  is  a  lack  of  proper 
evaluations. The most important element in judg-
ing the effectiveness of policy support is the issue 
of additionality or incrementality. If a policy tool is 
designed and implemented to increase the use of 
high technology in SMEs, the important question is 
not how much high tech has been subsidised by the 
government but “which proportion of the high tech 
development would not happen without the public 
support being in place”. Quite often, available evalu-
ation studies merely list the number of SMEs that 
have used the instrument or the amount of money 
spent  by  the  government.  However,  as  Storey 
(2000) has pointed out almost a decade ago, most 
of the appraisals of business assistance programmes 
in force in a large number of countries, while referred 
to as evaluations, are merely monitoring exercises. 
Most evaluations do not attempt to make compari-
sons with control groups, and if they do it is not in 
an adequate manner.
117   Information on the budgets of the policy instruments or the number of 
businesses supported has not been collected.
The following criteria have been applied in the selec-
tion of good practices:
(1)    The policy instrument should already exist and 
still  be  in  force.  Thus  we  excluded  all  instru-
ments that did no longer exist or were in the 
implementation phase.
(2)    The  policy  instruments  should  have  verifiable 
results, meaning that official or unofficial evalua-
tions are available.
(3)    The  policy  measures  should  be  effective  and 
attain their intended impact. The Effectiveness 
or impact can be assessed in terms of increased 
participation by target groups after introduction 
of the policy instrument, attainment of the spe-
cific goals of the instrument (e. g. an increase in 
the number of high technology entrepreneurs, 
reduction of the identified market failure).
(4)    The  policy  instrument  should  be  efficient  (as 
measured by the cost-benefit ratio), user-friendly 
and have low administrative burdens.
(5)    The policy instrument should have clearly iden-
tifiable  objectives,  as  this  facilitates  evaluation 
and assessment of the importance of the policy 
instrument in the first place.
(6)    The policy instrument should meet the earlier 
identified priorities of entrepreneurship policy in 
the EU and have a focus on fast-growing and 
innovative SMEs.
In addition, preference was given to policy instru-
ments that had a larger reach over instruments with 
a very narrow focus.
Based on these criteria, 69 good practices have been 
identified. From these, a further selection116 of 14 
116   The same criteria as for the first selection have been applied, although 
more strictly. In addition, we have tried to arrive at a reasonable distribution 
over the member states and the two policy fields: finance and regulation.97
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Table B.1: Selected good practices in the field of finance
Country
Name practice 
in English
Short description practice Type, phase
Selection 
criteria
Denmark Easier access to 
venture capital
This instrument contains 10 initiatives to 
improve the market for venture capital. 
These initiatives include e.g. tax deduc-
tion for investors, matching funds, bet-
ter conditions for business angel invest-
ments. These initiatives are developed 
as a response to the fragmented Danish 
tax system, characterised by disparities 
between effective corporate tax rates, 
inefficiencies and high compliance costs.
Subsidy, 
capital Entry, 
growth, 
transfer
Germany High-tech 
starter fund
The high-tech starter fund provides risk 
capital, loans and management coach-
ing to high-tech enterprises with prom-
ising results which are less than 1 year 
old. The main objective of this instru-
ment is to reduce the financing gap for 
these enterprises in their seed phase and 
ultimately contribute to the creation of 
highly skilled jobs.
Capital, loans 
Entry, growth
Ireland Seed and 
venture capital 
programme 
2007-2012
Research has indicated that new high 
technology start-up enterprises face 
difficulties in accessing seed/venture 
capital. Enterprise Ireland disburses risk 
capital (max 50% of the funds raised) 
to venture capital fund providers on the 
basis of their applications. Preference 
is given to those funds which invest in 
seed and start-up enterprises.
Capital Entry, 
growth
Latvia Fast growing 
SME credit 
programme 
ALTUM
Fast-growing SMEs (in manufacturing), 
which can otherwise not obtain finance 
from commercial banks, can receive a 
loan for 90% of the costs of high risk 
projects.
Loans Entry, 
growth
Nether-
lands
SME credit 
guarantee 
scheme
Starters, regular entrepreneurs and 
innovative firms may experience difficul-
ties in obtaining a credit or loan. This 
instrument provides them with a credit 
guarantee for max. 1 million Euro (start-
ers max 100,000 Euro).
Guarantee All 
phases
Slovenia Co-financing of 
investment in 
new technolog-
ical equipment
In order to improve accessibility to 
finance and encourage investments in 
new technologies, fast-growing SMEs 
with up to 9 employees can receive 
co-financing for investments in new 
technologies.
Subsidy 
Growth
Spain ICO SME line To improve access to finance, espe-
cially in years in which the interest rate 
is high, loans are granted to SMEs for 
better-than-market lending conditions.
Loans Growth
Source: EIM in co-operation with ENSR partners (2008).
Note:   The selection criteria are indicated with different symbols:   Existing practice,   Evaluation (Official or non-official), 
 Effectiveness/Impact,   Efficiency (cost-benefit ratio; user friendly; administrative burden),   Clear objectives,   
Focus on fast growers.98
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Table B.2: Selected good practices in the field of regulation
Country
Name practice in 
English
Short description practice Type, Phase
Selection 
criteria
Bulgaria Out of court 
business dispute 
resolutions
Businesses may be confronted with the 
judicial system. The process of litiga-
tion costs a lot of time and money. This 
law focuses on mediation. Businesses 
welcome mediation as it saves time and 
money while preserving and strengthen-
ing longstanding business relationships. 
Practice shows that most disputes are 
resolved by mediation within a week, 
while litigation may continue for years.
Simplification 
All phases
Denmark Minimising 
administrative 
burden
To reduce the administrative burden 
this instrument focuses on several areas: 
simplifying existing laws, a test panel to 
assess regulation in certain areas, better 
communication and services, the use of 
digital solutions.
Deregulation, 
simplification 
All phases
France Enterprise Job 
Pass
In order to reduce the administrative 
burden related to hiring employees, 
a free service is provided by which 
employers are relieved of recruitment 
formalities (e.g. recruitment declaration 
form), information for calculation of 
social security contributions and draw-
ing up an employment declaration.
Simplification 
Entry, growth
Hungary Act IV on the 
business associa-
tions
Establishing a corporation is an expen-
sive, long and difficult task in Hungary. 
This instrument reduces administrative 
burden via electronic registration. Creat-
ing and running a company can now be 
done much faster and cheaper.
Simplification 
Entry, growth
Nether-
lands
Law concerning 
debt reduction 
natural persons
This law enables debtors to request for 
a debt remission. As a result it is easier 
for failed entrepreneurs to make a fresh 
restart.
New regula-
tion Exit
Slovakia Income received 
from inheritance, 
donations and 
real estate trans-
fers is not subject 
to taxation
In order to reduce the costs related to 
complying with regulation and prevent 
tax evasion and violation of law, there 
was a tax reform. This reform includes 
the elimination of income tax on inherit-
ance, donations and real estate transfers.
New fiscal 
regulation 
Transfer
Spain Law 20/2007 of 
11th July on the 
status of the self-
employed
Working and social security conditions 
may be a barrier to entrepreneurship. 
This law intends to improve these condi-
tions. It establishes the definition of 
self-employed, provides self-employed 
with a benefit in case of bankruptcy, 
equalises conditions of self-employed 
to the conditions for employees, and 
provides for reductions in social security 
contributions.
New regula-
tion Entry, 
growth, exit
Source: EIM in co-operation with ENSR partners (2008).
Note:   The selection criteria are indicated with different symbols:   Existing practice,   Evaluation (Official or non-official), 
 Effectiveness/Impact,   Efficiency (cost-benefit ratio; user friendly; administrative burden),   Clear objectives,   
Focus on fast growers.99
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4.  Competitiveness aspects of 
the Sustainable Industrial 
Policy
4.1.  Introduction
In the overall context of a favourable business cycle, 
industry was performing well for a number of years. 
Increased global competition in products and serv-
ice  markets,  scientific  and  technological  progress 
and the increasing importance of environmental and 
natural resource constraints are shaping the compet-
itive environment within which industry is operating. 
With volatile prices of key commodities such as raw 
materials and energy, high inflation and a tighten-
ing labour market as well as the consequences of 
the severe financial crisis, a straightforward continu-
ation of past growth is not possible today. In order 
to keep Europe competitive in the increasingly chal-
lenging  international  environment  and  to  further 
minimise the risk of dangerous climate change, the 
EU is promoting change toward a low-carbon and 
more  energy-efficient  economy.  This  transition  is 
characterised by important challenges, but also clear 
opportunities.
The global nature of this paradigmatic shift in the 
economy  –  energy  prices  are  volatile  around  the 
world, climate change is global and the willingness 
to tackle it is rising in the international arena as well – 
represents a massive potential in the shape of grow-
ing  markets  for  environmental  and  energy-saving 
products.
European industry is well placed to grasp these oppor-
tunities:  it  is  more  efficient  than  other  economies 
(the EU-25’s manufacturing industry is 12.6% more 
efficient than that of the US, measured by direct CO2 
emissions per manufacturing value added118); it has a 
competitive edge in key industries for the future (e.g. 
wind energy, where EU companies have 60% of the 
world market); and it can rely on the internal market, 
one of Europe’s strengths.
However,  the  market  penetration  of  low-carbon, 
energy-efficient  products  and  technologies  is  still 
relatively low. This is because consumers are often 
not aware of the existence of these products or are 
discouraged  by  their  higher  initial  prices  despite 
subsequent savings over the longer term. This leads 
to unnecessary energy consumption and avoidable 
emissions of greenhouse gases and pollutants. More-
over, it prevents exploitation of economies of scale, 
keeps prices high and insufficiently rewards invest-
118   European Commission (2007).
ment, thus hampering eco-innovation and slowing 
down further efficiency improvements.
Evidence shows that increasing the market penetra-
tion  of  low-carbon,  energy-efficient  products  and 
technologies entails very significant potential bene-
fits for both the economy and the environment. For 
example,  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate 
Change reports that the energy used by buildings 
could be reduced by 30% with net economic bene-
fits by 2030. Concerning jobs, existing evidence also 
shows a positive link between investments in energy 
efficiency and (net) employment119.
Unleashing such potential calls for a collective effort 
from producers and consumers alike. Industry will 
have to invest in new products and technologies. 
Consumers  will  have  to  make  more  responsible 
choices. Policy makers in the European Union and its 
Member States are called upon to set the appropri-
ate framework conditions for such investment and 
choices to take place.
This  chapter  analyses  the  competitiveness  dimen-
sions of the EU’s Sustainable Industrial Policy. Section 
4.2 discusses the barriers that prevent the uptake of 
energy-efficient  products  and  technologies  in  the 
internal  market,  section  4.3  deals  with  the  policy 
response at the European level to tackle the barriers, 
section 4.4 presents the potential benefits of remov-
ing them, and section 4.5 concludes.
4.2.  Barriers and their impact on 
technological change
4.2.1.  Barriers that prevent the uptake of energy-
efficient products and technologies
Energy-efficient products are generally characterised 
by better environmental performance (i.e. lower CO2 
emissions) and lower operating costs during use (i.e. 
lower energy costs for the user). For a number of 
reasons  markets  often  fail  to  fully  recognise  these 
advantages,  creating  an  uneven  playing  field  that 
discriminates  against  better  performing  products 
and act as a barrier to their uptake. These reasons 
are discussed below.
The first issue is that markets may not price the lower 
environmental impacts of energy-efficient products 
with respect to traditional products, in other words 
environmental  externalities  may  be  only  partially 
internalised.  In  Europe,  this  problem  is  addressed 
by the emission trading scheme (ETS) for some sec-
tors of the EU economy, which introduces a price 
for CO2 emissions. This scheme currently covers over 
10000 installations in the energy and industrial sec-
119   Levine, M. D. Ürge-Vorsatz, et al. (2007).100
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tors, which are collectively responsible for 40% of 
total greenhouse gas emissions. The Energy Taxa-
tion  directive,  in  force  since  January  2004,  allows 
Member States to complement the ETS for sectors 
not covered by it. Even assuming that environmental 
impacts are hence correctly priced, there is still the 
possibility that consumers will fail to choose energy-
efficient products, even though this would save them 
money over the lifetime of the product. Partly, this is 
due to the lack of information on how to value oper-
ating costs relative to the (sometimes higher) pur-
chasing price. In a recent survey, 80.3% of compa-
nies confirmed that lack of consumer awareness was 
the main reason why demand for better performing 
products is not higher120.
Moreover, empirical studies and laboratory experi-
ments  show  that  individuals  do  not  always  make 
optimal decisions, even when all the necessary infor-
mation  is  available.  This  is  because  of  the  limited 
cognitive ability to process the amount of informa-
tion needed to draw the correct (rational) conclu-
sion121. There is some evidence that people find it 
difficult to calculate the long-run value of energy sav-
ings. McRae (1980) asked ‘suppose you were buying 
a new refrigerator and could get one that cost $100 
more but saved on electricity bills. How much would 
you have to save per month to spend the extra $100 
for the refrigerator?’ Table 2 below summarises the 
answers  given  by  the  respondents.  It  shows  that 
nearly half of respondents said that they would save 
$2 per month. This corresponds to a discount rate of 
24%. This is well above the rate of time preference 
of consumers, which is estimated to range between 
1.5% and 5%122. This implies that consumers tend to 
underestimate the costs saved during use (therefore 
discriminating  against  more  energy-efficient  prod-
ucts).
In other cases, the problem derives from the fact that 
the person who takes the decision to buy a prod-
uct (and pays the price) is different from the per-
son bearing the costs of its use123. The International 
Energy Agency (2007) analysed, based on a number 
of case studies, how these so called principal-agent 
problems are a barrier for exploiting the energy effi-
ciency potential. One of the case studies examined 
principal-agent problems in the house owner-tenant 
relationship. The house owner rents out houses or 
apartments, for which s/he decides the level of insu-
lation and the efficiency of appliances such as water 
120   European Business Test Panel (2007).
121   In the economic literature this phenomenon is sometimes referred to as 
‘bounded rationality’. The term initially coined by Herbert Simon was then 
developed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979, 1986, 1992).
122   Chin (2003).
123   In the economic literature, this is defined as a ‘split incentive’ problem. 
Split incentive problems arise when there are two parties who have different 
interests and it is impossible to write a perfect contract because of transaction 
costs. 
heaters, boilers, and refrigerators. Yet, it is the tenant 
who pays the energy bill. Therefore, the landlord has 
no  incentive  to  invest  in  energy-efficient  products 
and insulation and will simply buy the products with 
the lowest purchase prices124.
Table 3 below shows the results of a case study on 
the residential house market in the Netherlands. It 
depicts  the  percentage  of  houses  equipped  with 
insulation and energy-efficient equipment in three 
building  segments  (privately  owned,  social  rental 
and privately rented houses). The percentages are 
lower for privately rented houses than for privately 
owned and social rented houses. This demonstrates 
that the landlord-tenant problem can be a significant 
barrier to energy savings in buildings.
Besides the barriers mentioned above and concern-
ing producers and consumers, one can also identify 
those arising on the side of employees. The develop-
ment of energy-efficient products and technologies 
requires workers to acquire new skills for new jobs in 
the new production processes. In order to meet these 
new skill requirements in a smooth and efficient way 
there is a need to forecast them, remain committed 
to active labour market policies (including training 
and lifelong learning) as well as to modernise labour 
laws and social security systems.
4.2.2.  Impact of barriers on technological change
In  general,  research  and  innovation  activities  are 
risky investments whose returns are uncertain, occur 
only in the medium to long term and do not accrue 
solely to the innovator but create a positive external-
ity in the form of ‘knowledge spillovers’ to compet-
ing firms, downstream users and consumers. As a 
consequence, markets deliver a level of research and 
innovation below what would be optimal from the 
social point of view. In the specific case of energy-
efficiency innovations, the barriers discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2.1 further compound these effects.
Firstly, energy-efficiency innovations are subject to a 
double externality, in that they lead to the develop-
ment of products that themselves produce a posi-
tive externality in the form of reduced environmen-
tal impacts. This could be solved by correct pricing 
that internalises the environmental impact. As previ-
ously discussed, in Europe a price for CO2 emission 
has been introduced through the emission trading 
scheme and other measures such as the Energy Tax-
ation directive.
124   Renters could of course look for houses that have sufficient insulation 
and efficient energy appliances and pay more for these. However, it is not so 
straightforward to judge the insulation levels of a building and renters might 
not pay attention to the energy efficiency of a house when making their rent-
ing decisions.101
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Secondly,  the  demand  for  such  products,  which 
address environmental objectives, can be heightened 
by the regulatory environment. Public procurement 
can be especially efficient to accelerate innovation 
and create economies of scale in supplying energy-
saving  solutions.  Long-term  policy  predictability  is 
therefore  essential  for  encouraging  investments  in 
this type of innovation.
Finally, energy-efficient products are produced with 
production processes that are in general more com-
plex than traditional technologies and at the leading 
edge of technology. This implies that, when initially 
introduced in the market, they might have very high 
up-front costs and higher life-time costs than tradi-
tional technologies. This can deter consumers and 
make companies unable to generate the revenues to 
stay afloat. These costs would go down as the scale 
of  production  picks  up,  because  of  economies  of 
scale, and as a result of further innovation through 
learning-by-doing and R&D.
Figure 7 shows, for a variety of appliances and build-
ing materials, the percentage decrease in production 
costs when installed capacity doubles. In the eco-
nomic literature, this is commonly referred to as the 
‘learning rate’. The figure shows that, for some appli-
ances, the learning rate can be as high as 35%.
However, the barriers discussed in Section 4.2.1 pre-
vent demand from picking up. Coupled with long 
investment cycles, this creates ´technological lock-
ins´  forming  a  systemic  obstacle  to  innovation  in 
new,  environmentally  friendly  and  energy-efficient 
products. This shows that energy-efficient products 
can compete with traditional technologies only if a 
critical mass of demand exists in the early stages of 
deployment or the innovator is sufficiently confident 
about future demand development.
4.3.  Policy response: the Action Plan 
on Sustainable Consumption and 
Production and Sustainable Industrial 
Policy
Improving the energy efficiency of products calls for 
effort by all actors in society. Industry will have to 
invest in new products and technologies. Consumers 
will have to make more responsible choices. Policy 
makers in the European Union and its Member States 
are  called  upon  to  set  the  appropriate  framework 
conditions for such investment and choices to take 
place.
As  discussed  above,  industry  has  already  made 
progress  towards  higher  energy  efficiency.  Fur-
thermore,  a  number  of  voluntary  agreements  are 
already in place (for instance in the paper industry 
and chemical industry) to further reinforce energy-
efficiency initiatives125.
The proposals made recently by the European Com-
mission, notably in the Action Plan on Sustainable 
Consumption and Production and Sustainable Indus-
125   Green Paper on energy efficiency, COM(2005)265.
Table 2: Required savings to induce a $100 investment when buying a washing machine
Dollar savings required/month Implicit discount rate Proportion of respondents
1 12% 4.5%
2 24% 48.5%
3 36% 6.1%
4 48% 15.2%
5 60% 13.6%
6+ 72% 12.1%
Source: McRae (1980).
Table 3: Energy measures already implemented in the residential sector
Building segment
Measure Privately owned Social rental Private rental
Roof insulation 70% 59% 40%
Wall insulation 52% 55% 29%
Floor insulation 39% 30% 21%
Source: OECD Report that cites KWR (2000), Milieucentraal (2004).102
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trial Policy126, to contribute to this effort are discussed 
below. While the Action Plan takes a broader view 
than energy efficiency, improving the market pene-
tration of energy-efficient, low-carbon products and 
technologies is one of its main objectives.
Already, a wide range of policies are in place at EU 
and national levels to tackle the barriers described in 
Section 4.2 and improve the environmental perform-
ance and energy efficiency of products. This includes 
setting  requirements  for  energy-using  products127, 
providing information to consumers through differ-
ent labelling schemes128 and providing incentives to 
foster  the  uptake  of  energy-efficient  products  and 
technologies129.  Public  procurement  is  also  being 
used to leverage better performing products.
The Action Plan aims to further integrate these poli-
cies,  thereby  strengthening  synergies  and  imple-
menting  them  in  a  dynamic  and  forward-looking 
way to drive the market upwards. It proposes:
126   European Commission, COM(2008)397 final and European Commis-
sion, SEC(2008)2110.
127   Directive 2005/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
128   At  European  level:  Council  Directive  92/75/EEC;  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1980/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000; 
Regulation (EC) No 106/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 6 November 2001.
129   This  is  mostly  at  Member  State  level  within  the  criteria  set  by  the 
Community Guidelines on state aid for environmental protection, OJ C 82, 
1.4.2008, pp. 1-33.
•   To  extend  the  product  scope  of  the  Ecodesign 
directive, currently limited to energy-using prod-
ucts,  to  energy-related  products,  e.g.  products 
that have an impact on energy consumption dur-
ing use. This includes for example such products as 
window frames and water-using devices. This will 
enable the Commission to set minimum require-
ments for the marketing of products with signifi-
cant environmental impacts focusing on a limited 
number of significant environmental parameters, 
notably energy efficiency. The objective is to restrict 
products with high life-cycle costs in entering the 
market,  thereby  tackling  barriers  arising  from 
landlord-tenant problems and the like. Minimum 
requirement will be set only when there is sound 
evidence that voluntary initiatives by industry are 
not sufficient to reach this objective.
•   To set, alongside minimum requirements, advanced 
benchmarks  for  environmental  performance  to 
provide manufacturers with an early indication of 
the best performing products available on the mar-
ket.  The  preparation  of  implementing  measures 
pursuant to the Ecodesign directive will determine 
the relevance and feasibility of setting review dates 
for each group of products, on the basis of the 
foreseeable pace of technological change. This will 
provide businesses with a long-term view of future 
regulatory environment, on which they can base 
their investment decisions.
Figure 7: Learning rates for energy-using and energy-saving products
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•   To reinforce product labelling to provide consum-
ers with more complete information on the rela-
tive  environmental  and  energy  performances  of 
products, enabling them to make more informed 
choices.
•   Finally, relevant products will have to meet a mini-
mum level of environmental performance, below 
which Member States will not be allowed to set 
incentives or procure. Such a harmonised standard 
will help overcome the current fragmentation of 
initiatives on the internal market, thereby magni-
fying their effect for products above that level of 
performance, creating critical mass of demand and 
driving down production costs.
The Action Plan also provides for other actions to fos-
ter the uptake of low-carbon products and technolo-
gies. This includes the establishment of an EU-wide 
environmental  technology  verification  scheme  to 
help ensure confidence in new technologies emerg-
ing on the market as well as the development of 
industrial policy initiatives tailored to environmental 
industries.
4.4.  Potential benefits of removing barriers
A  successful  effort  to  overcome  the  barriers  and 
improve the market penetration of energy-efficient 
products and technologies can bring sizeable bene-
fits.
Based on a literature survey of 80 studies, the Inter-
governmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  indicates 
that  approximately  29%  of  baseline  emissions  by 
buildings and products could be abated by 2020 at 
no cost. This corresponds to 9% of current global 
CO2 emissions, which is equivalent to 70% of current 
European emissions. A recent survey by McKinsey for 
Germany confirms this potential130. Up to 60 million 
tonnes of CO2 per year in 2020 could be saved in 
Germany at a cost that would be recouped within 
the amortization period of the investment. This is 
based  on  technologies  available  today.  The  most 
cost-effective  potential  is  found  with  standby  for 
consumer electronics, IT & communications, energy-
efficient lighting, heating equipment and insulation.
There is evidence that this will help households save 
money. Estimates show that an average EU house-
hold could save 200-1000 euros per year in utility 
costs through cost-effective improvements in energy 
efficiency131. More specifically, studies carried out on 
the implementation of the Ecodesign directive show 
that for boilers and water heaters a mix of ecode-
sign, installation and labelling requirements would 
result in yearly net savings of €45 billion per year by 
130   Hartmann A., et al. (2008).
131   Levine, M. D. Ürge-Vorsatz, et al. (2007).
2020132, reducing emissions by 193 million tonnes 
of CO2 per year (equivalent to 4% of total CO2 emis-
sions in 2005). Based on the current EU-27 popula-
tion of half a billion people, this represents savings of 
90 euros per year per citizen for these two appliances 
alone. Also, the recently adopted minimum perform-
ance requirements on standby losses will save sub-
stantial amounts of energy and money to consum-
ers.  Currently  electricity  consumption  in  standby/
off mode is close to 50 TWh, corresponding to elec-
tricity costs of about 7 billion euros, and 20 million 
tonnes of CO2 emissions. It is estimated that in 2020 
the minimum requirement will lead to a reduction 
of standby/off mode electricity consumption of 35 
TWh compared to “business-as-usual” scenario. The 
electricity savings correspond to savings of electric-
ity costs of approximately 4,5 billion euros in elec-
tricity prices of the year 2005. Since more efficient 
standby/off mode is not expected to lead to cost 
increases of electrical appliances, the electricity cost 
savings become net savings133.
In  terms  of  productivity,  the  available  evidence 
shows that investment in energy efficiency will bring 
down the operational cost of production processes, 
thereby increasing overall productivity in the manu-
facturing sector (same output obtained with fewer 
inputs). Prima facie evidence is available for motor 
systems. The share of electricity costs in total costs 
currently stands at 2% in high-tech manufacturing 
and around 4.5% in low-tech manufacturing, with 
significant spikes for more narrowly defined energy-
intensive  industries.  Motor  systems  are  estimated 
to consume around 65% of the electricity used by 
industry.  Recent  estimates  indicate  that  improve-
ments of 30% are possible in the energy perform-
ance of motors134. Once such motors are in place, this 
will increase productivity by between 0.4 percentage 
points in the high-tech manufacturing sectors and 
0.87 percentage points in low-tech manufacturing.
Positive effects can be also expected on job crea-
tion. As households spend less on energy and more 
on energy efficiency, resources will be shifted from 
the energy sector towards the more labour inten-
sive energy efficiency sectors, with a positive effect 
on employment (even if we take into consideration 
adjustments  necessary  to  cope  with  the  changing 
composition  of  employment,  i.e.  acquiring  new 
skills,  retraining  or  lifelong  learning  needs).  This 
is  confirmed  by  the  available  empirical  evidence. 
The  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change 
reviewed the evidence on the link between employ-
ment and investments in energy-efficiency and con-
132   See  p.  32  of  Kemna,  et  al.  (2007,a)  and  p.  39  of  Kemna,  et  al. 
(2007,b).
133   European Commission (2008).
134   Hartmann, A., et al. (2008).104
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cluded that most studies find positive employment 
effects135.  A  study  for  the  European  Commission 
assessed the employment effects of energy conser-
vation schemes for the residential sector in several 
European  countries136.  In  all  countries  surveyed, 
these schemes were found to have a positive impact 
on employment. Some programmes show outstand-
ing results. In France, the Tax Incentives programme 
provides incentives for energy saving investment in 
residential space heating. It is estimated that 71000 
jobs have been created every year since its introduc-
tion  in  1974.  In  Germany,  the  Thermal  Insulation 
programme imposes insulation requirements for new 
buildings. It is estimated that 40100 jobs every year 
will be created in the period up to 2010. Finally, in 
the Netherlands it is estimated that the Condensing 
Boiler programme, which promotes the uptake of 
energy-efficient boilers, will have created 3800 jobs 
every year over the period 1995-2010.
4.5.  Conclusion
The  current  significant  changes  in  relative  prices 
between  energy  and  other  inputs  strongly  point 
to  the  need  to  ensure  an  efficient  reallocation  of 
resources and realise the shift to high energy-efficient 
production and consumption patterns. This chapter 
analyses the opportunities created by the growing 
markets for low-carbon, energy-efficient products.
It shows that a number of barriers still hinder the 
introduction  of  low-carbon,  energy-efficient  prod-
ucts on the internal market, holding back their mar-
ket penetration. This prevents exploitation of econo-
mies of scale, keeps the prices of these products high 
and slows down innovation in further efficiency. The 
consequence  is  unnecessary  energy  consumption, 
avoidable emissions of greenhouse gases and slower 
productivity growth.
The discussion of the recent proposal by the Euro-
pean Commission to tackle the barriers as part of an 
action plan shows that improving the performance 
of products and technologies can deliver very sig-
nificant potential benefits for both the economy and 
the environment, in terms of lower CO2 emissions, 
household savings, productivity and jobs.
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5.  Overview of the links 
between Corporate 
Social Responsibility and 
Competitiveness
5.1.  Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is “a concept 
whereby  companies  integrate  social  and  environ-
mental  concerns  in  their  business  operations  and 
in their interaction with their stakeholders on a vol-
untary basis” (European Commission, 2001). In its 
Communication to re-launch the Lisbon Strategy in 
2005, the Commission stated that CSR “can play a 
key role in contributing to sustainable development 
while enhancing Europe’s innovative potential and 
competitiveness” (European Commission, 2005). In 
March 2006 the Commission adopted a Communi-
cation on CSR which reaffirmed CSR as a business 
contribution to the Growth and Jobs Strategy and 
to sustainable development (European Commission, 
2006). In the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and 
Jobs, the Council recommends that Member States 
should  “encourage  enterprises  in  developing  their 
corporate social responsibility.”
In recent years there has been a significant growth 
in the number of enterprises that have an explicit 
policy on CSR. At the same time, the practice of CSR 
has evolved considerably. In an increasing number 
of companies, CSR and sustainability have become 
cross-cutting issues that are deeply integrated within 
both operations and strategy.
CSR can contribute to a number of social, environ-
mental and economic policy objectives. The aim of 
this chapter is to provide an up-to-date overview of 
how CSR can contribute to competitiveness. The prin-
cipal focus is on how CSR might contribute to com-
petitiveness at the level of the individual enterprise. 
The links between CSR and macro-level competitive-
ness are also explored, although there has been com-
paratively little research at this level of analysis.
For  the  firm-level  analysis,  the  economic  effects 
of CSR on 6 determinants and indicators of com-
petitiveness are considered: cost structure, human 
resources,  customer  perspective,  innovation,  risk 
and reputation management, and financial perform-
ance. These are the determinants and indicators of 
competitiveness where CSR is most likely to have a 
positive influence.
This chapter also takes account of arguments suggest-
ing that CSR may inhibit competitiveness. Such argu-
ments include, for example: that CSR is a cost, with no 
apparent benefit; that a causal link at firm level may 
exist from competitiveness to CSR instead of (or as 
well as) from CSR to competitiveness; and that inves-
tors and shareholders have no interest in CSR.
To date most of the key concepts and tools address-
ing CSR have been developed by and for large enter-
prises. Whenever possible, this chapter also consid-
ers the situation of SMEs. CSR as practiced in SMEs is 
usually less formal and more intuitive than in larger 
companies. It is often closely tied to the personal and 
ethical values of the SME owner-manager. As a gen-
eral rule, the smaller the enterprise the greater the 
relative importance of personal and ethical values as 
a driver for CSR. In any case, SMEs are less likely than 
larger enterprises to make a conscious analysis of the 
costs and benefits of following a more socially and 
environmentally responsible course of action.
5.2.  Definitions
The link between competitiveness and CSR at firm 
level has long been an important topic for both CSR 
researchers and practitioners, often under the ban-
ner of “the business case for CSR”. This chapter uses 
the terms “business case for CSR” and “link between 
CSR and competitiveness” interchangeably.
5.2.1.  Competitiveness
The concept of competitiveness can be applied at 
different levels, from the firm (micro) level, to the 
sectoral, regional and national (macro) level. Com-
petitiveness at macro-economic level is defined ear-
lier as a sustained rise in the standards of living (see 
introduction to this report). Sector-level competitive-
ness refers to the performance of a given industry 
in  a  given  country  or  region  relative  to  the  same 
industry in other countries or regions. A sector could 
be characterised as competitive on the basis of its 
capacity to grow, to innovate and to produce more 
and higher-quality goods and services, and to keep 
or gain market shares in international and domestic 
markets. A frequently cited definition of competitive-
ness at the firm level is provided by the US President’s 
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness: “A firm 
is competitive if it can produce products or services 
of superior quality or lower costs than its domestic 
and  international  competitors.  Competitiveness  is 
then synonymous with a firm’s long-run profit per-
formance and its ability to compensate its employees 
and provide superior returns to its owners” (Francis, 
1989). In the narrow sense, measures of competitive-
ness at the firm level therefore comprise indicators of 
financial performance, such as the development of 
sales, profits, and costs, as well as stock performance. 
One could add that firm-level competitiveness is not 
only a question of producing products and services 
of superior quality or at lower costs, but can also be a 107
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question of producing new or different products and 
services. Capacity for product innovation can there-
fore also be a source of firm-level competitiveness.
5.2.2.  CSR
The  European  Commission  (2001)  defines  CSR  as 
“a concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations 
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on 
a voluntary basis.” This definition has a number of 
important implications.
Firstly, the fact that CSR is the integration of social 
and environmental concerns within business opera-
tions means that CSR is not just philanthropy. The 
emphasis is on how enterprises do their daily work: 
how they treat their employees, how they produce 
goods, how they market them, and so on. CSR is not 
so much about what enterprises do with their profit, 
but how they make that profit.
Secondly, interaction with stakeholders is a crucial 
aspect of CSR. Effective CSR requires dialogue and 
partnership with stakeholders such as trade unions, 
public authorities, non-governmental organisations, 
and business representative organisations.
Thirdly,  by  describing  CSR  as  voluntary,  this  defi-
nition implies that CSR relates to what enterprises 
can do in the social and environmental fields over 
and above what they are required to do by law. This 
aspect of the definition works well within the Euro-
pean Union and in other contexts where the rule of 
law generally applies. In some countries, however, 
CSR can in the first place be a question of getting 
enterprises to comply with their legal obligations.
CSR is a very wide-ranging concept, which is one rea-
son why measuring its uptake and impact presents 
complex methodological problems. It is often divided 
into four main areas: workplace, market-place, envi-
ronment and community.
–   Workplace CSR refers to how a company treats its 
employees. It includes issues such as recruitment, 
work-force diversity, pay and working conditions, 
health and safety, and recognition of trade unions. 
It can also refer to human rights issues.
–   Marketplace CSR covers the ways in which a com-
pany operates in relation to its suppliers, customers 
and competitors. It covers issues such as responsi-
ble advertising and marketing, dealing with cus-
tomer  complaints,  anti-corruption  measures  and 
ethical practice, and imposing social and environ-
mental requirements on suppliers.
–   Environment-related CSR describes the measures a 
company can take to mitigate its negative impact 
on the environment, for example energy efficiency 
measures or less use of pollutants. It can also refer 
to goods and services that actively help to improve 
the environment.
–   Community-related  CSR  refers  to  the  relations 
between the company and the citizens and com-
munities that may be affected by its operations. 
It includes issues such as human rights, dialogue 
and partnership with potentially affected commu-
nities, and active contribution to community well-
being, for instance through employee volunteering 
schemes.
Some of these areas inevitably overlap in practice. 
For example, the environmental dimension of CSR 
can be of great importance in relations with commu-
nities affected by the operations of an enterprise.
Transparency and communication about social and 
environmental  performance  are  crucial  aspects  of 
CSR which cut all across these four areas. The prac-
tice of publishing sustainability or CSR reports has 
become  increasingly  common,  especially  amongst 
large enterprises.
5.3.  Competitiveness effects of CSR at 
micro-economic level
This section examines the effects of CSR on 6 deter-
minants and indicators of firm-level competitiveness: 
cost  structure,  human  resource  performance,  cus-
tomer perspective, innovation, risk and reputation 
management, and financial performance.
5.3.1.  Cost structure
5.3.1.1.  The evidence that CSR reduces costs is mixed
The question of cost savings resulting from CSR has 
often been at the centre of the debate on the busi-
ness case for CSR. Proponents of CSR have tended 
to  argue  that  responsible  business  behaviour  can 
lead to cost savings. An Economist Intelligence Unit 
research  programme  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit, 
2008) indicates that the benefits of pursuing sustain-
able practices outweigh the costs, although changes 
to profits are estimated to be small. Critics argue that 
CSR is expensive and that the benefits are often only 
experienced in the distant future, if they occur at all. 
Friedman (1970) states in a much-quoted article that 
“there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business – to use its resources and engage in activi-
ties designed to increase its profits so long as it stays 
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages 
in open and free competition without deception or 
fraud.” He concluded that consequently there is no 
role for CSR.
In reality, much depends on the nature of the CSR 
measure taken, as well as on the cost of that invest-108
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ment  and  the  time  period  considered.  Examples 
can be found of CSR measures that help to improve 
the cost structure of an enterprise (Woodward et al. 
2001), and evidence can also be found of CSR meas-
ures for which the cost-benefit relationship appears 
to  be  negative.  Welford  (2003)  argues  that  only 
some aspects of CSR strategies might reduce costs, 
and reaches the conclusion that the emphasis of the 
CSR-competitiveness relationship should be placed 
on “the area of differentiation where social and envi-
ronmental aspects of sustainable development will 
have most impact”.
5.3.1.2.  The effect of the environmental dimension of CSR 
on cost structure
Measures to reduce energy consumption and mate-
rial inputs are frequently cited as an aspect of CSR 
that can lead to cost savings. However, academic 
studies of the cost-saving effects of the environmen-
tal dimension of CSR give mixed results. According 
to Miles and Covin (2000), CSR-related environmen-
tal expenditures constitute investments that pay off 
due to cost savings from, for example, continuous 
improvements, low potential litigation expenditures, 
lower insurance and lower energy costs. In contrast, 
Chapple et al. (2005) find significant costs associated 
with  CSR-related  waste  reduction  practices  when 
applying a cost function approach to UK manufactur-
ing at county level. Little evidence is available for CSR 
impacts on the cost structure of SMEs, although few 
of the SMEs interviewed by Jenkins (2006) reported 
CSR-induced cost savings.
In spite of the sometimes contradictory evidence from 
past studies, the cost-saving potential of the environ-
mental dimension of CSR is likely to be strengthened 
by rising energy costs and the prospect of stronger 
mechanisms for the pricing of carbon emissions.
5.3.1.3.  Conclusion
CSR can contribute to cost savings in certain circum-
stances.  It  is  difficult  to  draw  general  conclusions 
about the cost-saving effects of CSR because they are 
highly dependent on the nature of the CSR measure 
taken. The example of the environmental dimension 
of CSR shows evidence of both positive and nega-
tive relationships between CSR and cost structure. In 
addition to cost savings from environmental meas-
ures, CSR may also contribute to cost savings in other 
ways, for example in the field of human resources, 
risk  management  or  access  to  finance.  These  are 
addressed in the following sections.
Increasingly the debate about the competitiveness 
benefits of CSR is not confined to the question of 
cost savings but also encompasses the questions of 
new value creation and new revenue streams. Porter 
and Kramer (2006) state that “if corporations were to 
analyse their prospects for social responsibility using 
the  same  frameworks  that  guide  their  core  busi-
ness choices, they would discover that CSR can be 
much more than a cost, a constraint or a charitable 
deed – it can be a source of opportunity, innovation 
and competitive advantage”. The following sections 
therefore look at the business case for CSR from both 
these perspectives: how it might reduce costs and 
how it might create new value.
5.3.2.  Human resources
Management theory suggests that CSR can have a 
positive  impact  on  human  resource  performance. 
According  to  Cochran  (2007),  a  firm  with  good 
employee relations can lower its employee turnover 
rate and improve employee motivation. Additionally, 
good employee relations may be an important argu-
ment for firms in attracting new staff members. The 
theory is generally confirmed by empirical studies.
5.3.2.1.  CSR as a lever for attracting, motivating and 
retaining employees
Case studies illustrate the positive impacts of CSR 
from  a  human  resource  perspective.  Brown  and 
Grayson describe how the values of founders and 
employees can play an important role in the growth 
and  commercial  success  of  a  smaller  enterprise 
(Brown and Grayson, 2008). Cochran describes how 
the workplace dimension of CSR helps to provide a 
large IT company with an ideal environment for high 
labour productivity and innovation (Cochran 2007).
Evidence  from  econometric  investigations  is  also 
compelling as far as the positive effects of CSR on 
human resource performance are concerned. Mont-
gomery  and  Ramus  (2003)  show  that  MBAs  from 
European and American business schools pay atten-
tion to CSR aspects such as employee relationship, 
environmental  sustainability,  stakeholder  relations, 
and  ethical  corporation  behaviour  when  making 
decisions about where to work. More than 90% of 
the persons interviewed were willing to forgo finan-
cial benefits in order to work for an organisation with 
a better reputation for corporate social responsibility 
and ethics. More recently, in a survey of MBA stu-
dents published by the Aspen Institute in 2008, 26% 
of respondents said the potential to make a contribu-
tion to society would be an important factor in their 
job selection. Although other factors still rank higher, 
this figure has risen from 15% in 2002. Turban and 
Greening (1997) provide evidence that a firm’s per-
formance in terms of CSR may provide a competitive 
advantage in attracting senior managers.
Representatives from large companies comment that 
potential new recruits now often ask questions about 
CSR-related  issues  in  interviews.  Large  companies 109
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realise that they increasingly need to be able to dem-
onstrate strong CSR credentials in order to attract the 
right candidates. In some companies this can partly 
take the form of “employee volunteering”, or oppor-
tunities for employees to participate in community 
projects or other non-profit activities during com-
pany time. Companies that run employee volunteer-
ing programmes report that such programmes can 
improve employee morale and help participants to 
acquire and develop new skills.
According to survey evidence from Italy, the posi-
tive effects of CSR on the relationship with employ-
ees also hold for SMEs (Longo et al. 2005). Similar 
findings based on interviews among UK SMEs are 
provided by Toyne (2003) and Jenkins (2006). Sur-
vey data from Denmark moreover suggests reduced 
costs associated with hiring, retention, and absen-
teeism among SMEs that offer unusually generous 
employee benefits (Kramer et al., 2007). None of the 
Danish SMEs studied by Kramer et al. (2007), how-
ever, had actually calculated whether these savings 
outweighed the costs of the extra benefits.
A 2007 survey of SMEs in Estonia found that many 
SME managers see CSR as a way of retaining quali-
fied employees in a tight labour market (PW Part-
ners, 2007). If SMEs in general have to fight harder 
than larger companies to attract the most talented 
employees, then one could argue that offering job 
fulfilment,  good  working  conditions  and  a  good 
work-life balance are relatively more important for 
SMEs than for large companies. Some SMEs success-
fully use their commitment to CSR to build an advan-
tageous reputation as the preferred local employer.
5.3.2.2.  The business benefits of employee diversity policies
Employee diversity policies are an important aspect 
of the workplace dimension of CSR. In a survey of 
900 European enterprises carried out in 2005, just 
under half of all businesses responding were actively 
engaged in promoting workplace diversity and anti-
discrimination.  The  single  most  important  benefit 
achieved or expected of diversity, cited by 42% of 
companies, was that it would help to resolve labour 
shortages  and  to  recruit  and  retain  high  quality 
staff (European Commission 2005). In this respect, 
UEAPME (the European Union of Crafts and Small 
and  Medium-Sized  Enterprises)  underlines  the 
importance of non-discrimination policies to SMEs: 
“SMEs particularly rely on the local labour market, 
therefore they cannot afford to discriminate against 
potential employees, especially as they are lacking 
human resources in many sectors” (UEAPME 2007). 
The potential potential positive impact of work-force 
diversity on innovation capacity is addressed below 
in section 5.3.4.3.
5.3.2.3.  The knowledge economy increases the benefits of 
work-place CSR
In spite of the strong evidence that CSR can have a 
positive impact on competitiveness from a human 
resource perspective, this will not always be applica-
ble to all enterprises. In the case of enterprises that 
rely heavily on low costs to create and maintain com-
petitive advantage, the possible benefits in terms of 
improved  employee  motivation  or  recruiting  and 
retaining workers will not necessarily outweigh the 
associated increase in costs. However, the strength 
of the positive relationship between CSR and com-
petitiveness gains from a human resource perspec-
tive looks likely to grow as the knowledge economy 
puts an ever greater premium on human capital as 
a  determinant  of  competitiveness.  Accordingly,  it 
would already seem that knowledge intensive indus-
tries such as the IT sector are particularly advanced 
along the work-place dimension of CSR.
5.3.2.4.  Conclusion
The  evidence  suggests  an  important  positive  rela-
tionship between CSR and competitiveness in terms 
of human resource management, although for some 
companies the additional costs might still outweigh 
the  benefits  at  least  in  the  short  term.  CSR  activi-
ties in general and the workplace dimension of CSR 
in particular have proved to be an attractive feature 
of  a  company’s  presentation  when  recruiting  and 
retaining employees. Companies that favour a diverse 
workforce can benefit from a wider pool of talent. The 
link between CSR practice and human capital seems 
to be relevant for enterprises of all sizes, and is likely to 
grow as a result of the knowledge economy.
5.3.3.  Customer perspective
The extent to which CSR can help to drive customer 
loyalty and demand remains a matter of consider-
able  debate.  Typically,  consumers  have  tended  to 
respond positively when asked if they are willing to 
pay a price premium for products with good social 
and environmental credentials, but have then failed 
to act on this when actually making their purchases.
5.3.3.1.  The influence of strategy and competitive 
positioning
The link between CSR and competitiveness from the 
customer  perspective  is  highly  dependent  on  the 
company’s  competitive  strategy  and  market  posi-
tioning. For some enterprises, especially those oper-
ating at the higher end of the market, CSR can be an 
integral part of the quality of products and services 
offered. Conversely, if a firm is positioned as a cost-
cutter, it will be less likely to go beyond legal compli-
ance in the social and environmental fields. However, 
even cost cutters need to ensure compliance with 110
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legal requirements and a minimum set of social and 
environmental standards. The fact that a number of 
discount retailers are paying increasing attention to 
the social and environmental performance of their 
suppliers would tend to support this argument.
5.3.3.2.  Evidence of consumer demand for CSR-related 
measures
Meijer  and  Schuyt  (2005)  analysed  the  behaviour 
of Dutch consumers and found that the corporate 
social performance of producers does not motivate 
consumers to buy a product. They did find, however, 
that CSR had to meet at least a minimum acceptable 
level in order not to repel possible consumers. They 
describe  CSR  as  a  hygiene  factor  or  bottom  line, 
rather than a motivator. In other words, a minimum 
attention  to  CSR  may  be  a  competitive  necessity 
rather than a competitive differentiator.
There is evidence, however, that the success of some 
firms’  from  customer  perspective  is  based  at  last 
partly on CSR aspects. Retail data from a telecom-
munications firm show that CSR-related issues are 
important drivers of corporate image and reputation, 
which  are  themselves  major  determinants  of  cus-
tomer satisfaction (Tuppen 2004). A major European 
retailer has a partnership with a non-governmental 
organisation (NGO), which makes use of the NGO 
logo  to  endorse  certain  products  that  meet  high 
environmental standards. In this case, the credible 
endorsement of a product’s environmental creden-
tials is used to drive consumer demand.
Research  suggests  that  CSR  can  contribute  to 
improved  customer  demand  in  the  case  of  SMEs. 
Based on case study evidence from seven European 
countries,  Mandl  and  Dorr  (2007)  point  out  that 
particularly high employee satisfaction and public-
ity attributed to CSR activities can also have a ben-
eficial outcome in terms of customer loyalty. Longo 
et al. (2005) report that the Italian SMEs surveyed 
expected consumer loyalty to be a positive result of 
their CSR engagement.
The competitive advantages of CSR from the cus-
tomer perspective will evolve as consumer demand 
evolves. The rapid growth in the market for fair trade 
and organic goods is a good indication of changing 
consumer demand. According to Fairtrade Labelling 
Organisations  International,  the  sales  of  Fairtrade-
certified  products  have  been  growing  at  an  aver-
age of 40% per year in the last five years, and in 
2007 amounted to around €2.3 billion worldwide. 
Mainstream retailers and producers are now enter-
ing this field, which until recently was the more or 
less exclusive preserve of specialised fair-trade opera-
tors. Some organisations argue that the availability 
of  more  comprehensive  consumer  information  on 
the social and environmental aspects of production 
would further drive consumer demand for responsi-
bly produced goods and so potentially reinforce the 
business case for CSR.
Although consumers are paying more attention to 
the social and environmental credentials of the prod-
ucts  they  buy,  this  is  not  necessarily  a  trend  that 
will continue uninterrupted. The biggest risk would 
appear to come from inflation and a serious global 
economic downturn. In such circumstances it is con-
ceivable that a significant proportion of consumers 
might put a greater premium on price and quality 
only, with less attention to social and environmental 
aspects. The recent increases in food prices may pro-
vide a test case in this regard.
5.3.3.3.  CSR in public procurement and private supply 
chains
Many enterprises, especially large enterprises, now 
impose  social  and  environmental  requirements  on 
their  suppliers.  The  growth  of  business  interest  in 
supply-chain partnerships such as the Business Social 
Compliance Initiative and the Global Social Compli-
ance Programme suggest that the number and seri-
ousness  of  CSR-related  supply  chain  requirements 
will continue to increase. This creates opportunities 
for supplier enterprises that, through their own CSR 
performance,  can  help  buyers  to  live  up  to  their 
social and environmental commitments.
The growth of green or sustainable public procure-
ment  should  similarly  strengthen  the  competitive 
position of suppliers who pay particular attention to 
environmental issues or who are able to offer innova-
tive environmental solutions. Several Member States 
are leading the way by setting ambitious green pub-
lic procurement targets. The Dutch government, for 
example, has set a 100 % Sustainable Procurement 
target to be reached by 2010. The European Com-
mission has recently proposed that, by the year 2010, 
50 % of all tendering procedures should be green.
The Commission is also preparing a guide for public 
authorities on how to integrate social requirements 
in public procurement. The integration of social crite-
ria within public procurement has lagged behind the 
progress made in the field of green public procure-
ment. If more widely applied, it could also strengthen 
the competitive position of enterprises that pay par-
ticular attention to the social aspects of CSR.
5.3.3.4.  The importance of ensuring that CSR claims are 
credible
Enterprises  are  sometimes  criticised  for  “green-
washing”,  or  making  unjustified  claims  for  the 
environmental benefits of a certain product in the 
hope of using a greener image to boost customer 111
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demand. Figures from the UK would suggest that 
this is a growing trend: the UK Advertising Stand-
ards Authority banned 19 green campaigns between 
January and September 2007, double the number in 
the previous year. Exaggerated or unjustified claims 
run the risk of generating a sceptical reaction from 
consumers over the medium to long term. A guide 
to sustainable marketing produced by CSR Europe 
warns that “customers want, above all, to trust the 
companies they are dealing with, and any hint of […] 
green wash can be harmful for a company’s brand”. 
If “green-washing” causes consumer scepticism then 
it  may  not  only  harm  individual  brands,  but  also 
undermine the potential competitive advantages of 
those companies that could justifiably market and 
advertise their products on the basis of their green 
characteristics.
5.3.3.5.  Conclusion
The  competitive  benefits  of  CSR  from  a  customer 
perspective appear to be strengthening as a result 
of  growing  demand  from  consumers,  enterprises 
and public authorities. It is possible that rising prices 
could have negative affect on this demand, however. 
The extent to which CSR can drive competitiveness 
from a customer perspective depends on the com-
petitive  strategy  of  enterprises.  Enterprises  whose 
appeal to customers is based essentially on low costs 
may have less to gain from CSR, although even some 
cost-cutting retailers believe that a certain level of 
commitment to CSR is now necessary.
5.3.4.  Innovation
When  explaining  their  motivations  for  addressing 
CSR, some company representatives cite innovation 
as an important beneficial outcome. The fact that the 
links between CSR and innovation are increasingly 
acknowledged is a good example of how the busi-
ness case for CSR is no longer just perceived in terms 
of potential cost savings but now also encompasses 
the potential for new value creation and the devel-
opment of new revenue streams. The links between 
CSR and innovation are complex, however, and less 
immediately obvious than in the case of other com-
petitiveness determinants examined in this chapter.
A number of studies have argued that CSR can be a 
route to innovation through the use of social, envi-
ronmental  or  sustainability  drivers  to  create  new 
ways of working, new products, services, processes 
and new market space (Grayson and Hodges 2004, 
Little 2006). Based on an analysis of innovative SMEs 
in Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom, Mendibil et 
al (2007) find that there is a positive link between 
innovation performance and CSR, even if the cause 
and effect relationship is not entirely clear.
Some academics have questioned the positive CSR-
innovation link, suggesting that some aspects of CSR 
could be incompatible with certain types of innova-
tion. For example, Midtun (2007) argues that, in the 
case of disruptive innovation, firms have to change 
extremely rapidly and sometimes disappear. In this 
case, it may be difficult to combine competitiveness 
and CSR objectives.
There would appear to be three main ways in which 
CSR can contribute to innovation capacity and per-
formance:  innovation  resulting  from  engagement 
with other stakeholders; identifying business oppor-
tunities through addressing societal challenges; and 
creating  work  places  that  are  more  conducive  to 
innovation.
5.3.4.1.  Innovation resulting from engagement with other 
stakeholders
CSR requires dialogue and cooperation with stakehold-
ers, both inside and outside the company. Through 
their  commitment  to  CSR,  many  enterprises  are 
engaging in dialogue and partnership with a range of 
stakeholders, such as grassroots community groups or 
global non-governmental organisations, with whom 
they would previously have had little or no direct con-
tact. Holmes and Moir (2007) have proposed a theo-
retical framework for analysing how engagement with 
external non-profit stakeholders might drive corporate 
innovation. They point out that innovation outcomes 
might be a deliberate outcome of engagement with 
external  stakeholders,  or  might  be  an  unexpected, 
ancillary benefit from such relationships.
Roome and Jonker (2006) have analysed how eight 
pioneering companies, leading exponents of CSR in 
Europe, managed to bring about a high degree of inte-
gration between their performance in CSR and their 
performance in terms of competitiveness. They found 
that managers in these companies “came to appre-
ciate that they confronted a growing array of issues 
that required them to seek to change the relationships 
they had with other actors in society.” By engaging 
and  improving  relations  with  external  stakeholders, 
they created new business models that “involved the 
combination of ideas from outside the company with 
an understanding of the existing business model.”
In a case study of a Spanish SME that manufactures 
tools  for  professional  and  industrial  use,  Mendibil 
et  al  (2007)  describe  how  in  practice  innovation 
and  social  responsibility  appear  to  come  together 
under the same approach. Strong engagement with 
employees and external stakeholders contributes to 
the innovation capacity and competitiveness model 
of the enterprise, even though the enterprise itself 
does not see a need to manage CSR explicitly as a 
separate concept.112
European Competitiveness Report 2008
Innovation is more and more understood as a col-
laborative exercise, and enterprises are increasingly 
unable to innovate effectively on their own. Concepts 
such as open innovation, society-driven innovation, 
stakeholder-driven innovation and customer-driven 
innovation  are  now  commonplace.  As  this  trend 
intensifies, CSR is likely to be become ever more rel-
evant to the innovation process, since CSR by defini-
tion brings enterprises into constructive relationships 
with a new range of stakeholders.
5.3.4.2.  Business opportunities from addressing societal 
challenges
There is a strong case, backed up by academic litera-
ture, for arguing that environmental management, 
as a part of the environmental dimension of CSR, 
can contribute to innovation. Rennings et al. (2006), 
for example, have shown a positive link between the 
maturity  of  environmental  management  systems 
and  environmental  process  innovation.  The  causal 
link is not always straightforward, however, and Sei-
jas Nogareda and Ziegler (2006) argue in favour of a 
“complex dynamic interrelationship” between green 
management and corporate green technology inno-
vations.
In pioneering enterprises, CSR has involved recon-
sidering the purpose and role of the enterprise in 
society. For a number of companies, this has lead 
to the realisation that a growing proportion of com-
pany value is likely to be created by providing busi-
ness solutions to societal challenges such as climate 
change, the ageing population, or poverty and social 
inclusion.  A  report  prepared  by  representatives  of 
enterprises that are members of the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development states that “the 
leading global companies of 2020 will be those that 
provide goods and services and reach new customers 
in ways that address the world’s major challenges” 
(World  Business  Council  for  Sustainable  Develop-
ment, 2000).
This  clearly  suggests  that  the  creation  of  business 
value will lie in providing innovative solutions that 
help  address  societal  challenges.  Some  companies 
now explicitly try to measure the potential public 
or societal value of a new product during the devel-
opment process. The European Commission’s Lead 
Markets  proposal,  which  aims  to  help  European 
enterprises to capitalise on their innovative potential, 
has identified six such lead markets, all of which are 
related to societal benefit: eHealth, protective tex-
tiles, sustainable construction, recycling, bio-based 
products and markets for renewable energies.
The development of low-carbon technologies is an 
obvious  example  of  how  addressing  societal  chal-
lenges  can  be  a  catalyst  for  innovation.  Another 
example involves so-called “bottom of the pyramid” 
business  strategies,  first  popularised  by  Pralahad 
(2004), through which enterprises treat poorer peo-
ple as valuable customers and seek to provide them 
with  appropriate  goods  and  services.  The  United 
Nations Development Programme reports that such 
approaches can lead to innovations that contribute 
to a company’s competitiveness. This can happen 
because “to meet the poor’s preferences and needs, 
firms must offer new combinations of price and per-
formance”, and because “the pervasive constraints 
that  businesses  encounter  when  doing  business 
with  the  poor  –  from  transportation  difficulties  to 
the inability to enforce contracts – require creative 
responses” (UNDP, 2008). A concrete illustration of 
such business models is the expansion of the micro-
credit  market,  not  only  in  developing  but  also  in 
developed countries.
Innovation to address societal challenges is an oppor-
tunity  for  enterprises  of  all  sizes,  including  SMEs. 
Based on a study of approximately 50 Danish SMEs 
engaged in CSR practices, Kramer et al. (2007) iden-
tify a number of companies that derive a substantial 
and growing share of business from socially beneficial 
innovations. The authors conclude that environmen-
tal and other socially beneficial innovations seem to 
be an expanding niche well suited to SMEs. As part 
of its work on inclusive business, the UNDP cites two 
examples of Polish SMEs, one from the energy sec-
tor and one from the IT sector, that have developed 
successful business models by innovating to provide 
services to low-income groups.
The extent to which social and environmental issues are 
integrated into the core business strategy of an enter-
prise will be an important determinant of its ability to 
find business opportunities in responding to societal 
challenges.  Enterprises  in  which  social  and  environ-
mental concerns are a peripheral issue or considered 
primarily from a public relations perspective are less 
likely to be able to exploit these opportunities.
5.3.4.3.  CSR involves creating better workplaces, which can 
be more conducive to innovation
Working conditions and the treatment of employ-
ees  are  an  important  aspect  of  CSR.  The  creation 
of better working environments, including placing 
greater trust in employees and paying more atten-
tion to employee health, well-being and quality of 
life, can lead to workplaces that are more conducive 
to innovation. The European Commission recognised 
this link in its 2006 Communication on innovation 
policy: “Innovation needs to be organised in a way 
that supports not only the acceptance of change but 
also provides opportunities in human resource man-
agement, leading to higher productivity” (European 
Commission 2006).113
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On the basis of 120 case studies conducted in the Hi-
Res project, Totterdill (2004) reports that new forms 
of  work  organisation  based  on  participation  and 
trust can offer several potential advantages, includ-
ing competitiveness through successful innovation in 
products, services and processes. The importance of 
placing trust in employees is reinforced by a study of 
the link between work organisation and innovation 
in 15 EU Member States, which found that in-house 
creativity and innovation is greatest when employees 
are given a high level of discretion in problem-solv-
ing (Arundel et al, 2007).
Work-force diversity, as an important aspect of the 
work-place dimension of CSR, has been shown to 
have a positive impact on innovation capacity. “Like-
minded people make like minded decisions”, whereas 
a broader range of perspectives, backgrounds and 
expertise  can  lead  to  creative  thinking  and  more 
effective problem-solving (Campayne, 2008).
A European Business Test Panel organised in 2008 by 
the European Commission found that 56% of partici-
pating enterprises had equality and diversity practices 
of some kind. Of these, 63% said that their workplace 
diversity had contributed to innovation and creativity 
in the company. These results seemed to apply equally 
to SMEs and larger enterprises. A study by the London 
Business School has shown that innovation perform-
ance tends to be higher in work teams that have a 
gender balance (London Business School, 2008).
Work-force diversity does not necessarily bring easy 
gains,  however.  The  main  risks  involve  reduced 
cohesion, increased conflict, and problems of com-
munication and participation. The quality of diversity 
management in a company is crucial if these risks 
are to be minimised and the innovation and other 
benefits are to be realised.
5.3.4.4.  Conclusion
There is evidence that certain aspects of CSR can have 
a positive impact on competitiveness by enhancing 
capacity for innovation. This relationship exists in the 
case of engagement with stakeholders through CSR, 
environmental  management,  and  the  workplace 
dimension  of  CSR,  including  work-force  diversity. 
The positive relationship between CSR and innova-
tion is strengthened by the fact that innovation is 
increasingly  a  collaborative  exercise,  and  by  the 
trend towards the generation of new business value 
from innovations that address societal problems.
5.3.5.  Risk and reputation management
5.3.5.1.  CSR, reputation building and risk management
The  link  between  CSR  and  strategic  risk  manage-
ment is well established. Bowman (1980) introduced 
the concept of corporate social responsibility as a 
means of anticipating and reducing potential sources 
of business risk. Heal (2005) suggests that CSR can 
minimise conflicts between companies, society and 
the environment and argues that risk management 
in the sense of avoidance or reduction of conflicts 
may be a major benefit of effective CSR programmes. 
Husted (2005) argues that CSR is an essential ele-
ment  of  corporate  risk  management.  Orlitzky  and 
Benjamin (2001) identify different kinds of business 
risks CSR may reduce, such as governmental regula-
tion, labour unrest, or environmental damage.
The issue of regulatory risk is important in this context. 
CSR may particularly help enterprises, including SMEs, 
to prepare for possible new regulations on social or 
environmental issues (Burke and Logsdon 1996, Orl-
itzky and Benjamin 2001). If that is correct, then CSR 
takes on added importance given the probability of 
new regulatory frameworks to promote sustainability 
and in particular to deal with climate change.
A  growing  number  of  companies  see  their  com-
mitment to CSR not just in terms of risk manage-
ment but as a means of enhancing their reputation 
in the eyes of customers, potential employees, and 
regulators. This can have the effect of exposing the 
enterprise to greater public scrutiny, however. Com-
pany representatives often report that, by making 
public commitments on CSR-related issues, they in 
fact become more vulnerable to criticism from non-
governmental organisations and other stakeholders. 
In the medium to long term, CSR is only likely to 
improve competitiveness through a better company 
reputation if it is deeply embedded in the company’s 
values and operations.
The power of communication technology has in any 
case already made enterprises much more vulner-
able to public criticism. This strengthens the links 
between CSR and competitiveness, since it increases 
the risks incurred by a lack of attention to CSR.
The  nature  of  the  knowledge  economy  may  also 
increase the potential of CSR to bring competitive 
advantage though improved reputation. Trust, repu-
tation and relationships are increasingly important 
to competitive success in the knowledge economy, 
not least because of the growing need to be able to 
collaborate with other stakeholders in order to cre-
ate new value. On the evidence of narratives written 
by SME owner-managers, Fuller and Tian have sug-
gested that ‘in a global economy where prices will 
always be difficult to beat, technological innovations 
highly specialised and an ever greater need for col-
laboration, new forms of social and symbolic capital 
generated through responsible behaviour […] may 
be features of new firms in Western society’ (Fuller 
and Tian, 2006).114
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Toyne (2003) provides further evidence that the risk 
and reputation aspects of CSR are important for SMEs. 
Based on interviews with a variety of SMEs and key 
informants, Toyne (2003) identifies risk to reputation 
as a key driver for the CSR agenda of SMEs. Fuller 
and Tian (2006) note that SMEs may act responsibly 
because their legitimacy with immediate stakehold-
ers (employees, customers, suppliers and their local 
‘community’) is at stake in a far more direct and per-
sonal way than it is with major corporations.
5.3.5.2.  Human rights and risk and reputation 
management
When looking at the CSR practices of leading enter-
prises, it is increasingly hard to distinguish between 
pure  risk  management  and  the  realisation  of  new 
opportunities.  The  area  of  human  rights  provides 
a good example of this. Though not enough com-
panies  as  yet  have  explicit  human  rights  policies, 
most of those that do are initially motivated by risk 
management, in addition to moral considerations. 
However, the Business Leaders’ Initiative on Human 
Rights argues that “turning risk into opportunity is 
a key component of a strategic approach to human 
rights  in  business”  (Business  Leaders’  Initiative  on 
Human Rights). It suggests that opportunities aris-
ing from corporate human rights policies can include 
positive impacts on stakeholder relations, minimisa-
tion  of  operational  disruption,  better  relationships 
with society and media, a positive impact on investor 
confidence, and improved employee morale.
5.3.5.3.  The supply-chain and risk and reputation 
management
The distinction between risk management and real-
ising new opportunities is similarly fluid in the case 
of CSR-related supply-chain requirements. The initial 
motivation of enterprises in imposing such require-
ments may be risk management, in the knowledge 
that  many  companies  have  suffered  reputational 
damage as result of non-compliance with social and 
environmental  standards  on  the  part  of  suppliers. 
However,  many  buying  enterprises  have  realised 
the advantages in terms of enhancing brand value 
and building deeper and more sustainable relation-
ships with suppliers. What is more, the advantages 
are not necessarily limited to the buyer: an analysis 
of the experience of Central European SMEs in the 
supply chain of a large IT company found that buyer 
requirements can be a driver for the introduction of 
better management systems in supplier enterprises 
(Danish Commerce and Companies Agency, 2008).
5.3.5.4.  Transparency and reporting
The same argument also applies to the question of 
transparency and CSR reporting. Many companies 
that now issue CSR or sustainability reports initially 
did so with the aim of protecting themselves from 
the  criticism  of  non-governmental  organisations. 
While they have not always been successful in that 
objective,  they  have  often  found  that  sustainabil-
ity reporting can lead to other advantages, such as 
employee pride and morale, stronger relationships 
with external stakeholders, and improving their own 
internal  capacity  to  measure  and  manage  social 
and environmental issues. Pohle and Hittner (2008) 
argue that greater levels of transparency can help to 
anticipate difficulties with external stakeholders: ‘the 
company that invites more eyes on its operations can 
pre-empt  problems  that  would  otherwise  become 
very expensive to solve.’
5.3.5.5.  Conclusion
CSR is an essential component of risk and reputation 
management for many companies. The business case 
for CSR in terms of risk and reputation management 
is strengthened by the fact that enterprises are more 
exposed to public scrutiny and criticism than in the 
past. This also means that there is greater pressure 
on companies to embed CSR deeply within their val-
ues and operations, rather than to assume it can be 
used as a simple public relations tool. Dealing with 
CSR issues such as transparency, human rights, and 
supply-chain requirements from a risk management 
perspective have lead some companies to discover 
additional positive impacts of CSR.
5.3.6.  Financial markets
Stock market effects are strongly related to all other 
economic effects of CSR. Since stock prices are an 
indicator for the general economic performance of 
corporations, they should, under the assumption of 
efficient capital markets, also reflect the discounted 
value of CSR practices.
5.3.6.1.  A positive but small link between CSR and financial 
performance
There is a large body of academic literature on the 
stock  market  effects  of  CSR,  reaching  a  range  of 
different  conclusions.  As  McWilliams  and  Siegel 
(2000) note, researchers examining the impact of 
CSR on financial performance have reported a posi-
tive impact (such as Ziegler et al., 2007), a nega-
tive impact (such as Wright and Ferris, 1997), and a 
neutral impact (such as Schröder, 2007). Since SMEs 
are generally not traded on the stock exchange, the 
literature on the link between CSR and financial mar-
kets is usually not applicable to them.
If the whole body of the existing academic literature 
is examined, as for example in meta-analyses by Orl-
itzky et al. (2003) and Margolis et al. (2007), the link 
between CSR and financial performance is found to 115
5 — Overview of the links between Corporate Social Responsibility and Competitiveness
be positive but small, and in any case is not nega-
tive. The results of different studies depend to a sig-
nificant extent on which specific aspects of CSR and 
financial  performance  are  analysed.  Orlitzky  et  al. 
(2003) find that the most powerful CSR measure in 
terms of effect on financial performance is reputation 
indices. This suggests that firm reputational aspects 
are amongst the most important drivers of the com-
petitiveness effects of CSR.
Margolis et al. (2007) report that the association is 
strongest for the specific cases of charitable contri-
butions, environmental performance, and revealed 
misdeeds (i.e. public announcements of actions that 
indicate socially irresponsible behaviour). The associ-
ation between corporate performance and chartable 
contributions may relate to the reputation effect as 
found by Orlitzky et al. (2003), while the association 
with revealed misdeeds may relate both to reputation 
effects and to risk management. The link between 
environmental and financial performance may relate 
to  environmental  innovations  besides  reputational 
or risk management issues. Bird et al. (2007) have 
similarly found a link between market value and envi-
ronmental performance, but also found that markets 
rewarded  companies  that  met  minimum  require-
ments with regard to diversity and were the most 
pro-active in the area of employee relations.
Margolis et al. (2007) also looked at 14 studies ana-
lysing the association between corporate transpar-
ency  and  financial  performance.  The  link  was  not 
strong, but the overall conclusion was that financial 
markets do react positively to company disclosures 
regarding socially responsible behaviour.
Although  there  is  a  certain  positive  correlation 
between CSR and financial performance, this in itself 
does not explain the causal link. Margolis et al. (2007) 
addressed  this  question  in  their  meta-analysis,  and 
found that although there was no financial penalty 
for CSR, the link from prior financial performance to 
subsequent CSR was at least as strong as the reverse.
5.3.6.2.  Socially Responsible Investment (SRI)
CSR  performance  may  lead  to  better  access  to 
finance if investors and analysts take account of such 
performance. The recent growth in Socially Respon-
sible  Investment  (SRI)  is  especially  relevant  in  this 
regard. SRI funds include social and environmental 
criteria, as well as economic criteria, in investment 
decisions. The SRI market is young, but has been 
growing  strongly  for  several  years.  The  European 
Social Investment Forum (EUROSIF) estimates that 
the broad European SRI market represents 15-20% 
of total funds under management in the EU.
Many  financial  market  experts  assess  the  market 
potential of SRI very optimistically. In a recent poll 
amongst 297 financial market experts conducted by 
the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW; 
Oberndorfer, 2007), more than 70 per cent of all the 
respondents assumed a growing or at least a con-
stant market share for SRI.
Generally, the growth of the SRI industry, combined 
with more robust methodologies for incorporating 
social  and  environmental  aspects,  should  in  time 
mean that enterprises with strong CSR policies gain 
competitive advantage in terms of access to finance 
on the international markets. This effect would be 
even stronger if mainstream funds and analysts (as 
opposed to just the SRI industry) took account, or 
greater account, of CSR criteria in their investments 
and valuations.
5.3.6.3.  Mainstream investors and analysts
There is some evidence that mainstream analysts and 
investors are attaching more importance to social and 
environmental issues. The UN Principles for Respon-
sible Investment, launched in 2006, now have over 
350 signatories, who between them manage assets 
worth about e8.2 trillion. A study of fund managers 
with over e7.6 trillion of assets under management, 
including more than half of the world’s leading 20 
fund  managers,  found  that  investment  skills  and 
research associated with the SRI industry are becom-
ing more mainstream (Horton and Kember 2008). 
However the authors of the study also note that “the 
industry as a whole is a long way from best practice: 
although  asset  managers  increasingly  accept  that 
ESG  [environmental,  social  and  governance]  fac-
tors can influence investment returns and risks, most 
have yet to develop the corresponding competen-
cies systematically across their organisation.”
In 2007 Goldman Sachs published details of GS SUS-
TAIN, a methodology for integrating social and envi-
ronmental issues into company valuation. Goldman 
Sachs believes it can be more confident in its predic-
tions of improving returns or industry leadership for 
those companies which appear to be best managed, 
as signalled by a strong score on environmental, social 
and governance issues. The GS SUSTAIN framework 
also facilitates the identification of emerging indus-
tries  and  companies  that  Goldman  Sachs  believes 
are well placed to address the structural issues facing 
major industries in terms of significant global themes 
such as alternative energy, environmental technolo-
gies, biotechnology, and nutrition. It is notable in 
this respect that GS SUSTAIN appears, in effect, to 
be identifying industries and companies that are best 
placed to help resolve important societal challenges.
5.3.6.4.  Measurement and communication
Methodological difficulties and access to reliable and 
comparable information can hamper the ability of 116
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investment analysts to take full account of social and 
environmental issues. Some investors, especially but 
not only from the SRI sector, believe that company 
disclosure of social and environmental performance 
should be standardised and perhaps made obliga-
tory. For companies, balancing transparency on non-
financial indicators with the need to protect strate-
gic information from competitors can be a complex 
task.
Substantial  work  is  being  undertaken  to  improve 
metrics and communication in the area of non-finan-
cial performance. The European Alliance on CSR is 
aiming to produce a framework of metrics and strat-
egies for the management and communication of 
key areas of non-financial performance, highlighting 
the link with financial performance. Other relevant 
work in this area has been undertaken by the UNEP 
Finance Initiative and the Enhanced Analytics Initia-
tive.
This is part of a wider trend towards the better meas-
urement, valuation and disclosure of intangible assets 
and intellectual capital. According to surveys from 
2004 and 2007, more than three quarters of board 
members and executives acknowledge that financial 
indicators alone are not enough to identify compa-
nies’ strengths and weaknesses (Deloitte 2007). The 
European Federation of Financial Analysts Societies 
is a strong proponent of action in this area, point-
ing out that companies which do not systematically 
analyse their intellectual capital have an insufficient 
understanding of what really drives their value crea-
tion.
The World Intellectual Capital Initiative has recently 
been launched under the auspices of the OECD to 
promote the management and reporting of intellec-
tual capital at company level and to promote interna-
tional dialogue on this issue. The Enhanced Business 
Reporting Consortium, which is part of this initia-
tive, aims to develop a voluntary, global disclosure 
framework for the presentation of the non-financial 
components of business reports, including key per-
formance  indicators.  Although  intangible  assets 
cover substantially more than just CSR-related issues, 
such issues are nevertheless often a subset of intan-
gible assets. Pressure for and progress towards better 
measurement, valuation and disclosure of intangible 
assets  will  therefore  also  affect  the  measurement, 
valuation and disclosure of CSR performance.
5.3.6.5.  Conclusion
Research indicates conclusively that there is a posi-
tive but small correlation between CSR and financial 
performance.  The  nature  of  the  causal  link  is  not 
clear, however. The growth of the SRI industry pro-
vides opportunities for better access to finance for 
companies that perform well on CSR. There is also 
evidence that mainstream investors and analysts are 
paying greater attention to CSR-related issues and 
more generally to intangible assets and intellectual 
capital. This is likely to increase the profile of CSR 
issues in the financial valuation of enterprises.
5.4.  Competitiveness effects of CSR at 
macro and sector level
5.4.1.  CSR and competitiveness at macro level
The European Commission sees CSR as an important 
part of the European Strategy for Growth and Jobs. 
If more European businesses are more socially and 
environmentally responsible, this should help Europe 
as a whole to meet its objectives under the growth 
and  jobs  strategy.  These  objectives  include  mak-
ing Europe more competitive, as well as objectives 
such as social inclusion. A greater commitment from 
European enterprises to CSR can also help Europe to 
better combine competitiveness objectives with the 
overarching goal of sustainable development.
Some Member States also frame their policies to pro-
mote CSR at last partially in the context of improv-
ing national competitiveness. The CSR strategy pub-
lished by the Danish Government in 2008 seeks to 
strengthen the international reputation of Denmark 
as a country renowned for responsible growth, which 
should in turn help to uphold its strong position in 
the global competition for competent labour, invest-
ment and market shares.
One of the main ways in which CSR could contribute 
to national and regional competitiveness in the EU 
is by generating higher levels of trust in business on 
the part of society. CSR practices that are credible, 
and that are recognised as such by citizens and other 
stakeholders  should  help  to  address  the  trust  gap 
between enterprises and other stakeholders in soci-
ety. Conversely, if the CSR practices of enterprises 
are perceived not to be credible, i.e. to be more pub-
lic relations than real substance, then this could in 
the longer term actually compound the problem of 
the trust gap.
Higher levels of trust in business on the part of society 
could positively affect macro-level competitiveness 
in a number of ways. It could, for example, make it 
easier to reach political agreement on measures to 
reduce unnecessary administrative burdens on busi-
ness. The possibilities for reaching social and politi-
cal consensus on such measures should be greater 
if  enterprises  are  perceived  to  share  the  values  of 
the societies in which they operate and are seen to 
address societal challenges as well as creating wealth 
through their own commercial success.117
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It is also possible that a better image of business in 
the eyes of society will help to create a more entre-
preneurial mindset amongst Europeans. It is probably 
harder to encourage more young people to become 
entrepreneurs if the pervasive attitude towards the 
achievements and impacts of existing enterprises is 
ambiguous. In its 2006 Communication on entrepre-
neurship education in 2006, the Commission sug-
gested that emphasising the notion of “responsible 
entrepreneurship” could help to make an entrepre-
neurial career a more attractive proposition to young 
people (European Commission 2006).
It seems reasonable to assume that the generation of 
trust through credible CSR practices may also help to 
create social capital in national and regional econo-
mies. If so, then CSR could also contribute to com-
petitiveness at a macro-level through a reduction in 
transaction costs.
Taken as a whole, the CSR practices of enterprises 
can also contribute to labour market integration and 
to skills development, both of which are identified 
in the Growth and Jobs Strategy as being important 
for European competitiveness. Companies contrib-
ute to labour market integration through employee 
diversity policies, which also have the effect of help-
ing to offset the potential negative competiveness 
consequences of the shrinking working age popu-
lation. The investments made by many enterprises 
in the skills development of their employees is also 
an  important  aspect  of  the  work-place  dimension 
of CSR, and may have positive implications at the 
macro level in terms of helping to create and main-
tain a European work force with the skills to compete 
in the globalised economy.
This chapter argues that CSR can contribute to the 
innovation  performance  of  companies.  If  so,  then 
CSR may also improve macro-level competitiveness 
by being a driver for improved innovation perform-
ance in a given nation or region as a whole. It has 
also been suggested that regions in particular, by 
actively developing a reputation for CSR and sustain-
able business, may be able to increase their attrac-
tiveness as an investment location (European Com-
mission 2007).
In spite of the validity of these arguments, the links 
between CSR and competitiveness at a macro level 
are difficult to measure. Isolating the cause and effect 
relationship between different aspects of CSR and dif-
ferent determinants of competitiveness is significantly 
more complicated at macro level than it is even at 
micro (firm) level. There has been little research into 
whether the aggregated CSR practices of individual 
companies do actually have a measureable effect on 
the determinants of national and regional competi-
tiveness in the ways suggested above. It will in any 
case always be dependent on a critical mass of com-
panies engaged in CSR in the economy under study, 
although the size of that critical mass is uncertain 
and also invites academic investigation.
In spite of the difficulty of measuring the cause and 
effect relationship between CSR and competitiveness 
at national and regional level, there is evidence of a 
positive relationship between the two. AccountAbil-
ity has established a Responsible Competitive Index, 
which measures the tendency of a country towards 
responsibility and sustainability, and then plots that 
against the Growth Competitive Index of the World 
Economic Forum. The 2007 edition of this exercise 
found a strong correlation, as have previous editions 
(MacGillivray et al., 2007). AccountAbility has carried 
out a similar exercise at regional level in the United 
Kingdom, and also has found a correlation between 
levels of responsibility and traditional indicators of 
regional competitiveness (MacGillivray and Mackie, 
2005).
5.4.2.  CSR and competitiveness at sector level
The links between CSR and competitiveness can also 
be considered from a sector perspective. The com-
petitiveness challenges facing certain sectors coin-
cide at least partially with the strategic CSR issues 
specific to that sector. There are a number of exam-
ples of this:
–   Chemicals:  The  High  Level  Group  on  the  Com-
petitiveness  of  the  European  Chemical  Industry 
has identified opportunities for the industry in four 
fields:  climate  change,  natural  resources,  renew-
able  energy  production  and  the  ageing  society. 
The  chemical  industry  therefore  has  the  poten-
tial to play a key role as a provider of solutions to 
major societal problems. As well as the opportuni-
ties for revenue generation this creates, the chemi-
cal industry might also improve its reputation in 
society and its exposure to regulation if it fulfils this 
potential.
–   Mining: Two important strategic issues facing the 
mining industry are access to land and the attrac-
tion of high-quality and suitably qualified workers. 
Both these factors are influenced by public percep-
tions of the industry, especially on issues such as its 
environmental performance and health and safety, 
which are also key CSR issues for the sector. The 
mining industry has also suffered from the percep-
tion  of  corruption,  and  the  Extractive  Industries 
Transparency Initiative is a response to that.
–   Information technology: Leading IT companies are 
cooperating to promote e-skills and digital literacy 
in Europe through the European Alliance on Skills 
for Employability and the e-skills Industry Leader-
ship Board. The companies involved are motivated 118
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by a number of considerations, including their own 
strategic interest in helping to ensure that Europe-
ans have a high level of IT knowledge and skills.
–   Tourism:  The  quality  of  tourism  products  and 
services is very closely linked to the training and 
behaviour of employees, the state of the surround-
ing physical environment, and good and close rela-
tions with the local community in any given tour-
ism destination. Each of these issues is high on the 
CSR agenda of tourism enterprises, but very often 
they cannot be addressed by any one enterprise 
acting on its own.
The implication of these examples is that in certain 
industries joint action by enterprises and other stake-
holders to address CSR issues can simultaneously help 
to address factors affecting the competitiveness of 
the sector. Research into the links between CSR and 
competitiveness in the financial, IT and pharmaceu-
tical industries suggests that collaboration between 
different stakeholders is key to successfully combin-
ing  innovation,  responsibility  and  competitiveness 
(MacGillivray et al., 2007).
There is, however, potential for tension between the 
competitiveness  interests  of  individual  enterprises 
and the competitiveness of the sector as a whole, 
since sector-wide action might reduce the opportuni-
ties for leading enterprises to differentiate themselves 
through CSR. Draper (2006) acknowledges this ten-
sion but suggests that a comprehensive approach to 
promoting CSR at sector level can improve the CSR 
performance of the sector as a whole and still allow 
leading enterprises to differentiate themselves. The 
Commission aims to further study the link between 
CSR and competitiveness at sector level though sup-
port for a number of multi-stakeholder, sector-based 
CSR programmes in 2009-10.
5.5.  Conclusion
This chapter has examined the affects of CSR on 6 
different determinants and indicators of competitive-
ness at firm level: cost structure, human resources, 
customer perspective, innovation, risk and reputation 
management, and financial performance. It has also 
examined possible links between CSR and competi-
tiveness at macro-level and at the level of individual 
industrial sectors. The following general conclusions 
can be drawn:
1.    CSR  can  have  a  positive  impact  on  firm-level 
competitiveness in the case of all 6 determinants 
examined. However, the strength of that impact, 
and the extent to which it is relevant to all com-
panies, varies. The business case for CSR is spe-
cific to different sectors, sizes and circumstances 
of companies.
2.    The strongest evidence of a positive impact of CSR 
on competitiveness appears to be in the cases of 
human  resources,  risk  and  reputation  manage-
ment, and innovation. Positive links between CSR 
and  competitiveness  also  exist  but  appear  less 
strong or not so generally applicable in the case 
of cost structure, the customer perspective, and 
financial markets.
3.    The business case for CSR is not static and is get-
ting stronger. Many of the factors affecting the 
business case for CSR are themselves dynamic and 
are intensifying. This is true of employee expecta-
tions, consumer awareness, trends in private and 
public procurement, expectations of future regu-
lation, the nature of innovation processes, and 
the  importance  that  financial  markets  attribute 
to social and environmental issues. Additionally, 
some new factors have been identified that were 
barely part of this discussion a few years ago. This 
is the case, for example, of innovation perform-
ance.
4.    The business case for CSR is increasingly based on 
value creation. As the practice of CSR has evolved, 
enterprises have begun to explore creative solu-
tions to maximise their positive impact, as well as 
introducing measures to minimise their negative 
impact. While the origins of the current atten-
tion to CSR lie in value protection (primarily risk 
and reputation management), leading businesses 
have found that it can also lead to opportunities 
for new value creation.
5.    The  strength  of  the  business  case  for  CSR  in 
any  given  enterprise  is  still  dependent  on  the 
competitive positioning of the company. There 
are  enterprises  with  competitive  strategies  that 
require no more than legal compliance in social 
and environmental fields, and where exceeding 
legal compliance might incur costs that under-
mine competitiveness. This is more likely to be 
the case for enterprises whose competitive posi-
tioning is primarily based on low cost.
6.    However, for an increasing number of enterprises 
in a growing number of industries, CSR is becom-
ing a competitive necessity – it is something that 
they cannot afford not to do.
7.    CSR needs to be part of core business strategy 
if it is to be a competitive differentiator. In this 
way CSR can also help to strengthen the Euro-
pean social model. The factors affecting the link 
between CSR and competitiveness are multifac-
eted and themselves reflect fundamental shifts 
in the environment in which business operates. 
Enterprises in which CSR remains a peripheral 
concern,  mainly  confined  to  public  relations 119
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functions,  are  likely  to  miss  opportunities  for 
competitiveness  gains.  It  has  been  suggested 
that  the  European  Commission’s  definition  of 
CSR should be adapted to reflect the importance 
of  strategy,  so  as  to  read:  “CSR  is  a  concept 
whereby companies integrate social and envi-
ronmental  concerns  in  their  strategic  decision-
making  processes,  in  their  business  operations 
and in their interaction with their stakeholders 
on  a  voluntary  basis”  (European  Academy  of 
Business in Society, 2007).
8.    For most of the competitive determinants exam-
ined, there is evidence that the impact of CSR is as 
relevant to SMEs as it is to larger companies. This 
is certainly true with regard to human resources, 
and also regarding reputation management and 
innovation.
9.    There are strong reasons for believing that CSR 
can have a positive impact on competitiveness 
at European, national, regional and sector level. 
The overlap between competitiveness and CSR 
at macro and sector level may be greater than is 
often acknowledged. More research is required, 
however,  in  order  to  measure  and  analyse  the 
ways in which CSR might enhance competitive-
ness at the macro-level and sector levels.
10.    The findings of this chapter support the argument 
that CSR can make a valuable contribution to the 
goals of the European Growth and Jobs Strategy, 
and should encourage more Member States, in 
cooperation  with  other  stakeholders  including 
employers’ organisations, to promote CSR as part 
of their national reform strategies. The Commis-
sion  will  continue  to  provide  political  impetus 
and practical support to all stakeholders engaged 
in CSR.
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C. Competitiveness at sector level
6.  Determinants of sectoral 
performance
6.1.  Introduction
Based on the reform agenda agreed in Lisbon, enter-
prise and industrial policies require a detailed under-
standing of the competitive process at the level of 
individual industries (European Commission, 2005; 
Grilo and Koopman, 2006; Zourek, 2007). Accord-
ingly,  the  current  chapter137  aims  to  identify  the 
major  determinants,  patterns  and  trends  in  Euro-
pean competitiveness from a distinctly sectoral per-
spective. The Competitiveness Report 2007 investi-
gated European sectoral competitiveness, assessing 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of European 
industries with respect to the various dimensions of 
performance, such as the growth of value added, 
employment,  labour  and  multifactor  productivity, 
profitability, international trade, and foreign direct 
investments. The present chapter now turns to the 
major determinants or ‘drivers’ of sectoral growth.
Sectoral growth is characterised in terms of growth 
in  output  (value  added),  labour  productivity  and 
multifactor productivity, and these are the variables 
for which various drivers are investigated. However, 
it is important to underline here the close interre-
lation among these variables and, particularly, the 
crucial role of productivity in the process of growth 
and competitiveness. On the one hand, labour pro-
ductivity  (which  can  be  further  decomposed  into 
capital deepening and total factor productivity) takes 
growth in GDP beyond the constraints imposed by 
labour inputs, and is therefore crucial to raising the 
standards of living of the population. On the other 
hand, at sectoral and firm level, labour productivity 
137   This chapter builds on the second part of the study “The drivers of sec-
toral growth and competitiveness in the EU” (forthcoming) coordinated by 
Michael Peneder.
plays an important role in determining unit labour 
cost and, ultimately, price competitiveness.
It is also important to underline the link between 
sectoral  growth  and  macroeconomic  performance 
as analysed in chapter 1. For labour productivity this 
link is shown in Figure 1, which presents the con-
tribution  of  each  sector  (from  agriculture  to  non-
market services) to the average annual growth rate 
in labour productivity for the whole economy, i.e. 
1.6%, over the period 1995-2005138. Interestingly, a 
large part of the labour productivity growth in the 
economy as a whole is accounted for by a relatively 
small number of sectors. In fact, the top eight sectors 
(from Agriculture, hunting and forestry to Health and 
social work) account for two thirds of labour produc-
tivity growth. This is the result of above-the-average 
growth rates (in six sectors out of eight) combined 
with relatively high shares in the economy. For the 
two sectors (Public administration and Health and 
social  work)  with  productivity  growth  below  the 
average their contribution is explained by their rela-
tively high shares (6.9% and 7.6% respectively) in 
the EU economy. Regarding the main branches of 
the  economy,  as  expected,  the  main  contribution 
over the whole period comes from manufacturing 
and market services: 34% of the labour productivity 
growth rate over 1995-2005 is due to manufactur-
ing and 35.6% to market services. The rest is from 
agriculture  and  fishing  (14.9%),  non-market  serv-
ices (9.7%), electricity, gas and water supply (3%), 
construction (1.9%) and mining (0.9%). Although 
the order of magnitude of the contribution of the 
main  branches  to  EU  labour  productivity  growth 
does not change significantly over time, manufac-
turing’s contribution increased from 32.3% (1995-
2000) to 36.5% (2000-2005) while that of market 
services went in the opposite direction, from 38.5% 
to 32.6%, in the same sub-periods.
138   The growth rate for the whole economy is the weighted average of sec-
toral growth rates. The weights are the share of sectors in the total number of 
hours worked at the beginning of the period considered.124
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Sectoral performance is driven by a myriad of dis-
tinct sources. At present, no single, comprehensive 
theory exists which can explain the role of these ele-
ments within a jointly integrated economic model. 
However, many of them are the subject of different 
strands of economic research. Accordingly, this chap-
ter is organised according to five groups of related 
factors:  macroeconomic  conditions,  demand-side 
factors, R&D and innovation, market structure, and 
finally openness and barriers to trade.
Figure 2 includes the five categories of growth driv-
ers and also an additional one “imputs to produc-
tion” that are examined in the chapter. First, mac-
roeconomic  conditions  affect  sectoral  growth  and 
performance  by  defining  the  environment  within 
which companies and industries operate. Among the 
relevant factors, those examined in this chapter are 
cyclicality in terms of aggregate fluctuations in GDP 
and  employment,  interest  rates,  exchange  rates, 
government spending, corporate tax rates, and the 
change  in  relative  prices.  Second,  demand  guides 
the allocation of scarce resources among compet-
ing  uses.  In  this  chapter,  demand  is  decomposed 
into  consumer  expenditure,  investment  spending, 
government spending, net exports and demand for 
intermediary  inputs.  Third,  R&D  and  innovation  is 
another key driver behind changes in the production 
function and, more generally, the process of value 
creation. Fourth, market structure determines the kind 
and degree of competition within industry, and the 
impact on consumer welfare and selection among 
heterogeneous suppliers. Finally, openness and barri-
ers to trade indicate differences in terms of degree of 
global competition and transactions between inter-
national partners within an industry.
The comprehensiveness of the analysis in terms of 
the  scope  of  databases  sourced  and  the  range  of 
variables covered has its price. Because the data on 
suspected ‘drivers’ of industrial growth stem from 
many distinct sources, there are large differences not 
only in terms of sector disaggregations, but also in 
the coverage of countries and years. Empirical analy-
Figure 1: Sectoral decomposition of average annual growth in labour productivity per hour worked 
in the EU-25
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sis must adhere to the boundaries set by the data139. 
Consequently, the five categories of sectoral growth 
drivers  are  discussed  separately,  although  a  more 
integrated econometric analysis is presented in the 
final section.
The empirical findings are presented in answer to the 
following questions:
•   What are the economic rationales behind the secto-
ral growth drivers selected? More specifically, what 
presumptions are made regarding their impact?
•   To  what  extent  do  these  growth  drivers  live  up 
to  the  expectations  posited  in  the  economic  lit-
erature and prove to have a statistically significant 
impact?
•   Do the determinants of sectoral performance have 
similar impacts on different industries, or are some 
139   The sectoral detail of this chapter is mainly at the level of the 2-digit 
NACE industry classification, with further aggregations as necessary. As far 
as the availability of data permits, we focus on the years since 1995 in our 
reporting on major characteristics and trends. The data are sourced from 
international sectoral databases, such as the EU KLEMS growth and produc-
tivity  accounts;  EUROSTAT’s  Structural  Business  Statistics;  Global  Insight’s 
World Economic Services Database; the OECD’s STAN, ANBERD, and Inter-
national Regulation databases; as well as the UN COMTRADE database.
industries  more  responsive  to  particular  growth 
drivers than others?
•   How do the sectoral growth drivers for the EU-15 
industries compare to those in the New Member 
States (NMS) or the US?
The chapter is organised accordingly. Sections 2 to 6 
examine the rationales and empirical findings for the 
five categories of sectoral growth drivers. Each sec-
tion begins with a general rationale and motivation, 
followed by a brief review of the empirical literature, 
and finally turns to a discussion of the new data and 
descriptive tables compiled for this study. Section 7 
presents econometric estimations of the impact of 
the various growth drivers. For the dependent vari-
ables characterising sectoral performance, we focus 
on the growth of value added, labour productivity 
and multifactor productivity. Section 8 summarises 
and concludes.
6.2.  Macroeconomic conditions
Macroeconomic conditions define the general busi-
ness  environment  within  which  companies  and 
industries operate. In modelling the impact of mac-
Figure 2: Stylised model of selected sectoral growth drivers
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- Net exports 
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roeconomic conditions on sectoral performance, we 
follow the conventional literature and use the loga-
rithm of per capita real income, in our case sector-
specific value added, as the dependent variable (see 
Fisher,  1993;  Levine  and  Renelt,  1992).  Since  the 
focus of the chapter is on the sectoral level, we con-
struct a separate model for each industry140, includ-
ing only the regressors that prove to be important 
for a given industry (i.e. those which are statistically 
significant in the regression). The coefficients of the 
estimations for the EU-15 are displayed in Table 1141. 
Zislin and Barrett (2007) report complementary data 
for the NMS10 and the US.
For each industry, we check overall per capita value 
added in the economy (which, as expected, carries 
a positive sign) and the unemployment rate (which 
has the expected negative sign). Both variables are 
intended to capture the cyclicality of markets. For 
value added, a coefficient greater than one tells us 
that  an  industry  is  more  volatile  than  the  overall 
economy and a coefficient below one captures an 
industry that is expanding (or contracting) less than 
the magnitude of the economic boom (or recession). 
A coefficient close to zero (or not significantly dif-
ferent from zero, which results in regressor exclu-
sion) means that an industry is reacting very little in 
response to the economic cycle.
A majority of the industries in the EU-15 fluctuate 
with the overall economy, as indicated by the posi-
tive coefficients for aggregate GDP. Many industries 
found to be most responsive to aggregate fluctua-
tions in GDP are those that depend on discretionary 
consumer spending (such as audio-visual apparatus, 
motor  vehicles,  or  air  and  water  transport).  Con-
versely, industries with a low correlation to aggregate 
GDP or none at all are often those that supply neces-
sities  (agriculture,  fishing,  manufacturing  of  food 
and beverages, manufacturing of coke and refined 
petrol, electricity, gas and water supply, etc.).
Perhaps  one  of  the  most  important  drivers  is  the 
change in relative prices. For example, Fisher (1991, 
1993) and Kormendi and Meguire (1985) demon-
strate  that  overall  price  increases  have  a  negative 
impact on growth. To adjust the variable to focus on 
sectoral growth, we utilise the change in relative prices 
as measured by the logarithm of the ratio between 
the price index of the value added for a given sector 
140   In order to have the maximum number of observations and degrees of 
freedom, a panel data technique with fixed effects is used, which also us to 
control for unobserved variables, such as the level of technology, as well as 
other variables that may be observed but are constant over the period of time 
(initial level of income, initial level of schooling, etc.). A separate model for 
each industry is estimated and EU-15 and NMS10 (new member states) are 
also treated separately. The data used go back to 1970 for EU-15 and to 1995 
for NMS10.
141   Results for NMS10 are presented in Peneder (2008) and a discussion of 
EU-15 results compared to those for NMS10 and US is presented below.
to that of the whole economy. An increase in the 
variable is interpreted to mean that prices in a given 
industry  rise  faster  than  across  the  economy  as  a 
whole142. While this increase can reflect either a pure 
rise in prices or an improvement in quality (faster 
than elsewhere in the economy), the two effects can 
not be separated. Regression coefficient for the vari-
able is interpreted as the relative price elasticity for 
the industry143. As Table 1 shows, the price elasticity 
in the EU-15 ranges from a low of -0.07 for insurance 
and pension funding to -0.87 for the sale, mainte-
nance and repair of motor vehicles. Price proves to 
have a particular influence on value added growth 
in agriculture; fishing; the manufacturing of food, 
beverages and tobacco; electrical machinery; trans-
port equipment; the sale, repair and maintenance 
of motor vehicles; auxiliary financial intermediation 
activities; and land and air transport.
We include real interest rates in our list of variables to 
be examined and expect a negative elasticity. When 
interest rates rise, firms at the margin borrow less, 
thus leading to lower investment and lower value 
added  per  capita.  We  investigate  sectoral  growth 
in relation to long-term interest rates (equivalent to 
a 10-year government bond yield) and short-term 
interest rates (equivalent to a 3-month government 
bond yield). Table 1 reveals that rising long-term real 
interest rates can deter growth particularly in manu-
facturing and services sectors, while primary indus-
tries remain largely unaffected.
With respect to real exchange rates, the impact is 
expected to be negative. The reason is that as a cur-
rency  appreciates,  those  industries  that  are  highly 
dependent  on  exports  will  see  a  decrease  in  the 
growth  of  their  value  added.  Unlike  with  interest 
rates, Table 1 shows that real exchange rate appre-
ciation does depress growth in the primary sector. 
Similarly, real exchange rates have negative elastici-
ties for some industries in the secondary sector, but 
to a much lesser extent than in the tertiary sector. 
The results are intuitive, since the primary and sec-
ondary sectors more often depend on exports, while 
service industries tend to focus more on the domes-
tic market.
With respect to government spending, supply-side 
theories suggest that the taxes necessary to fund 
distort incentives and reduce growth, while more 
142   To avoid potential confusion, one should stress that this concept aims 
for a normalisation of sectoral price movements and does not suggest substi-
tutability between products of different sectors.
143   The  variation  in  this  variable  is  thus  sector-specific.  We  nevertheless 
consider the variable in the macroeconomic analysis for two reasons: first, 
the denominator of the variable is indeed an economy-wide concept (GDP 
deflator) and second, price changes are often viewed as a macroeconomic 
force, despite being sector-specific. This is the case, because aggregate price 
changes in a certain factor of production will have different impacts on sec-
tors with different factor intensities.127
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demand-oriented  economists  tend  to  argue  that 
government spending can have a positive impact 
on growth by harmonising conflicts between pri-
vate  and  public  interests,  stabilising  aggregate 
economic fluctuations, or securing an increase in 
productive  investment.  We  explicitly  control  for 
the effect of taxes by including implied corporate 
tax rates in the list of macroeconomic drivers to be 
considered. In fact, Bruce and Turnovsky’s (1999) 
model  shows  that  it  is  the  tax  rate  that  should 
have a negative impact on the growth rate. After 
accounting for the tax rate as a possible driver, we 
expect the sign for government expenditure to be 
positive in the light of its contribution to growth-
inducing investment144.
Examining the role of government fiscal policy in the 
EU-15, an increase in tax rates primarily influences 
manufacturing  industries  (e.g.,  office  machinery 
and computers, textiles, and basic metals), which 
generally enjoy more flexibility in deciding in which 
location to invest. Conversely, service sectors (e.g. 
wholesale trade, financial intermediation, research 
&  development)  or  largely  government-owned 
sectors (e.g. electricity, gas & water supply) tend 
to be the main beneficiaries of rising government 
expenditure.
Turning to government balance (as a share of GDP), 
the general concern is that fiscal deficits can have 
the effect of crowding out investment and over the 
long  run  create  inter-generational  debt.  We  thus 
expect a positive coefficient for the government bal-
ance variable. Fisher (1991) argues that more gen-
erally, budget deficits can signal a government that 
is out of control, and he finds a significant negative 
effect of deficits on growth. Adam and Bevan (2001) 
find that fiscal deficits matter when they are above 
a certain threshold. Since the threshold effect could 
differ among industries, we do not expect the vari-
able to be significant in all sector-level regressions. 
As Table 1 shows, several manufacturing industries 
appear to be affected by exactly this scenario (i.e., 
wood and wood products, fabricated metal prod-
ucts, electric machinery, and radio and television).
Regression results for the NMS10 countries are less 
robust for basically two reasons. First, the data series 
considered  are  much  shorter  than  for  the  EU-15 
countries.  In  addition,  due  to  the  transformation 
a number of these countries have undergone dur-
ing the past two decades, many of the series are 
extremely unstable and may not reflect true mac-
roeconomic changes (but rather, adjustments due 
144   The objective of the analysis of public expenditure and revenues is to 
look at the different impact across sectors. This has to be considered as a 
first estimate of the order of magnitude of the effect of these drivers on the 
growth of the various sectors. Sector-specific analyses would be required to 
obtain more precise estimates of these effects. 
to liberalisation). With these caveats in mind, Zislin 
and Barrett (2007) observe that the two regions are 
very similar in terms of the general patterns of their 
macroeconomic  drivers  of  sectoral  growth.  How-
ever, the data also reveal some marked differences. 
For example, while fluctuations in relative prices are 
important for nearly all industries in both the EU-15 
and  NMS10,  the  benefit  of  lower  relative  prices 
is far more pronounced across sectors in NMS10. 
This could at least be partially attributable to the 
fact that the EU-15 has more developed economies 
which are more dependent on the non-price deter-
minants of competitive advantage. In addition, in 
the NMS10, fewer industries are correlated with the 
business cycle (although most still are). Furthermore, 
the industries adversely affected by exchange rate 
appreciation differ across the two regions (probably 
as a result of different export structures).
In order to benchmark European sectoral growth, 
Zislin and Barrett (2007) perform analogous regres-
sions  for  the  US.  They  report  that  in  the  US,  far 
fewer  industries  fluctuate  with  aggregate  GDP. 
Conversely, relative price elasticities in the US are 
higher than in EU-15. The real exchange rate, on 
the other hand, does not appear in US regressions 
nearly as often as in those for the EU-15. Implied 
taxes have less impact on US industries, which may 
be due to the fact that corporate taxes in the US did 
not change much over the course of the years con-
sidered. Conversely, both government expenditure 
and government balance play a larger role in the 
growth of US industries145.
6.3.  Demand-side factors
Demand, along with supply, completes the market-
place. The growth of output and profit generated 
by enterprises is profoundly influenced by demand-
side factors. Without adequate demand, even the 
most efficiently produced goods and services will 
fail. Consumer expenditures, investment spending, 
government spending, and net exports, as well as 
the demand for intermediate goods represent the 
145   It is worth noting an important source of bias in all estimates for Euro-
pean and US data. In the sectors that includes ICT equipment manufacturing 
(NACE 30 to 33), the value added deflators fall by considerably more in the 
US than in the EU (-9.4 per cent against -1.6 per cent per annum). While this 
difference is influenced by the greater relative size of the NACE30 subsector 
Office, accounting and computing machinery in the US (on average 11 per 
cent of value added in NACE 30 to 33 relative to 7 per cent in the EU), it 
is mostly driven by the deflators for this subsector. To the extent that the 
industries are producing similar outputs in the two regions which are traded 
in international markets, this difference might reflect a measurement assump-
tion rather than any real differences. Since EU KLEMS does not harmonise 
the output deflators, all discussion of comparisons between the EU and US 
should be read with this potential source of bias in mind. On the input side 
EU KLEMS does make an adjustment to the deflators for ICT capital so the 
contributions of this input will not be biased.128
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total possible end-market for a given sector146. The 
sum of all of these expenditure categories defines 
gross domestic expenditures at current prices. The 
sectors that gain significant shares of these end-
markets  are  more  likely  to  perform  better  than 
other sectors.
Looking at the relative importance of the various 
demand components for separate industries within 
the  economy,  we  apply  the  same  methodology 
as described in Section 2. The coefficients of the 
estimations are displayed in Table 2 for the EU-15. 
Apollonova (2007) provides complementary data 
for the NMS10 and the US.
Examining  the  drivers  individually,  we  find  that 
consumption plays a dominant role in the service 
industries – more so than in manufacturing. In fact, 
the industries with the highest statistically signifi-
cant elasticities (e.g., hotels & restaurants, insur-
ance & pension funds and air transport) are those 
that we would intuitively expect to be driven by 
consumers, both personal and corporate. Invest-
ment is an important driver (in terms of the mag-
nitude of the industry-specific elasticities) for sec-
ondary  industries  in  comparison  to  tertiary  and 
primary industries. The industries with the largest 
coefficients for the investment variable (furniture 
and  recycling,  machinery  and  equipment,  sale 
maintenance  and  repair  of  motor  vehicles,  con-
struction) are those that produce traditional capital 
goods.  Government  expenditure  appears  to  sig-
nificantly influence growth in only a few industries: 
medical instruments, financial intermediation and 
real estate. The first two may be explained by the 
large role played by European governments have 
in providing social healthcare and retirement pro-
grammes.
The  remaining  demand  side  drivers  –  exports, 
imports,  and  intermediates  –  have,  on  average, 
higher  and  more  significant  coefficients  for  the 
manufacturing  industries  than  for  services.  The 
export market is especially important for the manu-
facturing sub sectors radio & TV, pulp and paper, 
and office machinery, all of which have statistically 
significant coefficients larger than 0.40. Intermedi-
ate  demand  affects  manufacturing  sectors  more 
consistently than the services and primary sectors, 
but the sector with the largest statistically signifi-
cant coefficient is mining, followed by chemicals 
and wood (products).
Exports  and  intermediate  demand  are  the  two 
most important drivers for industries in the sec-
146   We include each industry’s intermediate goods demand as it represents 
one of the channels through which an industry’s output can be sold and at 
the industry level contains components of industry value added.
ondary  sector  by  virtue  of  their  consistent  sta-
tistical significance. On average, a one per cent 
increase in exports leads to a 0.2 per cent increase 
in value added per capita. An equivalent change 
in intermediate consumption causes an average 
increase of 0.3 per cent in value added per capita. 
Imports  and  government  expenditure  have  the 
lowest  impact  on  growth  in  the  manufacturing 
industries.  Overall,  the  estimations  suggest  that 
import  competition  does  not  hurt  the  growth 
achieved in most manufacturing industries in the 
EU-15.
Turning  to  the  service  industries,  consumption, 
exports and intermediate demand have an impact 
on roughly the same number of industries. The 
highest elasticities are observed for consumption. 
Since the government accounts for a smaller share 
of the economy than the private sector, govern-
ment  expenditures  has  a  significant  impact  on 
growth for only a few service industries, including 
construction and research and development.
Apollonova (2007) also compares the importance 
of the role played by the various demand-side fac-
tors in the EU-15 and NMS10 industries. Invest-
ment, exports and government expenditures are 
significant  in  the  growth  equations  for  approxi-
mately  the  same  number  of  industries  in  both 
regions. Imports, on the other hand, are far more 
frequent as a demand driver for the NMS10 than 
for the EU-15, and attest to the greater role that 
import  competition  plays  for  the  NMS10  indus-
tries. Consumption and demand for intermediate 
goods, on the other hand, are more significant in 
the EU-15 regressions, especially for the manufac-
turing sector. Looking at coefficients for all of the 
demand drivers in the secondary sector, the elas-
ticities associated with investment, imports, gov-
ernment  expenditures  and  intermediates  are  on 
average higher for the NMS10. This suggests that 
NMS10 industries in the secondary sector benefit 
more from increases in these demand factors. For 
service industries, the category of intermediates is 
one of the main drivers in the EU-15, and this trend 
is even more pronounced in the NMS10. In terms 
of the magnitude of the intermediate driver elas-
ticities in this sector, coefficients for the NMS10 are 
on average higher for intermediate goods demand, 
once again signalling that these factors are more 
important in the newer EU countries.
6.4.  R&D and Innovation
Research and development is another key input, and 
innovations can lead to major changes in the pro-
duction function (or the function of revenue genera-
tion, more generally). This section therefore provides 133
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a brief description of trends in innovation inputs at 
sectoral level, focusing on business expenditures on 
R&D. Although government and higher education 
sectors also carry out R&D activities, industrial R&D 
remains most closely linked to the introduction of 
new products and processes147.
There are a variety of indicators of innovative effort 
(R&D expenditure, patents, royalties, etc). As it is 
considered one of the main determinants of techno-
logical change R&D expenditure is used in this sec-
tion. A general finding is that R&D investments affects 
productivity positively in two ways: first directly via 
a firm’s own investments and secondly, indirectly via 
spillovers from the R&D of others (Griliches 1998). 
Empirical studies find positive, large spillovers associ-
ated with R&D activities, with social rates of return 
above private rates.
A body of industry studies on R&D and multifactor 
productivity (MFP) date from the 1960s, when the 
effectiveness of R&D as a source of technical progress 
was found to be falling over time. Griliches and Lich-
tenberg (1982) updated this early literature to find 
that R&D intensive industries had in fact been less 
affected  by  the  slowdown,  reasserting  the  impor-
tance of R&D as a source of productivity growth. 
Verspagen  (1995)  estimated  R&D  elasticities  with 
respect to output at industry level and found, for the 
UK, an elasticity in high-technology sectors of 0.109 
(machinery  and  electricals,  transport,  instruments 
and chemicals) and insignificant returns elsewhere. 
Cameron (2000) finds that the elasticity of R&D with 
respect to MFP varies significantly across industries, 
in line with specific industry characteristics, such as 
the capital-labour ratio.
In a recent paper, Griffith et al. (2004) attempt to 
identify separately two influences that R&D has on 
productivity growth, namely innovation and imita-
tion. These correspond broadly to the direct and the 
indirect effects, since innovation is the direct return 
on R&D investment, whereas imitation is the indi-
rect spillover from the innovations of others. In their 
analysis, Griffith et al. (2004) look at a cross-country 
industry panel dataset, constructed from a number 
of OECD databases, which incorporates the ANBERD 
data  considered  in  this  subsection.  They  identify 
147   The source of data used in this section is the ANBERD database (Analyti-
cal BERD database), which is a database developed and maintained by the 
OECD, based on official data on business enterprise expenditure on R&D data 
(BERD) provided by the individual countries. The major difficulty in the cal-
culation of the EU total is that official BERD data are available for only a small 
number of industries and years. The procedure followed in the calculation 
of total EU estimates is to use the available ANBERD estimates for Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, as well as the official BERD data for Greece 
and Portugal. These thirteen countries represent more than 95 per cent of 
total BERD in all 15 countries. New EU Member States are not included. From 
1991 onwards, the EU includes the former East Germany as part of unified 
Germany.
the role of human capital in stimulating an indus-
try’s absorptive capacity and thereby increasing the 
impact of R&D on productivity. In their discussion, 
they also consider the role of the technological fron-
tier in most US industries. They find that increased 
R&D expenditure in the leading country is likely to 
result in higher levels of MFP for follower countries 
as well.
Turning to sectoral R&D intensities (i.e. the ratio of 
BERD to gross output) in Table 3, the R&D intensity 
is higher in the US than in the EU in all sectors except 
electricity, gas and water.148 In US manufacturing, the 
highest proportion of output spent on R&D (over 12 
per cent) is in radio, television and communication 
equipment. In the US, producers of electrical and 
optical equipment spent 8.5 per cent of total output, 
compared to 4.6 per cent in the EU. High levels of 
R&D expenditure relative to output are also evident 
in the US for aircraft and spacecraft. In the EU, sec-
tors with high R&D intensities include electrical and 
optical equipment, transport equipment, and phar-
maceuticals. The EU lacks data for most services. In 
the US, the proportion of R&D to output in services 
is generally quite low, with the exception of the R&D 
sector (13 per cent) and computer & related activi-
ties (5 per cent). In the EU, the proportion of R&D to 
output in computer & related activities is also signifi-
cant (3 per cent).
Closer inspection of the time series (not displayed) 
shows  that  annual  R&D  intensities  do  not  vary 
greatly over time. In the US, some industries (such 
as pulp and paper, pharmaceuticals, and medical, 
optical  and  precision  instruments)  reveal  a  slight 
increase in the proportion of output spent on R&D 
since  1995.  Other  industries,  including  chemicals, 
office and computing machinery, and other electri-
cal machinery, show a decrease. In the EU, the only 
sectors  where  the  proportion  of  output  spent  on 
R&D appears to be increasing slightly over time are 
chemicals and computer & related activities.149
Table  3  also  contains  average  annual  growth  rates 
for R&D expenditure over the period 1995-2003. In 
several manufacturing sectors such as textiles, coke 
&  refined  petroleum,  nuclear  fuel,  and  chemicals 
(excl. pharmaceuticals), R&D expenditure is decreas-
ing in the US, while no similar pattern is evident for 
the EU, where all growth rates observed are positive. 
Manufacturing sectors where the R&D growth rate 
is higher in the EU include rubber and plastics, other 
148   R&D intensities could also be calculated as the ratio of BERD to value 
added, which may yield somewhat different results. Using this definition of 
sectoral R&D intensity, it is found that R&D intensity in the medium-high-
tech industry is higher in the EU than in the US, while the US show higher 
R&D intensities in the high-tech and low-tech industries.
149   As noted earlier it should be mentioned that other definitions of R&D 
intensities may lead to slightly different conclusions, but would not change 
the main messages.134
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non-metallic mineral products, machinery and equip-
ment, and transport equipment. In the US, R&D is 
experiencing negative growth in office and comput-
ing machinery, as well as in electrical machinery. How-
ever, no corresponding data are available for the EU. 
Among services, the sector with the highest growth 
in R&D spending is wholesale and retail in the US, 
with an average of 20 per cent over the last ten years. 
Research and development and computer & related 
activities both have current growth rates of over 10 
per cent. The EU has been positive, high R&D growth 
in computer-related services and other business activi-
ties. Negative growth rates have been experienced in 
the electricity, gas and water supply industry in the EU 
and the US, as well as in post & telecommunications 
and hotels & restaurants in the US.
Measures of R&D relate to inputs to innovation. Due 
to the inherent uncertainties of research, R&D inputs 
do not necessarily correspond to innovation output. 
Recently,  firm-level  indicators  have  been  available 
from the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS), which 
provide direct measures of innovation performance. 
Peneder (2008) has developed a new set of sectoral 
classifications based on these micro-data for 22 Euro-
pean countries. Taking account of the heterogene-
ous nature of innovation behaviour among individ-
ual firms, the new taxonomies are derived from the 
distribution of distinct firm types within sectors. The 
outcome is a set of integrated classifications focuss-
ing on (i) the type of entrepreneurship; (ii) techno-
logical  opportunity;  (iii)  appropriability  conditions; 
(iv) the cumulativeness of knowledge; and (v) a final 
characterisation  in  terms  of  the  overall  innovation 
intensity of sectors (see box 1).
Performing ANOVA regressions and non-parametric 
tests, Peneder (2008) confirms a positive association 
between the innovation intensity of a sector and its 
value added and productivity growth. However, this 
relationship is not linear and is more complex than 
suggested by economic theories. In particular, the 
positive association is found in those sectors with the 
highest innovation intensity and is most pronounced 
for the growth of MFP and the level of labour produc-
tivity. In contrast, he finds no clear association with 
employment growth. In the final section below, we 
will expand on the analysis by including a number 
Box 1: Classification by ‘Sectoral Innovation Intensity’ (Peneder, 2008)
• Very high innovation intensity: Sectors are characterised by a high share of creative entrepreneurship 
focused on product innovation (either alone or in combination with process innovations) and many firms 
performing high intramural R&D. Typically, the appropriability regime depends on the use of patents (fre-
quently applied together with other measures), and knowledge is highly cumulative. This group is mainly 
comprised of ICT-related sectors such as computers and office machinery, electrical equipment, commu-
nication technology, precision instruments, and computer related services. Other sectors within this group 
are machinery and R&D services.
• High innovation intensity: This group is comprised of sectors with an intermediate share of creative entre-
preneurship mostly involved in process innovations, and many firms performing R&D, albeit amounting 
to less than 5 percent of turnover. Cumulativeness of knowledge is high or intermediate and patents are 
frequently used for appropriation. Examples are chemicals, motor vehicles, other transport equipment, or 
telecommunication and postal services. The latter is distinctly characterised by high creative entrepreneur-
ship with product innovations in combination with much external acquisition of new technology.
• Intermediate innovation intensity: This group is the most heterogeneous, although common to all sec-
tors is the large number of firms pursuing opportunities through the acquisition of external innovations. 
Accordingly, appropriability measures are relatively weak, with a certain degree of importance accrued by 
strategic means. In this group, we find wood and wood products, pulp and paper, metal products, as well 
as air transport, financial intermediation and other business services.
• Low innovation intensity: The main characteristic of this group is the high share of adaptive entrepreneur-
ship, pursuing opportunities through the adoption of new technology. Accordingly, the prevalent mode 
of innovation activity is the acquisition of new technology. Appropriability conditions are generally weak 
and the cumulativeness of knowledge is low. Examples are the food sector, publishing and reproduction, 
electricity and gas, and insurance and pension funding.
• Very low innovation intensity: Finally, this group is characterised by a predominance of entrepreneurs 
pursuing opportunities other than from new technology, typically performing no innovation activities nor 
applying any measures for appropriation. The cumulativeness of knowledge is low. Examples are wearing 
apparel, leather products, wholesale trade, land and water transport.135
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Table 3: Sectoral R&D intensities and growth in R&D expenditures, 1995-2003
NACE Industry
Average R&D 
intensity
Average annual 
growth in R&D 
expenditure (in 
current prices)
EU US EU US
15t16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 0.3 0.4 5.5 4
17t19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 0.2 0.3 3.9 -3.1
20 Wood and products of wood 0.2 0.1 2.1 17.02
21t22
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publish-
ing
0.1 0.7 2.1 8.8
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.6 0.7 0.3 -3.7
244 Pharmaceuticals 4.2 5.6
24x Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 3.71 7.6 6.1 -0.6
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.8 1.0 7.8 4.3
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.5 0.6 2.7 0.7
27t28 Basic metals and fabricated metals 0.4 0.5 1.8 2.1
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 1.6 2.0 5 2.8
30t33 Electrical and optical equipment 4.6 8.5 3.1 3.5
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery na 9.3 -0.2 -1.8
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. na 2.3 -1.2 -6.5
32 Radio, television and communication equipment na 12.3 4.6 4.8
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments na 9.9 4.6 6.7
34t35 Transport equipment 3.9 5.6 6 0.7
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers na 4.3 8 1.6
35 Other transport equipment Na 8.4
353 Aircraft and spacecraft Na 10.4 2.5 -0.9
35x Other transport equipment Na 2.3 2.4 14.1
36t37 Manufacturing n.e.c. recycling 0.3 0.8 4.8 11.22
E Electricity, gas and water supply 0.26 0.08 -2.8 -14
F Construction 0.04 0.04 4.3 2.3
G Wholesale and retail trade; repairs 0.06 1.09 - 20.4
H Hotels and restaurants - 0.05 - -29.32
60-63 Transport and storage - 0.11 - 2.8
64 Post and telecommunications - 0.83 - -32.32
J Financial intermediation - 0.17 - 1.6
K Real estate, renting and business activities - - -
72 Computer and related activities 3.09 4.99 14.6 11.6
73 Research and development - 13.82 - 12.5
74 Other business activities 0.37 - 6.2 -
1 This figure refers to the total chemicals sector; 2 Data only for the years 2000-2003.
Note: R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of business expenditures on R&D (BERD) to gross output. The average R&D 
intensity is calculated over the 1995-2003 period. For the calculation of total EU estimates the available ANBERD estimates for 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as well 
as the official BERD data for Greece and Portugal were used. These thirteen countries represent more than 95 percent of total 
BERD performed by the EU15. New EU Member Countries are not included. From 1991 onwards, the EU includes the former 
East Germany as part of the unified Germany.
Source: OECD-ANBERD, EU KLEMS; NIESR calculations.136
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of additional growth drivers within a joint model. As 
we will then see, the findings will be confirmed and 
prove to be robust.
6.5.  Market structure
Market structure determines the nature and degree 
of rivalry in the marketplace. From a static perspec-
tive, competitive market regimes increase consumer 
welfare, as more competition and lower barriers to 
entry generally imply lower prices. From a dynamic 
perspective,  competition  additionally  raises  the 
incentives for innovation and product differentiation, 
while punishing inefficient production and waste of 
resources. Offering lower prices for goods and serv-
ices of a higher quality, competition boots demand 
and is therefore generally considered an important 
driver of sectoral growth.
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An important strand of research is represented by 
cross-industry  studies  in  the  Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) tradition. The SCP model holds 
that the structure of an industry, such as the number 
of firms and concentration, determines the way in 
which firms compete (i.e. their conduct) and this in 
turn determines their profitability (i.e. performance). 
The traditional SCP model has met with substantial 
criticism, as it is too simplistic to think of the flow of 
causation as being unidirectional (e.g. Sutton 1991). 
Performance  should  have  an  influence  on  market 
structure, when more efficient firms grow and less 
efficient firms shrink. In addition, there are feedback 
links  between  conduct  and  market  structure  (e.g. 
advertising that raises barriers to entry by increasing 
consumer loyalty), as well as between performance 
and conduct (e.g. profitability influencing investment 
and/or R&D expenditure). The basic message of the 
modified  Structure-Conduct-Performance  model  is 
that conduct is not only the result of industry struc-
ture, but is also in itself an important choice vari-
able that influences both the basic conditions of the 
industry (e.g. production technology, demand con-
ditions or entry barriers) and its market structure.
In this section, three aspects of market structure are 
considered. First, we investigate the sectoral patterns 
of firm entry and exit. Second, we turn to measures 
of  industry  concentration.  And  finally,  we  provide 
data on market regulation and its varied impact on 
different sectors.
6.6.1.  Business demography
The entry of new firms is a vehicle for entrepreneur-
ship that fosters not only employment but also inno-
vation and competition (Aghion et al., 2005). Public 
programmes  to  promote  new  entry  are  common 
practice in most countries, and entry and exit play an 
important role in most theoretical models of indus-
try dynamics. Models of Schumpeterian competition 
underscore the role of new entrants as carriers of 
fresh ideas that increase competitive pressure (e.g. 
Winter, 1984; Aghion and Griffith, 2005). The styl-
ised facts presented in the empirical literature show 
us that entry and exit are quite volatile over time and 
are highly correlated (e.g. Cable and Schwalbach, 
1991; Geroski, 1995). However, when considering 
entry and exit as potential ‘growth drivers’, we must 
keep in mind that most entries are small, have a low 
survival rate and thus often a negligible impact on 
performance  at  the  more  aggregate  level  of  sec-
tors or industries over the short run (Santarelli and 
Vivarelli, 2007).
Table 4 presents the sector means for entry, exit, 
turnover  and  net  entry  rates150.  For  example,  the 
highest average annual entry rates are recorded for 
the sectors of labour recruitment and provision of 
personnel, post and telecommunications, computer 
and related activities, miscellaneous business activities 
and investigation and security activities. These indus-
tries report average entry rates of close to or above 
15 per cent. The lowest entry rates are recorded for 
the collection, purification and distribution of water, 
the manufacture of food products, beverages and 
tobacco,  the  manufacture  of  rubber  and  plastic 
products,  the  manufacture  of  chemicals,  chemical 
products and man-made fibres and the manufacture 
of leather products, which have average entry rates 
below 6.5 per cent. If we look at exit rates, we see 
that auxiliary financial intermediation, investigation 
and security activities, post and telecommunications 
and miscellaneous business activities have average 
exit rates above 10 per cent, while the collection, 
purification and distribution of water and electricity, 
gas, steam and hot water have exit rates below 5 per 
cent. The industries with high entry rates are usu-
ally service industries displaying high growth, while 
the industries exhibiting low entry rates are manu-
150   The means are calculated over countries and time, thus giving more 
weight  to  countries  that  report  the  indicators  for  the  entire  time  period 
(1998-2003) than to countries that report only for a few years.137
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facturing industries and utilities which have much 
higher capital requirements. Entry, exit and overall 
firm turnover are closely related, as barriers to entry 
are often barriers to exiting as well, and barriers to 
exiting discourage entry. In particular, the presence 
of sunk costs makes incumbent firms behave more 
aggressively towards new entrants, thus increasing 
entry  costs  even  more  (Sutton,  1991,  1998;  Amir 
and Lambson, 1993).
6.6.2.  Market concentration
Closely related to the entry and exit of firms, but also 
determined by firms’ differential growth rates, is mar-
ket concentration. Theoretical work and a large body 
of empirical studies confirm that a fall in concentra-
tion is associated with an increase in competition, 
leading to lower prices and lower price cost margins 
(e.g.  Martin,  2002).  Excessive  mark-ups  not  only 
reflect superior efficiency but also market imperfec-
tions due to regulation and uncompetitive behaviour. 
Differences in market structure across industries are 
explained primarily in terms of economies of scale, 
product differentiation and the workings of capital 
markets. Sutton (1991, 1998) expanded the analysis 
of market structure by pointing out that there is a 
distinction between industries that have exogenous 
sunk  costs  (determined  by  intrinsic  differences  in 
technology)  and  endogenous  sunk  costs  (deter-
mined by strategic interaction between firms)151.
Drawing on the data from Eurostat’s Structural Busi-
ness  Statistics  according  to  size  classes,  Hölzl  and 
Reinstaller  (2007)  have  calculated  proxy  variables 
for the concentration of national producers by sec-
tor,  using  a  method  introduced  by  Schmalensee 
(1977) and recently applied by the OECD (2006). 
They present a lower and upper bound as well as 
an  average  estimate  of  the  Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). Following Dickson and He (1997), they 
further  provide  a  trade-corrected  measure  of  the 
average HHI, which takes into account the effect of 
foreign competition on market concentration in the 
manufacturing  industries.  The  non-trade-corrected 
concentration indices also reflect the country size, 
with  the  average  HHI  generally  being  smaller  for 
larger countries.
Table 5 presents the values of the different national 
concentration indices for the year 2003 (aggregated 
by country groups according to the relative size of 
the sectors). The year 2003 was chosen because it 
has the best sectoral coverage across countries. The 
151   Exogenous sunk-cost industries are characterised by the fact that the 
level of concentration will fall when market size grows. In contrast, endog-
enous sunk-cost industries are characterised by a lower bound to concentra-
tion that remains unaffected by market size. In these industries, firms strategi-
cally raise the level of sunk costs in order to prevent competitive entry (e.g. by 
escalating R&D or advertising expenses).
concentration of industries across country groups is 
quite similar. The same also holds true across coun-
tries. The sectors with relatively high concentration 
rates  are  tobacco  and  the  manufacture  of  coke, 
refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel. In addi-
tion, the manufacture of office machinery and com-
puters, electricity, gas, steam and hot-water supply, 
the collection, purification and distribution of water, 
as well as water transport and air transport all exhibit 
a high concentration across countries for all three 
concentration indices. The least concentrated indus-
tries are the manufacture of fabricated metal prod-
ucts, except machinery and equipment; wholesale 
trade and commission trade, except motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; retail trade, except motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; the repair of personal and house-
hold goods; construction; hotels and restaurants; real 
estate activities; and other business activities. These 
are mainly large, heterogeneous industries that have 
low sunk costs and low technological entry barriers.
6.6.3.  Market regulation
Finally, turning to market regulation, empirical evi-
dence has only recently become available through 
the  provision  of  comparable  regulation  indicators 
across countries by the World Bank and the OECD. 
For instance, Djankov et al. (2002) demonstrate that 
higher regulation of entry does not yield visible social 
benefits. Conversely, a number of studies show that 
tighter regulation leads to less entry (e.g. Cincera 
and Galgau, 2005) and to higher mark-ups (Griffith 
et al., 2006a, 2006b). In addition, the empirical evi-
dence suggests that regulatory reform has a larger 
impact on catching-up countries when they reduce 
regulation from a high to moderate level (Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta, 2003). Overall, the empirical evidence 
available  suggests  that  product-market  regulation 
has the effect of a brake on economic performance. 
This is attributable to its function as a mobility barrier 
for firms, thus decreasing competition, and the fact 
that it imposes compliance costs on enterprises that 
divert resources away from productive uses. In fact, 
product-market regulation in the EU countries has 
generally become less restrictive over the last twenty 
years, since regulatory reform is aimed primarily at 
stimulating  competition  and  improving  economic 
performance (Crafts, 2006).
Figure  3  summarises  the  development  of  product-
market regulations in seven network industries (elec-
tricity, gas, post, telecom, airlines, rail and road). The 
data are OECD estimates and demonstrate the sub-
stantial deregulation that has taken place since 1990.
Product-market  regulations  with  anti-competitive 
effects will also have an impact on firms operating in 
other sectors of the economy that use their output 138
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Table 4: Sectoral characteristics of firm demography, average 1998-2003
NACE Industry
Entry rate Exit rate Turnover rate Net Entry rate
Mean St.Error Mean St.Error Mean St.Error Mean St.Error
10-12 Mining and quarrying of energy producing materials 8.05 0.98 7.98 1.15 15.92 1.67 0.27 1.81
13-14 Mining and quarrying, other 6.51 0.57 5.34 0.45 12.24 0.91 1.66 0.83
15-16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 5.74 0.27 7.12 0.29 13.23 0.54 -1.29 0.32
17-18 Textiles and textile products 8.40 0.66 9.37 0.39 18.07 1.02 -0.82 0.74
19 Leather and leather products 6.42 0.35 8.45 0.36 15.24 0.60 -1.92 0.49
20 Wood and wood products 6.96 0.44 7.11 0.39 14.42 0.83 -0.05 0.39
21-22 Pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing 8.07 0.33 7.32 0.23 15.67 0.53 0.92 0.37
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 8.18 1.34 6.48 0.98 14.93 1.74 1.01 1.97
24 Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 6.19 0.33 5.86 0.29 12.21 0.61 0.22 0.34
25 Rubber and plastic products 5.96 0.34 5.41 0.24 11.65 0.52 0.60 0.37
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 7.04 0.49 6.60 0.36 14.16 0.84 0.77 0.53
27-28 Basic metals and fabricated metal products 7.80 0.37 6.23 0.37 14.32 0.76 1.68 0.38
29 Machinery and equipment 6.54 0.26 5.63 0.26 12.53 0.47 0.99 0.35
30-33 Electrical and optical equipment 6.69 0.28 6.30 0.24 13.26 0.47 0.60 0.35
34-35 Transport equipment 7.71 0.34 6.32 0.32 14.22 0.57 1.45 0.48
36-37 Manufacturing n.e.c. 8.45 0.57 7.49 0.30 16.32 0.87 1.20 0.60
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water 8.55 0.80 3.52 0.25 11.63 0.69 4.22 0.60
41 Collection and distribution of water 4.97 0.44 4.24 0.56 9.28 0.92 0.86 0.64
45 Construction 10.46 0.36 7.45 0.32 18.11 0.65 3.07 0.36
50 Sale, mainten., repair of motor vehicles & motorcycles 7.43 0.29 6.84 0.26 14.56 0.58 0.67 0.26
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade 9.95 0.36 9.49 0.32 19.46 0.66 0.59 0.33
52 Retail trade and repair 8.59 0.31 9.58 0.37 18.37 0.65 -1.03 0.40
55 Hotels and restaurants 9.62 0.33 9.14 0.32 19.11 0.69 0.77 0.26
60 Land transport 8.13 0.51 7.46 0.33 15.98 0.83 0.92 0.52
61 Water transport 10.26 0.65 9.01 0.54 19.79 1.08 1.87 0.86
62 Air transport 9.71 0.78 7.99 0.58 17.94 1.20 2.13 1.02
63 Supportive and auxiliary transport activities 10.05 0.38 7.60 0.26 17.89 0.63 2.60 0.38
64 Post and telecommunications 17.30 0.67 10.93 0.43 28.04 0.99 6.61 0.71
65 Financial intermediation, exc. insurance, pension funding 12.06 0.85 9.85 0.70 21.85 1.51 1.94 0.84
66 Insurance and pension funds, exc. compuls. soc. security 6.63 0.78 6.58 0.80 14.15 1.61 0.74 0.87
67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 13.31 0.76 10.61 0.74 24.25 1.44 2.68 0.84
70 Real estate 11.79 0.59 7.80 0.40 19.76 0.89 4.01 0.63
71 Renting of machinery and equipment 11.91 0.44 9.58 0.42 21.80 0.83 2.57 0.52
72 Computer and related activities 16.88 0.56 9.71 0.34 26.75 0.76 7.30 0.64
73 Research and development 12.03 0.55 8.02 0.46 19.89 0.85 4.05 0.77
741 Legal and management consultancy; holdings 13.47 0.71 7.72 0.34 21.68 1.03 6.32 0.77
742 Architectural, engineering services, technical consulting 9.91 0.45 6.92 0.35 16.91 0.73 3.24 0.52
743 Technical testing and analysis 10.69 0.50 7.01 0.39 17.90 0.76 3.99 0.66
744 Advertising 12.94 0.58 9.77 0.30 23.13 0.85 3.64 0.64
745 Labour recruitment and provision of personnel 17.58 0.91 9.76 0.46 27.87 1.33 8.54 0.93
746 Investigation and security activities 14.48 0.65 10.66 0.53 25.22 1.15 4.07 0.71
747 Industrial cleaning 12.33 0.40 9.68 0.35 22.07 0.68 3.06 0.47
748 Miscellaneous business activities n.e.c. 15.82 0.60 11.44 0.55 27.50 1.10 4.64 0.67
Notes: Entry rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t; Exit rate: enterprise 
deaths divided by the number of active enterprises; Turnover rate: entries plus exits divided by the number of active enterprises; Net entry 
rate: entries minus exits divided by the number of active enterprises; Volatility rate: the turnover rate minus the absolute value of the net 
entry.
Source: Eurostat Structural Business Statistics, WIFO calculations.139
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as intermediate inputs. Conway and Nicoletti (2006) 
devised for the OECD a regulatory impact indicator 
that measures this knock-on effect of regulation in 
selected non-manufacturing sectors. The knock-on 
effect in a specific country therefore depends on the 
extent of anti-competitive impact in the regulated 
sectors152 and the importance of these sectors as sup-
pliers of intermediate inputs (derived from harmo-
nised input-output tables).
Figure 4 provides an indication of the differences in 
the  overall  impact  of  regulation  across  industries. 
Regulation  has  the  lowest  impact  on:  real  estate; 
pharmaceuticals; aircraft and spacecraft; the renting 
of machinery and equipment; research and devel-
opment; and computer and related activities. The 
highest  average  impact  is  recorded  for:  wholesale 
and retail trade; electricity; gas and water supply; 
transport and storage; other business activities finan-
cial  intermediation;  and  post  and  telecommunica-
tions153.
6.7.  Openness and barriers to trade
Trade openness is generally considered to be a sec-
toral growth driver, as it improves the allocation of 
resources, increases the size of the market, allows 
152   The impact indicator is based on data for the following regulated sec-
tors: electricity, gas, airlines, rail and road transport, wholesale and retail 
trade, post, telecoms, financial services and business services.
153   A regression analysis of the effect of regulation across sectors confirms 
that regulation has an impact on the turnover of firms (Peneder, 2008). How-
ever, the high association between labour market regulation and entry and 
start-up regulation makes it very difficult to disentangle the effects of entry 
and labour regulation. Stel et al. (2007) argue that labour market regulation 
is more important than start-up regulation.
for greater competition and increases the chances 
of attracting investment. One particularly important 
aspect is intermediate trade, as it allows industries to 
increase their competitiveness by importing cheaper, 
more sophisticated and more diverse inputs for pro-
duction and new technologies. Another is trade in 
services, where the comparatively low level of cur-
rent  international  transactions  and  the  enduring 
restrictions due to regulatory barriers suggest a high 
potential to raise productivity and growth by open-
ing  markets  and  thereby  increasing  specialisation 
and economies of scale.
Figure 5 illustrates that in the EU-25, trade in total 
manufacturing goods, intermediate goods and serv-
ices grew faster than GDP between 1995 and 2005. 
Trade in services more than doubled within the same 
period, and trade in manufacturing was 1.9 times 
higher in 2005 than 10 years earlier. The develop-
ment of trade in intermediate goods was slightly less 
dynamic, although the figures still exceed those for 
GDP.  Considering  the  fast  export  growth  in  serv-
ices  and  their  share  of  more  than  80  per  cent  in 
total value added in the EU-25, one might expect 
the relation of exports to value added to be equally 
important. However, the data does not support this 
premise. In the EU-25, the share of exports in value 
added for services was 12 per cent in 2004, whereas 
the same relation for the manufacturing sector was 
12 times larger. Even when services account for a 
large amount of total value added, exports neverthe-
less remain low. The indicator illustrates that in terms 
of international transactions, trade in manufacturing 
goods still dominates.
Figure 3: Product-market regulation: Regulation in seven non-manufacturing industries, 1980-2003
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Notes: Box plot of the summary indicator of regulatory conditions in seven non-manufacturing sectors. The horizontal line in 
the middle of the box is the median value. The edges of the plot are the 2nd and the 3rd quantile of the cross country dis-
tribution of the indicators of regulatory conditions in the seven non-manufacturing sectors. The box plots provide summary 
statistics on the regulatory indicator for the EU15 countries on the left and for all OECD countries on the right hand side. 
Source: OECD international regulation database, WIFO calculations.140
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Table 5: Concentration indices for EU aggregates in 2003
Average HHI
Average HHI / trade cor-
rected
NACE Industry NMS EU15 EU25 NMS EU15 EU25
15 Food products and beverages 36 17 23 25 13 17
16 Tobacco products 7465 5641 6091 7389 2615 3793
17 Textiles 185 17 54 16 7 9
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 88 29 49 4 12 9
19 Leather 116 34 47 12 10 10
20 Wood and cork 81 40 52 55 31 38
21 Pulp and paper 361 129 158 149 88 95
22 Printing 70 33 38 57 30 33
23
Coke,  refined  petroleum  products  and 
nuclear fuel
1508 1356 1380 1420 1084 1137
24 Chemicals and chemical products 307 65 92 48 18 21
25 Rubber and plastic products 88 32 41 32 18 20
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 85 46 54 54 34 38
27 Basic metals 347 137 174 184 51 75
28 Fabricated metal products 15 9 10 7 7 7
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 74 23 30 7 10 9
30 Office machinery and computers 2352 646 923 114 95
31 Electrical machinery n.e.c. 214 79 107 29 34 33
32 Radio, TV and communication equipment 780 284 385 97 127 121
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 134 65 73 25 21 22
34 Motor vehicles 275 75 90 30 40 39
35 Other transport equipment 555 194 248 127 88 94
36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 86 35 47 20 20 20
37 Recycling 431 286 293
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water 199 531 388 137 439 309
41 Collection and distribution of water 297 472 391
45 Construction 15 5 6
50
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehi-
cles and motorcycles
32 14 16
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade 8 4 5
52 Retail trade and repair 14 11 11
55 Hotels and restaurants 25 6 7
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 67 21 31
61 Water transport 3176 355 454
62 Air transport 1646 1028 1030
63 Supportive and auxiliary transport activities 54 22 25
64 Post and telecommunications 799 267 310
70 Real estate activities 8 5 5
71 Renting of machinery and equipment 245 51 64
72 Computer and related activities 57 29 31 56 28 30
73 Research and development 257 162 166
74 Other business activities 3 2 2 3 2 2
Notes: Greece, Malta and Luxembourg are not considered in these aggregates due to poor coverage. Sweden’s coverage for the year 2003 is of 
poor quality, therefore the 2003 values for Sweden were replaced by the 2002 values. Where data was withheld for reasons of confidentiality, 
concentration indices for 2002 or 2004 were implemented when available.
Source: Eurostat Size Class data, WIFO calculations.141
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Figure 4: Average regulation impact index for sectors, average values between 2000 and 2003
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The overwhelming majority of empirical studies on 
trade openness and growth focus on the aggregate 
level  of  countries.  Analysing  the  results  of  a  wide 
number of cross-country and time-series regressions 
that test the quantitative relationship between inter-
national trade and GDP growth, Lewer and Van den 
Berg (2003) found that the growth effects of trade 
are large and fairly consistent across the many dif-
ferent  empirical  studies.  In  quantitative  terms,  an 
increase of one percentage point in trade increases 
real  GDP  by  0.22  percentage  points.  Hence,  they 
conclude that promoting free trade policies is justi-
fied as a way of improving economic growth and 
human  welfare.  In  contrast,  Rodríguez  and  Rodrik 
(1999) caution that gains from trade openness may 
often  be  overestimated  and  not  correctly  isolated 
from other policy shifts. Using data on more than 
one hundred countries, Freund and Bolaky (2004) 
find  evidence  that  openness  has  a  negative  effect 
on per capita income growth in countries with high 
labour and business entry restrictions, whereas less 
regulated economies benefit from increased open-
ness due to better allocation of resources and special-
isation patterns. In conclusion, while trade openness 
is generally considered to increase GDP per capita, 
the precise impact of openness on economic growth 
ultimately depends on the particular regulatory and 
institutional environment in the country and sector.
Empirical studies that focus on trade openness and 
growth  at  sectoral  level  are  scarce.  For  example, 
Cameron, Proudman and Redding (1997, 1999) test 
the relation between MFP growth in the UK man-
ufacturing sector, the UK-US productivity gap and 
the degree of international openness. They find that 
openness has a significant positive effect on the rate 
of  productivity  convergence,  and  that  this  effect 
is robust to the inclusion of R&D intensity, human 
capital, unionisation and capacity utilisation. Among 
other findings, they report that industries with the 
least trade openness in 1970 exhibited statistically 
significant lower rates of growth over the 1970-92 
period,  compared  with  the  more  open  industries. 
Another example is MacDonald (1994), who relates 
import penetration to productivity growth using a 
panel data set for 94 manufacturing industries in the 
US for the period between 1972 and 1987. The study 
reports  that,  after  controlling  for  industry  output 
growth and other industry-specific variables (such as 
R&D, the degree of concentration, the ratio of total 
selling expenses to sales and the share of unionised 
employees in the total), import competition has a 
positive and significant effect on labour productivity 
growth. Moreover, this effect appears to be stronger 
in more highly concentrated industries.
The  indicator  of  export  openness  presented  in 
Table 7 shows that the share of total manufactur-
ing exports in gross output increased in all country 
aggregates  between  1996  and  2004.  The  group 
containing new member states (NMS6) saw more 
than double the indicator of export openness for 
total manufacturing goods more than double in the 
same period. The office machinery and computer 
industry deserves special attention, as its openness 
indicator outperforms all the other sectors. Other 
industries with high indicators of export openness 
for all country aggregates are radio, TV and com-
munication, scientific instruments, and leather and 
footwear. The motor vehicles and other transporta-
tion equipment industries also export a great part 
of their production within the NMS6. However, for-
eign markets do not appear to be of great impor-
tance to the publishing and printing industry, when 
viewed in light of the export openness indicator for 
total manufacturing.
Those industries which increased their export open-
ness  most  between  1996  and  2004  in  the  EU16 
were  office  machinery  and  computers;  radio,  TV 
and  communications;  leather  and  footwear,  and 
clothing. Similarly, in the United States, the radio, 
TV  and  communications  office  machinery  and 
computers  and  chemicals  significantly  increased 
their shares of exported production. At the same 
time,  the  export  openness  indicators  for  non-
metallic mineral products and the publishing and 
printing  industries  increased  only  slightly  in  the 
EU16. Although the general trend in Europe and 
the United States has been an increase in export 
openness,  some  American  industries  have  seen 
their shares of exports in total production fall. For 
instance, in the United States, food and beverages, 
wood  products  and  cork,  and  tobacco  displayed 
lower  levels  of  export  openness  in  2004  than  in 
1996. Table 7 summarises the import penetration 
figures for the European country aggregates and the 
United States, as with the export openness indica-
tor, office machinery and computers showed high 
levels of import penetration in all countries. Radio, 
TV and communications, and to a somewhat lesser 
extent leather and footwear, appear to be industries 
wheredomestic demand is largely met by imports. 
Individual country characteristics are also evident, 
as other transportation equipment, machinery, and 
motor vehicles have high import penetration indi-
cators for 2004 in the NMS6. Conversely, scientific 
instruments  and  clothing  have  high  levels  in  the 
EU16, as do clothing and furniture manufacturers in 
the United States. One feature common to all coun-
tries is that publishing and printing does not rely 
on imports. Office machinery and computers radio, 
TV and communication; and leather and footwear 
were those industries in the EU16 and the United 
States, which saw a great increase in their import 
penetration indicators between 1996 and 2004.143
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Figure 5: Development of GDP and international trade (incl. intra-EU25), 1995-2005
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Source: Eurostat, UNO, WIFO calculations.
Table 6: Export openness in 1996 and 2004 (incl. intra-EU trade)
Industry
EU10 NMS6 EU16 US
1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004
Percentage shares of export in gross output
Food, beverages 18.2 23.1 8.7 17.8 17.3 22.6 3.3 3.2
Tobacco 35.3 45.5 7.9 14.0 31.7 42.3 9.9 3.2
Textiles 42.7 59.9 24.6 66.6 40.7 60.6 3.2 6.4
Clothing 39.4 68.2 46.9 73.5 40.4 68.8 3.0 3.5
Leather, footwear 47.4 81.2 33.9 66.0 45.4 79.3 7.2 14.2
Wood, products, cork 16.3 23.4 21.9 40.5 17.0 25.5 2.2 1.8
Pulp, paper 33.1 36.6 23.9 51.1 32.5 37.6 4.5 4.9
Publishing, printing 6.3 8.6 4.3 12.6 6.2 8.9 1.5 1.5
Chemicals 44.9 67.5 27.1 55.8 43.8 66.8 10.0 13.4
Rubber, plastic 27.9 38.6 19.0 45.9 27.2 39.3 5.9 8.2
Non-metallic min. prod. 17.7 21.5 18.0 31.8 17.7 22.5 3.8 4.2
Basic metals 35.5 47.8 20.4 52.3 33.7 48.2 6.7 8.0
Fabricated metal prod. 14.9 19.8 18.5 40.1 15.2 21.4 2.8 2.9
Machinery 46.7 59.6 26.0 84.1 45.3 61.1 12.1 13.7
Office machinery 92.0 214.1 13.8 110.8 88.9 197.6 17.8 20.5
Electrical mach. 38.1 51.1 31.1 75.7 37.6 53.6 7.8 10.1
Radio, TV, communic. 61.8 97.5 27.7 87.1 59.9 96.0 16.6 24.0
Scientific instruments 50.4 78.6 18.2 66.8 48.7 78.0 9.3 12.4
Motor vehicles 48.4 59.2 27.1 88.0 47.3 61.3 6.9 7.4
Oth. transp. Equipm. 46.7 60.9 33.4 97.2 46.0 62.2 10.7 12.2
Furniture; manuf. n.e.c. 25.2 36.7 32.3 75.0 25.8 40.8 5.7 7.3
Manufacturing 34.0 47.5 20.8 56.3 33.0 48.2 7.3 8.7
Note: values above 100 percent are due to measurement problems. – EU10 includes Austria, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Fin-
land, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom; NMS6 includes Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic and Lithuania; EU16 = EU10 + NMS6. The results for coke and refined petrol have been excluded since 
figures for industry NACE 23 are currently being subject to revisions by many national statistical offices.
Source: UNO, EU KLEMS, WIFO calculations.144
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Many  current  debates  focus  on  the  question  of 
whether  the  internationalisation  of  trade  impedes 
or generates value added growth in the importing 
country. On the one hand, there are popular fears 
that  increased  intermediate  imports  undermine 
national  competitiveness  because  a  large  share  of 
value  added  is  produced  in  foreign  countries.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  declining  depth  of  own  pro-
duction is often considered a natural consequence 
of the increasing global division of labour, with bet-
ter resource allocation raising efficiency and hence 
value added growth. The latter effect implies that 
the advantage of cheaper inputs as a result of inter-
mediate imports from lower-cost countries can sup-
port the importing industry in its own expansion and 
result in more value added growth. Accordingly, it is 
interesting to note that intermediate imports from 
the rest of the world did indeed grow fast, i.e. on 
average by 5.5 per cent a year between 1996 and 
2005 in the EU-27. However, imports of other goods 
grew at a faster rate, by almost 7 per cent, causing 
the share of intermediate imports in total manufac-
turing imports to decrease over time.
Services  are  often  considered  to  be  non-tradable. 
However, the rapid technological development over 
recent decades has had a direct impact on services 
by shortening distances and creating new methods 
of supply. Primo Braga (1996), Hoekman and Primo 
Braga (1997), or Miozzo and Soete (2001) refer to 
this phenomenon as the ‘internationalisation of serv-
ices’. New information and communication technol-
ogies increase the transportability of services previ-
ously constrained by the geographical and temporal 
proximity of production and consumption. In paral-
lel with technological progress, a growing number of 
knowledge-intensive services are also required in the 
production, maintenance and operation of manufac-
tured goods. Services like R&D, design, marketing, 
advertising,  distribution,  inventory  management, 
quality control and after-sales maintenance are now 
essential parts of the industrial production process.
However, closer inspection shows that the liberalisa-
tion process in services is neither fast nor simple154. 
Their  typical  characteristics,  such  as  intangibility, 
non-storability and in many cases the need for direct 
interaction  between  clients  and  producers,  have 
made the liberalisation process more complex. Sie-
ber and Porto (2007) therefore examined whether 
services industries for which liberalisation commit-
ments were submitted by WTO member countries 
presented higher growth rates than those industries 
154   Regarding the services liberalisation process special mention has to be 
made of the Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, which aims 
at eliminating obstacles to trade in services in the European Union.
without  such  commitments.  They  distinguished 
between four modes of supply: (i) cross-border flow 
of services; (ii) consumption abroad (i.e. a service 
user entering the supplier’s territory); (iii) establish-
ment of a commercial presence abroad; and (iv) the 
presence of natural persons (i.e. a service supplier 
entering the client’s territory). Non-parametric tests 
showed that the combination of liberalisation across 
the four modes of supply seems to have a stronger 
effect on sectoral growth than liberalisation within a 
single mode. Industries that submitted commitments 
under the four modes, such as hotels & restaurants, 
post & telecommunications, or computer services, 
displayed a higher growth in value added, labour 
productivity and employment than the others.
6.8.  Joint econometric model
In this final section, our aim is to test within a joint 
econometric model, whether the presumed growth 
drivers  indeed  exert  a  measurable  and  statistically 
significant impact on sectoral performance. As our 
focus is on structural factors, we are looking for long-
term relationships and do not attempt to explain the 
more noisy year-to-year variations in the time series 
data. Consequently, the final data panel is organised 
as a matrix of countries – time – industries, with most 
variables being average values or the rate of change 
over the period 1995 to 2004.
For our dependent variables, we focus on the growth 
of value added, labour productivity, and multifactor 
productivity.  With  respect  to  the  explanatory  vari-
ables (i.e. the ‘growth drivers’), we apply the follow-
ing procedure in our basic specification of the various 
growth regressions. First, we include the logarithm 
of the sector’s level of labour productivity in 1995 to 
control for the additional growth opportunities seen 
by a sector when catching up. Second, to control for 
differences in capital intensity, we include the mean 
and log change in the share of capital in total fac-
tor income. As capital services are already used in the 
construction of MFP measures, these variables are not 
included in the regressions on multifactor productiv-
ity. Third, we apply fixed country effects to control for 
constant differences between countries with respect 
to any determinants of sectoral growth that are not 
included in our set of explanatory variables.
Furthermore, we compare two alternative basic spec-
ifications,  one  with  fixed  industry  effects  for  each 
NACE  2-digit  sector,  and  one  with  fixed  industry 
effects for each separate class of a new sectoral tax-
onomy of ‘innovation intensity’ (see Box 1). Since in 
the first instance we apply a much larger number of 
industry dummies, the overall variation explained by 
the model is also higher. However, apart from saving 
more  degrees  of  freedom,  the  sectoral  innovation 145
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classification also allows for a meaningful economic 
interpretation. Being significant and robust across a 
wide range of different model specifications, it per-
forms surprisingly well and is therefore retained in 
the baseline model.155 All coefficients for the indus-
try-type dummies need to be interpreted relative to 
the group of sectors with a ‘high innovation inten-
sity’, used for a comparative control.
For the other explanatory variables, multicollinear-
ity and the additional loss of observations bars us 
155   In particular, the sector classification performs better than the pure R&D 
variable from the ANBERD database, which is most likely due to the larger 
number of observations we are able to retain in the estimations.
from including them within one integrated model. 
We therefore apply separate models to test for the 
growth impact of the change in the share of infor-
mation  and  communication  technologies  (ICT)  in 
total capital income, the average share of high-skilled 
labour in total hours worked, firm turnover, average 
firm size, the average Herfindahl-Hirschman concen-
tration index (HHI), and finally, export openness as 
along with import penetration. With the exception 
of the average capital share in factor income and the 
average firm size, all the variables are expressed in 
logarithms, which transform positively skewed dis-
tributions  into  approximately  normally  distributed 
variables.
Table 7: Import penetration in 1996 and 2004 (incl. intra-EU trade)
Industry
EU10 NMS6 EU16 US
1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004
Percentage shares of import in domestic sales1)
Food, beverages 17.0 22.3 7.9 16.6 16.1 21.8 3.2 5.1
Tobacco 21.5 37.7 6.0 14.6 19.1 35.0 0.7 1.3
Textiles 45.9 64.1 36.2 75.6 44.7 65.6 6.5 17.0
Clothing 54.7 80.9 24.7 61.1 52.5 79.8 14.1 32.9
Leather, footwear 58.1 87.3 31.2 74.9 55.0 85.9 40.7 62.0
Wood, products, cork 20.6 25.8 8.5 25.3 19.4 25.8 5.1 9.2
Pulp, paper 32.7 35.2 32.7 54.1 32.7 36.6 4.7 5.2
Publishing, printing 5.0 6.7 6.8 12.4 5.1 7.1 0.9 1.5
Chemicals 41.0 64.4 39.5 70.4 40.9 64.9 7.4 14.0
Rubber, plastic 26.8 36.2 26.4 51.3 26.8 38.0 6.7 11.8
Non-metallic min. prod. 15.7 19.4 14.2 27.8 15.6 20.2 7.0 10.3
Basic metals 35.9 48.3 18.6 56.0 33.8 49.0 9.3 14.2
Fabricated metal prod. 13.5 18.3 17.2 39.0 13.7 20.0 3.5 5.7
Machinery 37.9 51.6 39.7 86.7 38.0 54.5 10.4 15.5
Office machinery 94.0 158.2 55.8 110.6 91.8 153.9 24.2 35.9
Electrical mach. 33.6 47.9 32.3 73.4 33.5 50.5 9.9 15.6
Radio, TV, communic. 63.5 97.9 46.1 88.2 62.3 96.5 19.7 31.9
Scientific instruments 48.6 75.4 38.6 76.2 47.9 75.5 7.3 11.9
Motor vehicles 44.2 54.0 35.5 85.2 43.6 56.0 12.7 16.6
Oth. transp. equipm. 39.9 57.0 18.7 97.1 38.9 58.6 4.8 7.2
Furniture; manuf. n.e.c. 30.9 45.6 20.0 57.2 30.1 46.3 15.7 23.5
Manufacturing 32.5 46.1 24.5 57.3 31.9 47.1 9.0 13.8
Note: values above 100 percent are due to measurement problems. – EU10 includes Austria, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Fin-
land, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom; NMS6 includes Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic and Lithuania; EU16 = EU10 + NMS6. – 1) Domestic sales = Gross output + import - export. The results 
for coke and refined petrol have been excluded since figures for industry NACE 23 are currently being subject to revisions by 
many national statistical offices.
Source: UNO, EU KLEMS, WIFO calculations.146
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We generally consider the explanatory variables to 
be ‘growth drivers’ and accordingly expect positive 
coefficients in the estimations. Two exceptions are 
the initial level of labour productivity and industry 
concentration, for which we expect negative signs. 
Another exception is average firm size, where the 
available literature is ambiguous and does not pro-
vide any strong a priori reasoning for either a positive 
or negative impact.
Table 8 reports the estimation results for value added 
growth, whereas Tables 9 and 10 show the results 
for labour and multifactor productivity. The coeffi-
cients of the base model are all remarkably robust 
with respect to variations in the precise specification. 
Generally exhibiting identical signs, variations in the 
size of the coefficients are also reasonable and mod-
est. To summarise, the panel estimations of sectoral 
growth drivers reveal the following stylised facts:
Catching  up:  The  initial  level  of  labour  productiv-
ity has a negative impact on the average growth of 
value added, as well as on labour and multifactor 
productivity. This reflects the well-known principle of 
diminishing returns and implies that growth oppor-
tunities are higher, the further an industry is away 
from the technological frontier.
Innovation and technological change: The estimations 
show a strong positive but not necessarily linear rela-
tionship between an industry’s innovation intensity 
and any one of the three measures of growth. In par-
ticular, the group of sectors characterised by a very 
high  innovation  intensity  consistently  outperforms 
the  others.  This  group  comprises  sectors  such  as 
computers, other machinery, electrical equipment, 
computer services and the R&D sector. In contrast, 
sectors characterised by a low innovation intensity 
(e.g.,  food  products,  electricity  supply,  and  insur-
ance) often perform worse than those classified in 
the group with a very low innovation intensity (e.g. 
land and water transport), particularly with respect 
to value added and labour productivity growth. This 
indicates  that  the  sectors  with  the  lowest  innova-
tion  intensity  exploit  opportunities  from  sources 
other than technological innovation to expand their 
demand and output.
Accumulation  of  productive  resources:  Gross  fixed 
capital  formation  is  maybe  the  most  important 
and robust growth driver for both value added and 
labour productivity. While the positive coefficient of 
the average capital income share demonstrates this 
to be true in the long run, the positive effect of the 
change in capital income points to a positive short-
run effect as well. However, it is not only the total 
quantity  of  capital  inputs  which  matters,  but  also 
their composition. More specifically, the share of ICT 
capital proves to be an additional, significant sectoral 
growth driver. With respect to human resources, the 
employment of high-skilled labour also contributes 
positively to sectoral growth in terms of value added 
and labour productivity.
Competition: Testing for a number of variables relat-
ing to the nature and intensity of competition shows 
that the employment-weighted turnover of firms has 
a positive impact on the growth of value added and 
labour productivity. This points to the positive impe-
tus of ‘creative destruction’ and continued rejuvena-
tion of an industry’s firm population. This is consist-
ent with the observation that a large share of very 
small firms (with fewer than 10 employees) has been 
conducive to value added growth during the period 
in  question.  However,  the  relationship  between 
sector  growth  and  firm  size  is  more  complex,  as 
the share of small firms with 10 to 49 employees 
appears to have a negative impact on value added. 
Furthermore, a higher average firm size generally has 
a positive effect on labour and multifactor produc-
tivity growth. Similarly, the coefficients for the HH 
concentration index vary with the chosen indicator 
of sectoral performance. It has a negative impact on 
the growth of value added and multifactor produc-
tivity, but a positive impact on labour productivity 
growth. Finally, our indicators for both export and 
import openness consistently have a positive coeffi-
cient in each of the regressions, confirming the posi-
tive impact of an industry’s presence on competitive 
international markets, as well as the growth impetus 
from increased competition through imports.
6.9.  Summary and conclusions
Differences in demand, technology or the concen-
tration of suppliers define the particular market envi-
ronment in which enterprises compete. While mac-
roeconomic conditions and the relative abundance 
of  production  inputs  shape  the  general  business 
environment, industries also differ in their sensitivity 
to these factors. As a consequence, enterprise and 
industrial  policies  must  be  founded  on  an  under-
standing of the determinants of economic perform-
ance at the sectoral level, if they are to foster growth 
and development in the economy at large. Peneder 
(2008) investigates the major determinants, patterns 
and trends in European competitiveness from a dis-
tinctly sectoral perspective. For this brief summary 
of the main findings, we return to the four guiding 
questions posed in the introduction.
I. What are the general economic rationales and what 
presumptions are made with respect to sectoral growth 
drivers? We summarised the basic rationales in the 
introduction to this chapter. In particular, we focused 
on five different dimensions of sectoral growth driv-
ers for the following reasons:147
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First, macroeconomic conditions affect sectoral growth 
and performance by defining the environment within 
which  companies  and  industries  operate.  Among 
the relevant factors, we considered, e.g., aggregate 
fluctuations in GDP, interest rates, exchange rates, 
government spending, corporate tax rates, and the 
change in relative prices.
Second,  demand  guides  the  allocation  of  scarce 
resources among competing uses. In this chapter, it 
is decomposed into consumer expenditures, invest-
ment spending, government spending, net exports 
and the demand for intermediary inputs.
Third, R&D and innovation is the key driver behind 
changes in the production function (or, more gen-
erally,  the  value-creation  function).  In  economies 
characterised by high per capita income, innovation 
provides the main route for getting away from pure 
price competition.
Fourth,  market  structure  determines  the  kind  and 
degree of competition in the industry, which exerts 
an impact on consumer welfare and selection among 
heterogeneous suppliers. By lowering prices in the 
short run, and rewarding cost-discipline and innova-
tion over the long run, keeping markets competitive 
has a positive effect on the growth of productivity 
and value added.
Finally, openness and low barriers to trade not only 
raise  global  competition  in  an  industry,  but  also 
increase accessible sales areas and ease transactions 
with international partners, thus fostering gains from 
specialisation and the diffusion of knowledge.
II. To what extent do these growth drivers live up to 
expectations and prove to have a statistically signifi-
cant impact? In brief, the econometric estimations 
showed each of the five categories to be a significant 
driver of sectoral growth:
The first two sections tested the impact of macro- 
and  demand-side  factors  by  estimating  analogous 
macro  regression  models  for  each  industry.  For 
example, relative prices proved to be a consistent 
force,  dampening  growth  in  sectors  where  prices 
rise faster than in other industries. Not surprisingly, 
fluctuations in aggregate demand affect sector out-
puts accordingly. In the majority of sectors, higher 
long-term interest rates, exchange rates and implied 
tax rates, as well as large government deficits, are 
significant barriers to growth.
The final section produced a set of integrated panel 
estimations for the sector-specific drivers of growth. 
Here, the regressions provide evidence of a robust, 
positive  but  not  necessarily  linear  relationship 
between  innovation  intensity  and  growth.  While 
sectors with a high innovation intensity consistently 
outperform the others, the findings also indicate that 
sectors with the lowest innovation intensity manage 
to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities other than 
technological innovation. In addition, they demon-
strate a significant positive impact from the accumu-
lation of productive resources, especially ICT capital 
and educated labour, and from effective competition, 
as indicated by e.g. a high turnover rate for firms, a 
high degree of openness to international trade, and 
in general a low degree of firm concentration156.
III. Do the sectoral growth drivers have similar impacts 
on  different  industries  or  are  some  industries  more 
responsive than others? The study provides ample evi-
dence of the differential impact of sectoral growth 
drivers:
An estimation of the macro models by sector confirms 
that industries differ in their sensitivity to variations 
in the general business environment. For example, 
while the majority of industries fluctuates with the 
overall economy, the most responsive industries are 
those that depend on discretionary consumer spend-
ing  (e.g.  audio-visual  apparatus,  motor  vehicles, 
air- and water transport), while industries with little 
sensitivity to aggregate GDP often supply necessities 
(e.g. food & beverages, refined petrol, or electric-
ity, gas and water). Real exchange rates and fiscal 
variables are more important to the manufacturing 
industries, apparently due to their higher exposure 
to trade, need for capital investment, and access to 
government subsidies. Finally, the estimations show 
that exports and intermediate demand are the most 
significant  sources  of  demand  for  manufacturing, 
while consumption expenditure is most important 
to the services sectors.
The sections on sector-specific growth drivers pro-
vided  even  more  evidence  of  differences  between 
industries. Table 12 summarises the relative impor-
tance  of  selected  growth  drivers  by  sectors  on  a 
five-part scale, ranging from “1 = very high” to “5 = 
very low”. This score is calculated as the average of 
the quintiles in the ranking of industries within each 
country,  wherever  that  variable  was  available.  For 
instance, a score of “1” indicates that in the compari-
son of industries within a country this growth driver 
is on average ranked within the first quintile (i.e. the 
upper 20 per cent of the distribution). Conversely, a 
score of “5” means it belongs to the fifth quintile (i.e. 
the 20 per cent of industries with the lowest value 
reported for that indicator).
–   To  give  some  examples,  sectors  such  as  refined 
petroleum, chemicals, electricity, gas, and water 
156   Except for the regressions on labour productivity growth, where supplier 
concentration appeared to exert a positive impact. This is in contrast with the 
negative impacts of supplier concentration on the growth of value added and 
multifactor productivity.151
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supply stand out due to their high dependence on 
physical capital in general (measured by the share 
of capital in total factor income), whereas other 
sectors, such as telecommunications, financial serv-
ices, or business services do so with respect to ICT 
capital. Similarly, the demand for educated labour 
differs among sectors, with business services and 
financial intermediation having most pronounced 
shares for high-skilled labour.
–   Another important difference between sectors is the 
rate of firm turnover, which indicates the dynam-
ics of creative destruction in an industry and tends 
to decrease with the size of average sunk costs. 
Examples  of  industries  with  very  high  (employ-
ment-weighted) firm turnover are the construction 
sector, wholesale and retail trade, as well as hotels 
and restaurants. As regards the net entry of firms, 
computer & related services as well as other busi-
ness services achieve the highest scores.
–   The Herfindahl index of firm concentration is high-
est in sectors such as computers and office machin-
ery, audio-visual apparatus, air transport, or post 
and  telecommunications.  While  the  two  former 
examples are characterised by large sunk costs due 
to R&D and/or branding, the two latter examples 
are  network  industries  with  a  considerable  capi-
tal intensity. Similarly, average firm size is highest 
among producers of transport equipment, in the 
electricity, gas and water supply as well as in post 
and telecommunications.
IV. How do the sectoral growth drivers of EU-15 indus-
tries  compare  to  those  in  the  New  Member  States 
(NMS) or the US? The limited availability of disaggre-
gated data does not always allow for comparisons. 
Nevertheless the analysis revealed some noteworthy 
differences:
–   For instance, in the NMS, sectors appear to be more 
sensitive to the movement in relative prices than 
in the EU-15, which indicates a stronger depend-
ence on the price determinants of competitiveness. 
Investment,  exports  and  government  expendi-
tures play a similar role among the components of 
demand in both country groups, whereas import 
competition far more frequently exerts a significant 
impact on sectoral growth in the NMS. Conversely, 
consumption  and  intermediate  goods  are  more 
significant  growth  drivers  in  the  EU-15.  Finally, 
with respect to trade openness, office machinery 
and computers showed high levels of import pen-
etration in all countries. Radio, TV and communica-
tions, and to a somewhat lesser extent leather and 
footwear, appear to be industries where domes-
tic demand is largely met by imports. Individual 
country characteristics are also evident, as other 
transportation equipment, machinery, and motor 
vehicles have high import penetration indicators 
for 2004 in the NMS6. Meanwhile, scientific instru-
ments and clothing have high levels in the EU16.
–   In the US, sectoral price elasticities appear to be 
higher than in the EU-15, suggesting more com-
petitive markets, and maybe a less differentiated 
supply  of  goods  and  services.  Conversely,  real 
exchange rates and implied tax rates matter less in 
the US, since the exposure to trade and probably 
also to tax competition within the domestic eco-
nomic area is lower. Similarly, domestic consump-
tion is a more important demand component in 
the US than in the EU. US growth in ICT capital is 
generally higher than in the EU10, and was partic-
ularly marked in the second half of the 1990s. The 
US also dominates the EU in terms of high-skilled 
labour, currently employing on average twice as 
many graduates as the EU10 in most industries. 
Furthermore, R&D intensity is greater in the US, 
although the returns on R&D appear to be com-
parable across the two regions. What we do see in 
the EU however, is an increase in R&D intensity in 
chemicals and computer-related industries, which 
is consistent with trends observed in other inputs, 
such as ICT capital investment and skilled labour.
Overall, the detailed empirical facts presented in this 
chapter substantiate the case in favour of the new 
industrial policy approach. This approach is based 
upon a horizontal view, which clarifies the determi-
nants of the general framework conditions and their 
differential impact on specific sectors.157 The aim is 
to adjust and fine-tune sector-level framework con-
ditions by strengthening and increasing capabilities 
and productive resources as well as by safeguarding 
market  structures  conducive  to  effective  competi-
tion.
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D. Statistical annex
7.  Sectoral competitiveness 
indicators
Explanatory notes
Geographical coverage: all indicators refer to EU-27
Production index: The production index is actually 
an index of final production in volume terms.
Labour productivity: this indicator is calculated by 
combining the indexes of production and number 
of persons employed. Therefore, this indicator meas-
ures final production per person.
Unit Labour Cost: it is calculated from the produc-
tion index and the index of wages and salaries and 
measures labour cost per unit of production. “Wages 
and salaries” is defined (Eurostat) as “the total remu-
neration, in cash or in kind, payable to all persons 
counted on the payroll (including homeworkers), in 
return for work done during the accounting period, 
regardless of whether it is paid on the basis of work-
ing time, output or piecework and whether it is paid 
regularly  wages  and  salaries  do  not  include  social 
contributions payable by the employer”.
Relative  Trade  Balance:  it  is  calculated,  for  sector 
“i”, as (Xi-Mi)/(Xi+Mi), where Xi and Mi are EU-27 
exports and imports of products of sector “i” to and 
from the rest of the World.
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA): For sector 
“i” it is defined as follows:
=
∑
∑
EU,i
EU,i
i
i
W,i
W,i
i
X
X
RCA
X
X
where:
X = exports
i = sector
W = World
Statistical nomenclatures: the indicators in tables 7.1 
to 7.6 are presented at the level of divisions of the sta-
tistical classification of economic activities in the Euro-
pean Community (NACE Rev.1), while those in tables 
7.7 and 7.8 are presented in terms of divisions of the 
statistical classification of products by activity (CPA).
Data sources: tables 7.1 to 7.6 are based on Euro-
stat’s short-term indicators data. Tables 7.7 and 7.8 
are based on United Nations’ COMTRADE and Euro-
stat’s COMEXT databases.158
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8.  Microeconomic data 
country fiches
The country fiches present the performance of each 
Member  State  in  the  policy  areas  covered  by  the 
microeconomic pillar of the Strategy for Growth and 
Jobs (the Lisbon agenda). The EU average is given as 
a benchmark. It should be noticed that the openness 
indicator at EU level refers to extra-EU trade, while 
the openness indicators at country level refer to total 
external trade (so intra-plus extra-EU trade), implying 
that the bars representing the relative openness of 
the Member States should be interpreted with cau-
tion. Providing a common framework for all Mem-
ber States, the integrated guidelines for growth and 
jobs specify the overarching objectives to be pursued 
in each policy area. The main policies constituting 
the microeconomic pillar (guidelines 7 to 16) are: 
Research,  Innovation,  encouraging  investments  in 
ICT, Industry, Internal Market, Competition, encour-
aging the sustainable use of resources and the syner-
gies between environmental protection and growth, 
creating  a  more  attractive  business  environment, 
promoting  entrepreneurship  and  expanding  infra-
structure. The link of these policies with competitive-
ness – taken here as the “capacity to grow” - is well 
established (for example, see Competitiveness Report 
2007 for a review of empirical evidence). Higher pro-
ductivity growth is the main channel through which 
these policies improve competitiveness. In this con-
text, the country fiches give a snapshot picture of the 
competitiveness profile of the Member States.
The source and a short description of the indicators 
used in the country fiches are presented at the end 
of the document. The reader wishing a more com-
plete picture may refer to the Structural Indicators 
database of EUROSTAT. An Internet link is provided 
to sources other than EUROSTAT.167
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Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Bulgaria
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Denmark
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Finland 
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
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Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
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Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
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Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
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Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
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Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
EU average = 100
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
IG nº7
R & D
IG nº8
Innovation
IG nº9
ICT
IG nº10
Industrial policy
IG nº12
Internal market
IG nº13
Competition
IG nº11
Environment
IG nº15
Entrepreneurship
& SMEs
IG nº16
Energy &
Infrastructure
IG nº14
Business environment
425.7
Slovenia
02 55 07 5 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD, % GDP, 2005)
Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD, % GDP, 2004)
Science & technology graduates (‰ 20-29 years population, 2005)
Venture capital investments - early stage (2005, % GDP)
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP, 2005)
High-tech exports (as share of total exports, 2004)
Transposition deficit of Internal Market rules (% of total nr of 1620 IM
directives, as at 10/5/2007)
Number of open infringement cases brought in front of the Court of
Justice (as at 10/5/2007)
Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
Share of electricity from renewable energy to gross el. consumption (2005)
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market (2005)
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: long
distance calls (2005)
Price of telecommunications: national (€/10’ call, 2006)
Electricity prices - industrial users (2007, €/kWh)
Gas prices - industrial users (2007, €/GJ)
High value = FAVOURABLE High value = UNFAVOURABLE
EU average = 100
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Total expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % GDP, 2006
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) % of GDP, 2006
Science and technology graduates (tertiary graduates per 1000 of 20-29
yrs population), 2006
Summary Innovation Index, 2007
Total ICT (IT + Telecom) expenditure (% GDP), 2006
Broadband penetration rate (nr of lines / 100 inhabitants), 2007
High-tech exports (as share of total exports), 2006
Transposition deficit of 1687 IM directives in %, as at 13/5/2008
Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
taxes (EU27=100), 2007
Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
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Austria
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Comparative price levels, including indirect taxes (2006, EU-25=100) -
provisional data
Total State aid (2005, % GDP)
Sectoral and ad hoc State aid (2005, % GDP)
e-Government usage by enterprises (%, 2006)
Overall Product Market Regulation indicator (2003)
Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
Starting a Business - Time (days) - 2006
Starting a Business - Cost (% of income per capita) - 2006
Total greenhouse gas emissions (2004, CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual
base year = 100)
Energy intensity of the economy (2005, kgoe/1000 € GDP at 1995 prices)
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Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
Energy intensity of the economy, 2006
Electricity generated from renewable sources (% gross elec.
Consumption), 2006
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market - as % of the
total generation, 2006
Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecommunications: nat'l long
distance calls, 2005
Price of telecommunications: local calls ( /10`call), 2006
Electricity prices for industry - Ie (Euro per kWh), 2007
Gas prices for industry - I3-1 (Euro per Gigajoule), 2007
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Difficulty of Firing Index (2006)
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Comparative price levels, final private households' consumption incl. indir.
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Openness of the economy (exports + imports of goods and services as %
of GDP), 2006
Total State aid - Percentage of GDP, 2006
e-Government usage by enterprises (%), 2007
Dealing with Licenses - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
DG ENTR index for Administrative Burden Reduction (0=worst / 10=max),
2007
Starting a Business - Reported time (minimum in days), 2008
Starting a Business - Procedures (number), 2007-2008
Venture capital investments - early stage (% GDP), 2007
Total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalents, Kyoto actual base year
= 100), 2006
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Information on the indicators:
–   Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD), and
–   Business sector R&D expenditure
Source: EUROSTAT. Both are expressed in a percent-
age of GDP. R&D is defined according to the Frascati 
Manual
–   Tertiary graduates in Science and Technology
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: The indicator 
includes new tertiary graduates in a calendar year 
from both public and private institutions completing 
graduate and post graduate studies compared to an 
age group that corresponds to the typical gradua-
tion age in most countries. It does not correspond 
to the number of graduates in these fields who are 
available in the labour market in this specific year. 
The levels and fields of education and training used 
follow the 1997 version of the International Stand-
ard  Classification  of  Education  (ISCED97)  and  the 
Eurostat Manual of fields of education and training 
(1999). Expressed as per 1000 of population aged 
20-29 years.
–   Summary Innovation Index (SII)
Source:  European  Innovation  Scoreboard.  Short 
Description: The SII is a composite indicator summa-
rising the various indicators of the European Innova-
tion Scoreboard. It gives an ‘at a glance’ overview 
of aggregate national innovation performance. More 
information can be obtained at:
http://www.proinno-europe.eu/admin/uploaded_doc-
uments/European_Innovation_Scoreboard_2007.pdf
–   ICT expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: Annual data 
on expenditure for IT and telecommunication hard-
ware, equipment, software and other services as a 
percentage of GDP.
–   Broadband penetration rate
Source:  EUROSTAT.  Short  Description:  The  broad-
band penetration rate describes the number of dedi-
cated, high-speed connections per 100 inhabitants. 
This indicator shows how widely broadband access 
to the internet has spread in the countries on the 
general level, not specifying by user group. Broad-
band lines are defined as those with a capacity equal 
or higher than 144 Kbits/s. Various technologies are 
covered; ADSL, cable modem as well as other types 
of access lines.
–   High-tech exports
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: This indicator 
is calculated as share of exports of all high technology 
products of total exports. High Technology products 
are defined as the sum of the following products: 
Aerospace, computers, office machinery, electronics, 
instruments,  pharmaceuticals,  electrical  machinery 
and armament. The total exports for the EU do not 
include the intra-EU trade.
–   Member State transposition deficit
Source:  European  Commission,  Internal  Market 
Scoreboard.  Short  description:  the  percentage  of 
Internal Market Directives for which the implemen-
tation deadline has passed are not currently written 
into national law. More information can be found 
in:  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/score/index_
en.htm
–   Comparative price levels
Source: EUROSTAT. Short description: the ratio com-
pares the price levels of final consumption by private 
households including indirect taxes of each Member 
State to the EU average (EU-27=100). Comparative 
price levels are the ratio between Purchasing power 
parities (PPPs) and market exchange rate for each 
country.  PPPs  are  currency  conversion  rates  that 
convert economic indicators expressed in national 
currencies to a common currency, called Purchas-
ing Power Standard (PPS), which equalises the pur-
chasing power of different national currencies and 
thus allows meaningful comparison. If the index of 
the comparative price levels shown for a country is 
higher/ lower than 100, the country concerned is 
relatively expensive/cheap as compared with the EU 
average.
–   Openness of the economy
Source: EUROSTAT data, DG ENTR calculation. Short 
description: it expresses the sum of external trade of 
goods and services of each country as % of GDP).
–   State aid
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: The numerator 
is the sum of all State aid granted to specific sectors 
(agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, coal, transport 
except railways and other services), State aid given 
on an ad-hoc basis to individual companies e.g., for 
rescue and restructuring, and State aid for horizontal 
objectives such as research and development, safe-
guarding the environment, energy saving, support 
to  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  employ-
ment creation, the promotion of training and aid for 
regional development. The denominator is GDP.195
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–   e-Government usage by enterprises
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: Percentage of 
enterprises using the internet to interact with public 
authorities (i.e. having used the Internet for one or 
more of the following activities: obtaining informa-
tion,  downloading  forms,  filling-in  web-forms,  full 
electronic case handling).
–   Dealing with Licenses – number of procedures
Source: World Bank, Doing Business project. Short 
description: the World Bank Doing Business project 
provides objective measures of business regulations 
and their enforcement so as to make their business 
environment  comparable.  This  particular  indicator 
records all procedures necessary to build a standard-
ised warehouse. These procedures include submitting 
all relevant project-specific documents (for example, 
building  plans  and  site  maps)  to  the  authorities; 
obtaining all necessary clearances, licenses, permits 
and  certificates;  completing  all  required  notifica-
tions; and receiving all necessary inspections. Doing 
Business  also  records  procedures  for  obtaining  all 
utility connections. Proce  dures necessary to register 
the property so that it can be used as collateral or 
transferred are also counted. More information can 
be obtained from: http://www.doingbusiness.org/
–   Index of Administrative burden reduction
Source: DG ENTR. Short description: In March 2007 
the Spring European Council agreed that admin bur-
dens arising from EU legislation should be reduced 
by 25% by 2012 and invited Member States to set 
their own national targets of comparable ambition 
within their spheres of competence by 2008. The 
Index of Administrative burden reduction is based 
on a codified assessment of Member States’ policies 
in this area and following a number of criteria such 
as the status of the policy (explicit policy, strategy, 
Action plan…), the existence of a dedicated struc-
ture for carrying out the policy, the methodology 
applied, the use of targets etc.
–   Starting a business - number of days
Source:  DG  ENTR.  Short  description:  the  data  are 
obtained through the network of National Start-up 
Coordinators.  According  to  the  Spring  European 
Council conclusions 2006 , Member States should 
establish, by 2007, a one-stop-shop, or arrangements 
with equivalent effect, for setting up a company in 
a quick and simple way. Member States should take 
adequate measures to considerably reduce the aver-
age time for setting up a business, especially an SME, 
with the objective of being able to do this within one 
week anywhere in the EU by the end of 2007. Start-
up fees should be as low as possible.
–   Staring a business – number of procedures
Source: World Bank, Doing Business project. Short 
description:  Doing  Business  (see  above)  records  all 
procedures that are officially required for an entre-
preneur to start up and formally operate an industrial 
or commercial business. These include obtaining all 
necessary licenses and permits and completing any 
required notifications, verifications or inscriptions for 
the company and employees with relevant authori-
ties.
–   Venture capital investments –early stage
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: Venture cap-
ital investment is defined as private equity raised 
for  investment  in  companies;  management  buy-
outs,  management  buy-ins  and  venture  purchase 
of  quoted  shares  are  excluded.  Data  are  broken 
down into two investment stages: Early stage (seed 
+ start-up) and expansion and replacement (expan-
sion  and  replacement  capital).  Here,  only  early 
stage investments are considered, as a percentage 
of GDP.
–   Total greenhouse gas emissions
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: Emissions of 
the 6 greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Proto-
col are weighted by their global warming potentials 
(GWPs) and aggregated to give total emissions in 
CO2 equivalents. The total emissions are presented 
as  indices,  with  the  base  year  =  100.  In  general, 
the base year is 1990 for the non-fluorinated gases 
(CO2, CH4 and N2O), and 1995 for the fluorinated 
gases (HFC, PFC and SF6). Data exclude emissions 
and removals due to land use change and forestry 
(LUCF).
–   Energy intensity of the economy
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: This indicator 
is the ratio between the gross inland consumption 
of energy and the gross domestic product (GDP) for 
a given calendar year. It measures the energy con-
sumption of an economy and its overall energy effi-
ciency. The gross inland consumption of energy is 
calculated as the sum of the gross inland consump-
tion of five energy types: coal, electricity, oil, natural 
gas and renewable energy sources. The GDP figures 
are taken at constant prices to avoid the impact of 
the inflation, base year 1995 (ESA95). The energy 
intensity ratio is determined by dividing the gross 
inland consumption by the GDP. Since gross inland 
consumption is measured in kgoe (kilogram of oil 
equivalent) and GDP in 1 000 EUR, this ratio is meas-
ured in kgoe per 1 000 EUR.196
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–   Electricity generated from renewable sources
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: This indi-
cator  represents  the  electricity  produced  from 
renewable  energy  sources  as  a  percentage  of 
gross electricity consumption for a given calen-
dar year. It measures the contribution of electric-
ity produced from renewable energy sources to 
the  national  electricity  consumption.  Electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources com-
prises the electricity generation from hydro plants 
(excluding  pumping),  wind,  solar,  geother-
mal  and  electricity  from  biomass/wastes.  Gross 
national  electricity  consumption  comprises  the 
total gross national electricity generation from all 
fuels (including auto-production), plus electricity 
imports, minus exports.
–   Market  share  of  the  largest  generator  in  the 
electricity market - Percentage of the total gen-
eration
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: The indica-
tor shows the market share of the largest electric-
ity generator in each country. To calculate this 
indicator, the total net electricity production dur-
ing each reference year is taken into account. It 
means that the electricity used by generators for 
their own consumption is not taken into account. 
Then, the net production of each generator dur-
ing the same year is considered in order to calcu-
late the corresponding market shares. Only the 
largest market share is reported under this indica-
tor.
–   Market share of the incumbent in fixed telecom-
munications –long distance calls - Percentage of 
the total market
Source:  EUROSTAT.  Short  Description:  The  incum-
bent is defined as the enterprise active on the market 
just before liberalisation. The market share is calcu-
lated as the share of the incumbent’s retail revenues 
of the total market. A national long distance call is a 
call from one local network to another.
–   Price  of  telecommunications  -  Euro  per  10  min 
local call
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: The indicator 
gives the price in Euro of a 10 minute call at 11 am 
on a weekday (including VAT) for a local call (3km). 
The prices refer to August each year. Normal tariffs 
without special rates are used.
–   Electricity prices for industry - Euro per kWh
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: This indicator 
presents electricity prices charged to final industrial 
consumers. Electricity prices are defined as price in 
Euro per kWh without taxes applicable on 1 January 
each year for annual consumption of 2 000 MWh 
(maximum demand of 500 kW and annual load of 
4 000 hours).
–   Gas prices for industry - Euro per Gigajoule
Source:  EUROSTAT.  Short  Description:  This  indica-
tor presents the natural gas prices charged to final 
industrial consumers. Gas prices defined as price in 
Euro per GJ without taxes applicable on 1 January 
each year for annual consumption of 41 860 GJ (200 
days load factor).197
E. List of background studies to the 
European Competitiveness Report 2008
Some parts of the European Competitiveness Report 
2008 are based on, or use, material prepared by a 
consortium led by WIFO, the Austrian Institute for 
Economic Research in Vienna:
Chapter 1 – “Key facts about competitiveness in the 
EU” is partly based on material presented in “Sec-
toral  Growth  Drivers”  coordinated  and  edited  by 
Michael Peneder from WIFO, and the study “What 
drives income differentials, underutilisation of labour 
and economic growth in Europe? A detailed GDP 
accounting exercise” by Gilles Mourre (2008). Domi-
nique Simonis, Gilles Mourre, and Tassos Belessiotis 
provided helpful comments on this chapter.
Chapter 2 – “Openness and productivity” is based 
on the report “Trade costs, openness and productiv-
ity: market access at home and abroad” (2008), by 
Arjan Lejour, Hugo Rojas-Romagosa from CPB, and 
Victor  Rodriguez,  Carlos  Montalvo,  and  Frans  van 
der Zee from TNO.
Chapter 3 – “The economics of entrepreneurial 
activity and SMEs: policy implications for the EU” 
is  based  on  “The  economics  of  entrepreneurial 
activity and SMEs: policy implications for the EU” 
by  Werner  Hölz,  Michael  Peneder,  Maria  Silva-
Porto from WIFO, and Rob van der Horst, Jenni-
fer Telussa from EIM Business & Policy Research, 
(2008). Helpful comments and suggestions from 
Roy  Thurik  and  Andre  van  Stel  are  gratefully 
acknowledged.
Chapter 5 – “Overview of the Links between CSR 
and Competitiveness” uses material from “Review of 
Litrature on the Links between CSR and Competitive-
ness” by Ulrich Oberndorfer from Centre for Euro-
pean Economic Research (ZEW) (2008).
Chapter  6  –  “Determinants  of  Sectoral  Perform-
ance” uses material from “Sectoral Growth Drivers” 
coordinated  and  edited  by  Michael  Peneder  from 
WIFO (2008).European Commission
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